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ABSTRACT 
The list serves: the apparatuses of security and governmentality 
Kenneth C. Werbin, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2008 
Inspired by taxonomist Jack Goody's theorizing of 'ancient lists' as 'intellectual 
technologies,' this research analyzes listing practices in modern and contemporary 
formations of power, and how they operate in the installation and securing of the 
uncertain political economic milieus of circulation that characterize Michel Foucault's 
conception of governmentality. Propelling the list's critical operations in the delimitation 
and policing of 'threatening' movements from out of modern history, and into a 
contemporary analysis of power, this research demonstrates how the correlation of 
computer, statistical, and list technologies and techniques first installed under the Nazi 
regime, continues to factor significantly in the segmenting and constitution of a most 
critical classification of contemporary homo sapiens: the terrorist class, or homo sacer. 
Indeed, in this analysis of how lists serve formations of power, Foucault's populations 
and milieus of circulation installed through the apparatuses of security are reconciled 
with Giorgio Agamben's theorizing of 'bare life' as the fundamental political unit of 
modern and contemporary sovereignty. Investigating how lists served the emergence of 
modern computers, and continue to correlate power/knowledge in contemporary 
assemblages like no-fly lists; as well as in a series of increasingly pervasive and 
ubiquitous watch-list conjunctures, this research characterizes the technoscientific 
cultural construction of the contemporary terrorist as a critical function of no-blank list 
culture. In this way, it is argued here that the list is not simply an innocuous tool of 
everyday life for administering the minutiae of mundane existence, but rather, operates as 
a security technology of contemporary governmentality—a critical support of juridical-
disciplinary mechanisms and assemblages of police—with the dual role and double 
integration effect of self-elaborating and securing the classes of 'factual' knowledge it 
itself calls into 'truthful' reality. 
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THE LIST SERVES: THE APPARATUSES OF SECURITY AND 
GOVERNMENTALITY 
Introduction: In lists we are... 
In short, the point of view adopted in all these studies involved the attempt to free 
relations of power from the institution, in order to analyze them from the point of 
view of technologies; to distinguish them also from the function, so as to take 
them up within a strategic analysis; and to detach them from the privilege of the 
object, so as to resituate them within the perspective of the constitution of fields, 
domains, and objects of knowledge (Foucault 2007c, p.l 18). 
'The list' serves. Indeed, the list serves the all-encompassing work of classifying 
and developing all fields, domains, and objects of knowledge as related to all living 
beings, things, and events. Equally, since ancient times, the list has served an 
instrumental role in managing security, territory, and population, albeit in a series of 
radically different political power/knowledge formations, and in a variety of roles. The 
list is a technology that serves the administration, organization, management, policing, 
and circulation of things and populations, as well as the development of knowledge, and 
in this way, the list is a political technology that has served, and continues to serve 
different formations of power, or governmentality. 
From ancient administrative lists that logged the kings' reigns and served as the 
basis for early history, to contemporary apparatuses of security that list 'predicted 
terrorist threats' boarding planes; from early lists of prohibitions, rules, and laws like the 
Ten Commandments, to censuses and their attendant analyses of populations; from the 
Nazis' lists of Jews and threats to the Volk1 to McCarthy's blacklists of communist 
threats; from ancient lexicons scrawled on scrolls, to the emergence of cybernetics and 
1
 German for 'people.' "Volk" From The Concise Oxford-Duden German Dictionary. Ed. Michael Clark 
and Olaf Thyen. Oxford University Press, 2004. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. 
Concordia University Library, Montreal. 31 January 2008 
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computers; from lists underpinning classification and naming systems in 'natural history,' 
to lists pivoting global classification infrastructures and flows of populations across the 
world; from no-fly lists, to no-fill-in-the-blank list culture—the list is a simple, yet highly 
powerful critical support technology of modern and contemporary forms of government 
that somehow has received very little attention from scholars. Moreover, the combination 
of its historical, cultural, and contemporary dimensions also makes the list apolitical 
technology that serves juridical-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and 
apparatuses of security, playing a pivotal instrumental role in what Michel Foucault 
(2007a) has called "governmentality.'" 
So, since there has to be an imperative, I would like the one underpinning the 
theoretical analysis we are attempting to be quite simply a conditional one: If you 
want to struggle, here are some key points, here are some lines of force, here are 
some constrictions and blockages. In other words, I would like these imperatives 
to be no more than practical pointers. Of course, it is up to me, and those working 
in the same direction, to know on what fields of real forces we need to get our 
bearings in order to make a tactical effective analysis. But this is after all the 
circle of struggle and truth, that is to say, precisely of philosophical practice 
(Foucault 2007d, p.3). 
Drawing on the lines of force, constrictions and blockages Foucault (Foucault, 
Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991; Foucault and Faubion 2000a; Foucault, Senellart, and 
Davidson 2007) articulates for struggle around contemporary apparatuses {dispositifs) of 
security and governmentality in his seminal lecture series at the College de France in 
1977-1978 on Security, Territory, Population, and through the examination of two events 
in modern governmentality, and two events in contemporary governmentality, this 
research explores how lists are political technologies—fields of real forces—that have 
served and continue to serve formations of power. 
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The first event explored in this research is the emergence of what this work calls 
'Nazi Governmentality' in chapter 1: a modern event wherein juridical-legal and 
disciplinary mechanisms underpinned by list technologies were redeployed in a milieu of 
circulation (security) that privileged pseudo-scientific articulations of biology and 
taxonomy in the establishment of caesuric fractures between 'normal' and 'abnormal' 
populations. Herein we will see how this modern society installed an apparatus of 
security that interwove calculation, probability, population, and risk assessment—the 
techniques of statistics—with a natural history 'truthfully' articulated through eugenics 
and Nazi race theory, which sought to classify and normalize all people, things, and 
knowledge to the biological body of the German people, the Volk. This chapter argues 
that crucial to the installation of this apparatus of security—this art of governmentality— 
was the critical support technology of lists; not only a way of seeing and doing law, 
discipline, circulation, and security under the Third Reich, but also a way of 
operationalizing the fracture of threatening populations from general populations in the 
constitution of regimes of truth about the battles between 'us' and 'them.' In this way, 
chapter 1 explores how "The list served: Nazi governmentality." 
Overlapping in time with the first event is the second, chapter 2, how "The list 
serves: entropy and governmentality," which traces the birth of modern computer 
technologies and their attendant cybernetic, game, and system theories in the 1940s and 
1950s, and how this event came to install global milieus of circulation characterized by 
the physical law of entropy. This chapter argues that in these entropic milieus we would 
come to see ourselves, and our societies as technoscientific cultural constructions of 
cyborg elements and populations, circulating in disordered and ever-expanding 
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environments, where the boundaries between people, objects, and knowledge are 
completely eviscerated. In this way, while the emergence of modern computers ushered 
in awe-inspiring developments, it also served to increasingly isolate cyborgs in global 
classification infrastructures, subjecting them to evermore pervasive and ubiquitous 
delimitation, policing, and listing. 
In the era of the Cold War, when myths relating to us vs. them were heightened, 
and ultimately transformed into epic global battles between communists and the free 
world, black and white classifications of opposing forces, and wars over meaning (like 
the current one on terror) began to appear as ongoing and never-ending, further 
necessitating the self-elaborating operations of assemblages of policing involving 
delimiting, predicting, and policing the movements of unknown threats through listing 
practices. As computers and statistics were increasingly deployed to comb ever-
expanding and ever-disordered—entropic—sets of social data for regularities and 
patterns of 'threatening' living beings and things since World War II, these self-
elaborating processes have produced the teleological effect of establishing natural and 
global good versus evil relationships, and the further need to redeploy lists to delimit and 
police the movement of threats. 
Moving onto a contemporary examination of the interweaving of juridical-legal 
mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and apparatuses of security hinged by list 
technologies is the third event of this research project, chapter 3, "Fear and No-Fly 
Listing in Canada," an interrogation of the emergence of contemporary no-fly lists, 
wherein Foucault's lines of force, blockages and constrictions are brought to bear on a 
examination of lists as technologies of security installed under contemporary 
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governmentality. This event is followed up with an event called "No-blank list culture, or 
how technoscience constructs the terrorist" chapter 4: an analysis of how the list 
apparatuses of security continue to grow, evolve, and expand outside any perceived 
territorial boundaries of aero-circulation, installing and normalizing the juridical-legal 
and disciplinary mechanisms of list technologies of security in more and more milieus of 
everyday circulation. 
Research terrain 
The list served: ancient times 
While there is little specific research into lists, let alone how they relate to people, 
things, and knowledge, an invaluable chapter called ' What's in a list?"1 by Jack Goody 
(1977) reveals that the majority of ancient writings were in fact constituted in lists, and 
further, that much of early social order and organization revolved around listing practices. 
In the only direct and substantive examination of lists as technologies that I have found 
on record, Goody explores lists as they relate to transformations from oral to literate 
societies, suggesting through a material analysis of ancient documents, that while lists 
pre-date literacy, they were radically transformed by writing and reading, ultimately 
contributing to their emergence as powerful 'technologies of the intellect' (p. 106). For 
Goody (1977), the 'power' associated with lists as 'technologies of the intellect,' and 
specifically to the development of knowledge in ancient societies, was a factor of the 
dual-role they played; wherein lists at once brought order through the clear delimitation 
of boundaries between things and/or people—visualizing classes—and at the same time, 
they brought contradiction, through the questions they raised regarding the veracity of the 
'classes' they constituted and called into existence. 
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In saying the list transforms (or at least embodies) the class, I mean that it 
establishes the necessity of a boundary, the necessity of a beginning and an end. 
In oral usage, there are few if any occasions when one is required to list 
vegetables or trees or fruit...But the question: is a tomato a fruit or a vegetable? Is 
the kind that would seem pointless in an oral context, but which may be essential 
to the advance of systematic knowledge about the classification and evolution of 
natural species. And it is this kind of question generated by written lists (Goody 
1977, p. 105). 
Using as his corpus ancient Sumerian, Mesopotamian and Assyrian writings, 
Goody argues through a taxonomic material analysis of the characteristics of these early 
writings that there were three kinds of lists in these ancient societies; each of which at 
once carved out clear categories of knowledge, and at the same time opened up questions 
about the truth and nature of the classes they constituted and represented. In this way, 
Goody's taxonomic dual-role understanding of lists as 'intellectual technologies' 
positions them as a source of ongoing friction between truth and falsity; on the one-hand 
cementing clearly delimited boundaries through the invocation of written classes, and on 
the other, calling into question the very lines in the sand they draw through the scanning 
and consideration of their contents. 
Indeed, this research argues that Goody's lists, understood as dual-role 
'intellectual technologies,' critical to both the administration and organization of people 
and things, and further 'to the classification and evolution of the natural species,' (p. 105) 
are assertions that bear out; and well beyond ancient Sumerian, Mesopotamian and 
Assyrian times, but also in the era where Foucault takes up his seminal 1977-1978 
lectures series on Security, Territory and Population: At the end of the Classical age, 
with its series of sovereign and disciplinary mechanisms; and onward, and into the era of 
'governmentality,' which takes shape in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, 
the 'intellectual technology' role that lists play continues to bear out through to modern 
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and contemporary political formations and their apparatuses of security. As we shall see, 
the list's dual-role intellectual function that Goody describes, is in fact, characteristic of 
all technologies of security; what Foucault (2007f) calls their 'double integration' (p.59) 
effects. 
But for now, what Goody (1977) gives this investigation into lists and the 
governance of people is an understanding of lists as critical technological supports of 
formations of power dating back to ancient times. And more instrumentally, he provides 
us with a taxonomy for the operations of lists as 'intellectual technologies' on three 
levels: (a) as retrospective tools of administration, (b) as administrative tools for 
managing the future, and finally, (c) as lexical repertoires enabling the development of 
knowledge through the contradictory operations of at once delimiting, and at the same 
time, posing questions as to the veracity of the classes they constitute. 'Retrospective 
lists' were "record[s] of outside events, roles, situations, persons, a typical early use of 
which would be the king-list. It is a kind of inventory of persons, objects or events" 
(Goody 1977, p.80). For Goody these administrative lists were used to store and sort data 
in the short and long term, and indeed, two-thirds of Goody's ancient corpus consisted of 
such written lists, which began to crystallize economic and legal problems in ancient 
society, interweaving people, things, and events in a manageable and viewable form. 
'Shopping lists' (p.81), for Goody, were those intended to administer the future, where 
items got checked off, mentally or physically, providing new levels of organization and 
complexity for ancient societies. Indeed, a recent news article from the BBC (British 
Broadcasting Corporation) with the headline and byline "300-year-old shopping list 
found: A Chinese shopping list thought to have been written 300 years ago has been 
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found stuffed inside an 18th Century vase in a York stately home," is evidence of how 
the list continued to serve this administrative, organizational and knowledge development 
role through the Classical age and in a range of literate societies . Finally, 'lexical lists', 
like those that would seek to classify the tomato as fruit or vegetable, provided an 
'inventory of concepts'; acting in ancient times as 'proto-dictionaries' and 'embryonic 
encyclopedias' (Goody 1977, p.80). 
Lexical lists were the least represented lists in Goody's ancient corpus, as 
characteristically they appeared only in educational situations. But at the same time, these 
least represented lists are crucial to the history of the development of knowledge in how 
they acted as 'abstractions,' 'de-contextualizations,' and 'conceptual prisons,' which 
'crystallized problems of classification' and 'led to increments of knowledge, to the 
organization of experience' (p.94). Goody (1977) argues that, "it was the keeping of such 
chronicles and the re-ordering of materials by means of visual inspection of the written 
word that permitted wider developments in the growth of human knowledge" (Goody 
1977, p.90). Indeed, for Goody, ancient administrative lists, like lists of the kings' reigns, 
were the incunabula for the development of 'event lists' (p.90), which ultimately played a 
significant role in the development of history: 
Lists were arranged in varying order, including chronological and were soon used 
for recording daily events or facts behind a given situation. Thus 'king-lists', year 
formulae and other data necessary to law became the basis of historical writing... 
Such records were of fundamental importance in enabling writers to draw out 
histories of particular sequences of events from the more general records, some of 
which accounts seem to have been used for composing the books of the Old 
Testament. Archives are a pre-requisite of history (Goody 1977, p.90-1). 
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The dual delimiting and knowledge development roles of Goody's overall 
conception of lists as 'intellectual technologies'—their double integration—that on the 
one hand establishes boundaries and encourages hierarchies, and on the other, leads to 
".. .questions about the nature of the classes through the very fact of placing items 
together" (Goody 1977, p. 102) is not only key to understanding lists as critical support 
technologies of formations of power/knowledge, but also to understanding literacy as a 
communication technology and cultural phenomenon. Indeed, Goody's work can be 
situated in a whole stream of research related to understanding the technologies of 
writing and reading as spaces of tension; epitomized in the work of Harold Innis (1991), 
James Carey (1989), and Walter Ong (1991). But where Goody's emphasis on the 
techniques of lists and how they operate as 'intellectual technologies' is productive in 
terms of generating a rough taxonomy for the operations of listing, it only offers a 
glimpse into how lists operate as political technologies of security in modern and 
contemporary formations of power, or more specifically governmentality. And it is 
precisely here that my research bifurcates from such communications research traditions, 
not discounting them, but suggesting an alternate and perhaps complementary trajectory. 
Where such traditions examine what writing and reading are, or literacy as 
communication technology, and where Goody in particular taxonomically investigates 
what lists are, or the list as a technology of the intellect, I am less concerned with the 
technological characteristics of lists—the whats of taxonomic structures—and more with 
the hows of listing practices; techniques that are deeply subsumed in the constitution of 
meanings, fields, domains, and objects of knowledge. In other words, this research 
concerns itself with how list techniques have been redeployed in juridical-legal and 
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disciplinary mechanisms and instrumentalized in modern and contemporary apparatuses 
of security that serve governmentality. 
Indeed, this research argues that it is insufficient to characterize and classify lists 
as 'intellectual technologies,' but rather one must consider them as political technologies, 
that operate in conjunction with a wide range of myths, stories, ideologies, practices, and 
other technologies—ways of doing and ways of seeing—that together, operate in, and as, 
an economy of discourses; all overlapping, competing, and collaborating with one 
another. In this way, lists are ultimately explored here as critical support technologies of 
modern and contemporary articulations of security, territory, and population—understood 
broadly as governmentality. Indeed, Foucault's (2000a) conception of governmentality is 
central to a key research question of this project: How do lists at once provide a 
technological way of doing, and at the same time enable us to see truth? 
The list served: the classification of the human species 
What is this field in which nature appeared sufficiently close to itself for the 
individual beings it contained to be classified, and yet so far removed from itself 
that they had to be so by the medium of analysis and reflection? (Foucault 
2001:1970, p.139) 
In his chapter in The Order of Things related to 'Classifying,' Foucault 
(2001:1970) traces the evolution of the field of 'natural history,' wherein roughly 
between the seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries, the difficulties surrounding 
linking together diverse attempts at establishing taxonomies a la Aristotle, Descartes, and 
Newton, began to butt theoretical heads with attempts at microscopic observation that 
were emerging in the new sciences surrounding 'evolution, the specificity of life, and the 
notion of organism' (p. 140), which ultimately culminated in the work of Charles Darwin 
(1809-1882) in the nineteenth century. For Foucault, the tensions inherent in 'dividing 
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knowledge into these two interwoven fabrics' (p. 141), which for him, were 'alien to one 
another,' are ultimately reconciled by Darwin's new focus on an analysis of populations, 
epitomized above all by the classification of living beings; the application of categories 
that are for Foucault (Foucault 2001:1970) strictly 'anachronistic' to the production of 
this 'most important of all knowledge' (p.142); the constitution of the human species. In 
this way, the event of natural history for Foucault marks the emergence of a new 
'classifying' regime that concerns itself with the all-encompassing task of 'truthfully' 
categorizing everything and everyone. 
The ever more complete preservation of what was written, the establishment of 
archives, then of filing systems for them, the reorganization of libraries, the 
drawing up of catalogues, indexes and inventories, all of these things represent, at 
the end of the Classical age, not so much a new sensitivity to time, to its past, to 
the destiny of history, as a way of introducing into the language already imprinted 
on things, and into the traces it has left, an order of the same type as that which 
was being established between living creatures. And it is in this classified time, in 
this squared and spatialized development, that the historians of the nineteenth 
century were to undertake the creation of a history that could at last be 'true'—in 
other words, liberated from Classical rationality, from its ordering and theodicy: a 
history restored to the irruptive violence of time (Foucault 2001:1970, p.143-4). 
Before the seventeenth century, writes Foucault, 'the history of a living being was 
that being itself,' understood as existing 'within the whole semantic network that 
connected it to the world' (p. 144) an existence wherein divisions and classifications that 
we now take-for-granted, including those of the human species, did not exist. In such 
times, argues Foucault, signs were a part of things themselves, for it was only in the 
seventeenth century that signs began to take on modes of representation, articulated 
according to their structure, numbers and magnitude, forms and arrangements. With this 
event, Foucault sees the biological begin to be suffused with the natural, in the 
constitution of an emergent regime of truth, which would come to pivot the classification 
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of all living beings. In short, the emergence of 'man as the human species,' homo 
sapiens, further subdivided and listed as elements in populations circulating amongst 
many in a field, domain, and object of knowledge that would come to be called natural 
history. 
Indeed, with the emergence of 'natural history'—this 'double integration' of 
taxonomy and biology—the boundaries between living beings, things and events are 
rendered irrelevant; all categorized, classified and listed as elements in populations. At 
the same time, with the event of natural history, the historian was transformed from one 
who retold what they read, heard, and experienced, to one who undertook to meticulously 
examine things themselves, in microscopic detail, seeing people, living beings, and 
objects as they truthfully were; transcribing, classifying and finally, listing their findings 
in the 'smooth, neutralized and faithful words' (Foucault 2001:1970, p. 172) that came to 
constitute the elements of natural history; the 'interweaving and classification' of all 
living beings, things, and events. 
Natural history in the Classical age is not merely the discovery of a new object of 
curiosity; it covers a series of complex operations that introduce the possibility of 
a constant order into a totality of representations. It constitutes a whole domain of 
empiricity as at the same time describable and orderable (Foucault 2001:1970, 
p.172). 
With the emergence of this mutation of natural history, argues Foucault, a gap 
was left between words and things, and in this space, representation emerged as an 
interweaving force. 'Natural history' found its locus in the articulation of the elements of 
representation, 'those same elements that can now without let or hindrance be named' 
(p.141); those same elements that self-elaborate themselves as a regime of 'natural' truth. 
In this way, Foucault argues that natural history as a field and domain is characterized by 
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a classifying space of representation; by an analysis that anticipates the possibility of 
naming; the possibility of seeing, at a distance, the truth of order between living beings, 
things and events, rendered indistinct in representation. In this way, for Foucault, 
representation is the 'language of language' (p. 142), in how it intermediates between 
words and things, particularly, as this concerns the theory of natural history, that takes as 
its chief concern the "fundamental arrangement of knowledge, which orders the 
knowledge of beings so as to make it possible to represent them in a system of names" 
(p. 171-2). And all such systems of classifying, naming, representing, and ordering take as 
their basis the ancient technology of lists. 
Moreover, it is argued here that the practices of classification in 'natural history', 
and equally in all fields and domains where classification is practiced, all rely on the 
critical support technology of lists, which continue to serve administration, organization, 
and the lexical development of knowledge with the event of natural history, but also now 
become critical support technologies of classification in and of themselves. So, it is not 
just the act of classifying in natural history that renders the boundaries between living 
beings, things, knowledge, and events increasingly irrelevant as Foucault argues, but this 
is also a factor of the effects of lists as critical support technologies operationalized in 
these biologically driven modes of representation. In this way, through the Classical age, 
the list continued to serve its delimiting and developing power/knowledge role, but at the 
same time, it also began to be taken up in new tasks, in other disciplines, in new ways. 
Indeed, the research presented here argues that 'natural history' interwoven with 
'biology' as a regime of truth underpinned by list technology also produced the effect of 
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reinforcing a new kind of 'natural theodicy ,' wherein distinctions between the defense of 
godly 'good' in light of the presence of devilish 'evil' are wholly secularized; a milieu of 
circulation in which 'us' versus 'them'—normal populations and their battles with evil, 
or rather, abnormal foes—come to supercede melees between god and the devil. The 
history of how lists serve modern and contemporary apparatuses of security and 
governmentality is 'a history restored to the irruptive violence of time' (Foucault 
2001:1970, p. 144) one in which the political events of the day are understood as 
providing the 'natural history' around which threats are calculated, predicted, policed, 
and secured as populations on lists. 
The list serves: disciplinary and juridical-legal mechanisms 
By definition, discipline regulates everything. Discipline allows nothing to 
escape. Not only does it not allow things to run their course, its principle is that 
things, the smallest things, must not be abandoned to themselves. The smallest 
infraction of discipline must be taken up with all the more care for it being small 
(Foucault 2007e, p.45). 
The list is a critical support technology of discipline in how it delimits spaces and 
assists in prescribing the articulation of elements within them. It is indeed a tool for 
caring for the mundane minutiae; it is the web that does not let details slip through the 
cracks, forcing classification on living beings, things, and events into discipline's 
enclosures. In this way, the list serves discipline in how it provides an underpinning 
structure for the materialization and visual inspection of whatever discipline might 
analyze, break down, and prescribe. Discipline lists, and once listed, components can be 
seen and prescriptions can be made for their order. In providing such visualization, lists 
3
 Definition: the vindication of divine providence in view of the existence of evil, "theodicy noun" The 
Oxford Dictionary of English (revised edition). Ed. Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson. Oxford 
University Press, 2005. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. Concordia University Library, 
Montreal. 31 January 
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as disciplinary mechanisms also present opportunities for modification, facilitating the 
classification of components according to other objectives, all the while continuing to 
serve their administrative, organizational and knowledge development roles. But as 
technologies of discipline, they also help establish sequences, or co-ordinations of people, 
actions and things; how they are to be optimally assembled. Who is best suited to what? 
What is best suited to whom? How are actions, people, and things to be efficiently and 
effectively linked together? Lists provide answers to such questions for discipline, 
materializing prohibitions and prescriptions, and at the same time, exercising new force 
in the fracture of threatening populations from general populations as technologies of 
security. As Foucault writes, 
Discipline fixes the processes of training (dressage) and permanent control, and 
finally, on the basis of this, it establishes the division between those considered 
unsuitable or incapable and the others. That is to say, on this basis it divides the 
normal from the abnormal (Foucault 2007f, p.57). 
In this way, it is argued here that lists serve what Foucault calls 'disciplinary 
normalization' (p.57) which consists of positing an optimal model and prescription for a 
certain 'normal' result, and then steering people, movements, and actions to conform to 
the optimal model. "The normal being precisely that which can conform to this norm, and 
the abnormal that which is incapable of conforming to the norm" (Foucault 2007f, p.57). 
Indeed, for Foucault, it is not the normal and the abnormal that are of primary importance 
to disciplinary normalization; rather, it is the norm. It is the "originally prescriptive 
character of the norm and the determination and the identification of the normal and the 
abnormal [that] becomes possible in relation to this posited norm" (p.57). In this way, 




Due to the primacy of the norm in relation to the normal, to the fact that 
disciplinary normalization goes from the norm to the final division between the 
normal and the abnormal, I would rather say that what is involved in disciplinary 
techniques is a 'normation' rather than normalization (p.57). 
A simple list of rules, like say, the Ten Commandments, can be used here to 
clarify how the list serves disciplinary normalization (normation) in systems of law. Out 
of the vast disorder that marked the world in biblical times, ten tenets were drafted that 
constituted a list of basic prohibitive and prescriptive norms of, and for, life in a milieu of 
high uncertainty. If we take any one of the most commonly referred to commandments, 
like say, 'though shall not murder,' or 'though shall not steal,' we can clearly see on a 
very simple level how the listed object—the prohibition of murder or theft—posits a 
norm from which we can identify populations who don't murder, or steal, as normal, and 
those who do murder, or steal, as abnormal. That these norms are materialized, as a list of 
prohibitions, is at the simplest level how the list serves to enclose what discipline 
analyzes, breaks down, prescribes and modifies. In this way, we can see how from one of 
the earliest systems of law, the Ten Commandments, and forward, lists have served 
disciplinary normalization; or to put it differently; the materialization of discipline's 
prescriptions for 'good life' through the positing of a list of prohibitionary norms is the 
fundamental basis of systems of law. 
Order is what remains when everything that is prohibited has in fact been 
prevented. I think this negative thought and technique is typical of legal code 
(Foucault 2007f, p.46). 
Indeed, there is a fundamental relationship between discipline and lists, and the 
law and the norm, in that 'every system of law is related to a system of norms' (Foucault 
2007f, p. 5 6), but also in that everything system of norms functions on the critical support 
technology of lists in the visual materialization of laws. Where discipline delimits a space 
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of rules and prescriptions, the basic function of law is to give greater definition to that 
which is prohibited through the materialization of written lists of norms. The history of 
the juridical-legal mechanism is nothing more than the increasingly complex 
materialization of prohibitions of lists of posited norms. In other words, order is 
established in systems of law through an increasingly subtle analysis of disorder, listing 
more and more prohibitions for disciplining the uncertainty of the world—for bringing 
order to it. 
In basic or complex, religious or governmental, systems of law, everything that 
remains beyond the list of prohibitions for countering disorder becomes what is thus 
called order. In this way, we can say that order, in biblical law and times, and beyond, 
was everything that remained beyond a list of rules that delimited a space where 
murdering, stealing, lying, coveting one's neighbor, etcetera are prohibited. In other 
words, order is what remains beyond discipline's ever-finer prescriptions and lists of 
rules—juridical-legal mechanisms—and at the same time, order itself is called into 
question by the delimiting and knowledge development effects of the critical support 
technology of lists functioning as juridical- disciplinary mechanisms themselves. 
In this way, we can say that law, as a disciplinary mechanism that explicitly 
materializes lists of prohibitions, is a system that imagines the negative. Law as a 
disciplinary mechanism is understood as planning and working a space that is 
complementary to reality, a space to counter the reality that 'man is wicked, bad, and has 
evil thoughts, etcetera,' (Foucault 2007e, p.47); a mirrored sphere of prohibitions 
intended to steer the bad to the good, where lists serve as critical support technologies. 
Law operates in the imaginary, since systems of law are based on the formulation and 
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listing of 'all the things that could and must be done' (p.48) as imagined by a set of rules 
and prescriptions invoked by discipline and materialized as lists. 
The list serves: the apparatuses of security 
In other words, the law prohibits and discipline prescribes, and the essential 
function of security, without preventing or prescribing, but possibly making use 
of some instruments of prescription and prohibition, is to respond to reality in 
such a way that this response cancels out the reality to which it responds— 
nullifies it, or limits, checks, or regulates it. I think this regulation within the 
element of reality is fundamental in apparatuses of security (Foucault 2007e, 
P-47). 
The 1977-1978 lectures series that Michel Foucault delivered at the College de 
France marked the emergence of Foucault's conception of 'governmentality' and its 
attendant apparatuses (dispositifs) of security. For Foucault governmentality begins to 
take shape in the eighteenth century, a period in which Western societies not only began 
to adopt the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species, part of a broader 
'truthful' natural history of everything, but also, wherein the apparatuses of security first 
emerged. Throughout these lectures, and indeed, throughout Foucault's work overall, he 
emphasizes time and again that the history of the emergence of juridical-legal 
mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and mechanisms of security, are not marked by 
moments of rupture, but rather, by a deepening of the correlations between these 
mechanisms through the specific technologies and techniques the apparatuses of security 
strategically deploy. For Foucault, relations of power reside in these correlations, 
associations and representations, and it is precisely here that a strategic analysis must 
unloosen relational bonds. In other words, taking up the point of view of technologies and 
their techniques in order to detach them from relations of power, and then resituate all 
within the perspective of the constitution of fields, domains, and objects of knowledge. 
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So there is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing 
the earlier ones to disappear. There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and 
then the age of security. Mechanisms of security do not replace disciplinary 
mechanisms, which would have replaced juridical-legal mechanisms. In reality 
you have a series of complex edifices in which, of course, the techniques 
themselves change and are perfected, or anyway become more complicated, but in 
which what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the 
system of correlation between juridical-legal mechanisms, disciplinary 
mechanisms, and mechanisms of security. In other words, there is a history of the 
actual techniques themselves (Foucault 2007d, p.8). 
In this way, it is argued here that the list, conceived of as a critical support 
technology of juridical-legal, disciplinary, and security mechanisms, is not to be 
understood in isolation and as unchanging, but rather, is seen as an instrument, or more 
precisely a technology with the dual role of delimiting and developing knowledge, whose 
techniques have been deployed, redeployed, and transformed since ancient times in 
different political formations of power. Indeed, there is a different treatment of space by 
juridical-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and what the apparatuses of 
security install, and as such, the list as a critical support technology is called upon to play 
a variety of roles and serve a variety of different functions within and between each. 
The list serves: milieus of circulation and populations 
In order to understand the shift from sovereignty, to discipline, to the space of 
governmentality, Foucault explores the town in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
which for him, was marked overall by uncertainty and unpredictability regarding the 
indefinite series of events (plagues, famines, etc.), indefinite series of accumulating units 
(homes, inhabitants, etc.), and indefinite series of mobile elements (carts, horses, people, 
etc.), whose circulation now needed to be guaranteed day and night. Indeed, in the 
eighteenth century what emerged for the town was a need to organize circulation, not to 
enclose and prohibit spaces as sovereignty had long done through juridical-legal and 
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disciplinary mechanisms, but rather, to let things happen, to encourage 'good' 
circulation, and discourage 'bad'. In other words, governing towns in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries began to concern itself with security, or more specifically, with the 
creation of a space, or a milieu, that neither permitted, nor prohibited, but took as its 
maxim circulation; inserting calculations, probabilities, and populations as a means of 
maximizing the good circulation of elements with the intent of nullifying the movement 
of the bad. 
I think the management of these series that, because they are open series can only 
be controlled by an estimate of probabilities, is pretty much the essential 
characteristic of the mechanism of security (Foucault 2007d, p.20). 
Where sovereignty had capitalized territory through juridical-legal and 
disciplinary mechanisms, enclosing and structuring spaces through operations of 
prohibitionary delimitation and the hierarchical and functional distribution of elements, 
and thus raised location as the major problem of government; security began to attempt to 
install a milieu of circulation, in which elements and events (as well as probable elements 
and events) are regulated 'within a multivalent and transformable framework' that raised 
probabilities and populations as the major problem of government. In this way, "the 
space in which a series of uncertain elements unfold is, I think, roughly what one can call 
the milieu" (Foucault 2007d, p.20). In other words, the milieu is where circulation 
installed by the apparatuses of security is carried out, and at the same time it is a space 
that treats problems of causality by introducing probabilities into the mix, ultimately 
underpinned by the instruments of 'statistics,' the meaning of which derives from the 
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Latin, specifically statisticus, or concerning affairs of state , and hence its direct ties for 
Foucault to apparatuses of security and governmentality. 
In short, the apparatuses of security of the eighteenth century worked, fabricated, 
organized, and planned a space that addressed the questions of uncertainty and 
unpredictability posed by the town, through the installment of a milieu of circulation; 
where good circulation was intended to be maximized and bad circulation was intended 
to be diminished and nullified through mathematical and statistical techniques involving 
calculations, probabilities, risk assessments, and the delimitation of 'populations.' 
The milieu appears as a field of intervention in which, instead of affecting 
individuals as a set of legal subjects capable of voluntary actions—which would 
be the case of sovereignty—and instead of affecting them as a multiplicity of 
organisms, of bodies capable of performances, and of required performances—as 
in discipline—one tries to affect precisely, a population. I mean a multiplicity of 
individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only exist biologically 
bound to the materiality within which they live. What one tries to reach through 
this milieu, is precisely the conjunction of a series of events produced by these 
individuals, populations and groups, and quasi natural events which occur around 
them (Foucault 2007d, p.21). 
Instead of a binary division between the prohibited and the permitted, the marker 
of sovereignty and discipline, the apparatuses of security install a milieu of circulation 
where on the one hand, an 'average' considered as 'optimal' is established, and on the 
other hand, 'a bandwidth of the acceptable' (p.21) is set to keep circulating elements in 
check. What takes shape within this milieu of circulation is a completely different 
distribution of people, things, and mechanisms that now take as their focus the 
normalization of populations, the realm of statistics, and its specific techniques of 
calculations, probabilities, predictions, and populations. With this shift to affecting 
4
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populations, the spotlight of government is shifted from questions of individuals 
subjected to the rule of a sovereign, or bodies disciplined by the limits of performance, 
re-focusing on agglomerations of individuals as the primary unit of analysis; populations 
as the focus of governmentality. 
The more I have spoken of population, the more I have stopped saying sovereign 
(Foucault 2007f, p.76). 
For Foucault a crucial event in the emergence of this art of governmentality was 
how questions of food scarcity and epidemics began to be treated in the eighteenth 
century. Prior to the eighteenth century, these problems were countered by juridical-legal 
and disciplinary mechanisms involving regulating, permitting, and prohibiting the 
circulation of grain—the complete prevention of famine being the objective. But 
henceforth, solutions would begin to take as their focus ensuring circulation, not 
preventing, nor prohibiting famine or epidemics per say, but installing market 
mechanisms of security that would seek to ensure the free movement of 'grain' as a 
means of nullifying 'famine' and 'plague' movements. Random fluctuations in 
abundance/scarcity and dearness/cheapness would be allowed for, but countered by an 
analysis of populations with the aim of statistical normalization, rather than prevention 
and prohibition. 
The physiocrats and the economic theorists of the eighteenth century, tried to 
arrive at an apparatus {dispositif) for arranging things so that, by connecting up 
with the very reality of these fluctuations, and by establishing a series of 
connections with other elements of reality, the phenomena is gradually 
compensated for, checked, finally limited, and the final degree canceled out, 
without it being prevented or losing any of its reality. In other words, by working 
with the reality of fluctuations between abundance/scarcity, dearness/cheapness, 
and not by trying to prevent it in advance, an apparatus is installed, which is, I 
think, precisely an apparatus of security and no longer a juridical-disciplinary 
system (Foucault 2007e, p.37). 
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What uniquely characterizes the apparatuses for arranging things—these 
economic market mechanisms of security—that are installed in the eighteenth century is 
the emergence of population as a primary unit of analysis, established through the 
operations of the statistical techniques of calculation, probability, prediction of worth/risk 
in the 'securing' of milieus of circulation. "This conception of market mechanisms is not 
just the analysis of what happens. It is at once an analysis of what happens and a program 
for what should happen" (Foucault 2007e, p.40). Indeed, the event of food scarcity in the 
town led to a whole new way of 'conceiving' and 'programming' things; a way where 
curbing scarcity was countered "by a sort of 'laisser-faire,' a certain 'freedom of 
movement (laisser-passer),'' a sort of 'laisser-allef, in the sense of 'letting things take 
their course'" (Foucault 2007e, p.41). 
Where discipline is a centripetal force in how it concentrates, focuses, and 
encloses a space, the security mechanism that is installed to curb food scarcity in the 
eighteenth century is precisely the opposite; it 'lets things happen' (p.41). In other words, 
where discipline circumscribes a space in which the mechanisms of power will 'function 
fully and without limit,' (ibid.) 'preventing everything, even and above all the detail,' 
(ibid.) the function of security is to provide a milieu of circulation that lets things happen, 
relying 'on details that are not valued as good or evil in themselves;' a milieu that does 
not prohibit, or prescribe, but rather, ensures the 'secure' circulation of elements in, 
between, and amongst populations. Indeed, details and elements circulating in the milieu 
installed by the apparatuses of security are taken to be 'necessary,' 'inevitable,' and 
'natural processes;' not deemed 'good' or 'bad' in their own right, but only pertinent 
insofar as they situate matters at the level of population and circulation. "The multiplicity 
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of individuals is no longer pertinent, the population is" (2007e, p.42), and the population 
is now constituted by a list of cases, or elements, or statistical scores, not individual 
living beings. 
And herein marks a shift for the list in the apparatuses of security, which might 
seem to be less pertinent in how one might now consider them as remaining subsumed in 
juridical-disciplinary mechanisms, now redeployed as instruments, relays, or conditions 
for targeting populations through the apparatuses of security. However, this research 
argues that list technology is redeployed in two ways in the apparatuses of security. As 
per the above, the list continues to serve its administrative, organizational and knowledge 
development roles in the apparatuses of security through its redeployment as a critical 
support technology of juridical-disciplinary mechanisms. But at the same time, the list 
becomes a technology of security in and of itself in the apparatuses of security, one that 
takes as its focus the fracture of 'threatening populations' from general populations,' 
serving the raw and practiced schisms of ongoing battles and struggles between 
populations—the caesuras of 'us' and 'them;' what the precise operations of the Nazi, 
computerized, no-fly, and no-blank lists explored in subsequent chapters reveal. 
As we will also see in the work of Giorgio Agamben (1998; 2000; 2005), 
Foucault engages the literary term 'caesura,' meaning 'a break between words within a 
metrical foot,' or 'a pause near the middle of a line', in a sense that extends the definition 
beyond the literary, to encompass breaks, or fractures of, and between bodies. Indeed, 
from its Latin origins, caes- and caed- 'cut, hewn', and 'fell, slaughter, murder' 
respectively, as well as the Latin verb caedere, 'to fall,' words like cadaver appeared in 
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the sixteenth century. This etymology reveals a meaning for caesura as related to 
fractures of and between bodies in a biological sense5. 
The list serves: risk assessment 
The population as a political subject, as a new collective subject absolutely 
foreign to the juridical and political thought of earlier centuries is appearing here 
in its complexity, with its caesuras. You can already see it appearing as an object, 
that is to say as that on which and towards which mechanisms are directed in 
order to have a particular effect on it, as well as a subject, since it is called upon to 
conduct itself in such and such a fashion (Foucault 2007e, p.42). 
In order to understand how the apparatuses of security relate to disciplinary 
normalization, Foucault invokes the example of the epidemic disease of smallpox in the 
town in the eighteenth century. What happened with the event of the epidemic was that 
the effects of the purely empirical techniques of statistics began to be applied to medical 
problems involving questions of circulation, in what would inevitably appear as a domain 
that concerned itself with 'medical policing' (Foucault, 2007c, p.58). Thanks to the 
statistical instruments available, it was now possible to think through the phenomena of 
epidemics in new terms; those of the 'calculus of probabilities,' a field of empiricity 
previously not tied to medical science (ibid, p.59). What was remarkable about this 
application of statistics and probabilities in the prevention of smallpox were the 
operations of variolation and vaccination, and more generally, of the application of 
techniques of populations and probabilities to diseases. In other words, how the approach 
was not to 
5
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.. .try to prevent smallpox so much as provoke it in inoculated individuals, but 
under conditions such that the nullification of the disease could take place at the 
same time as this vaccination. With the support of this kind of first small, 
artificially inoculated disease, one could prevent other possible attacks of 
smallpox. We have here a typical mechanism of security with the same 
morphology as that seen in the case of scarcity. There is a double integration, 
therefore, within different technologies of security, and within the rationalization 
of chance and probabilities (ibid, p.59). 
Indeed, with the disease accessible at both the level of the group and at the level 
of each individual case, then thanks to statistics and its analysis of populations and 
distributions, we are now able to identify the risk for each individual within a group of 
contracting, succumbing, or being cured of a disease, listing such populations as risks, or 
'threats.' Where variolization provokes the threat by materializing the disease in the 
individual, vaccination seeks to nullify the threat and disease through the materialization 
of the disease that variolization itself provoked. In other words, the operations of 
variolization and vaccination can be understood as a double integration self-elaborating 
process, in that variolization calls the disease into reality, and vaccination acts on this 
invoked reality, nullifying its effects, each authorizing and reinforcing the other. As with 
the mechanisms installed to counter scarcity; as with those aimed at countering 
epidemics; and as with the statistical technologies and techniques of rationalizing chance 
and probabilities; the list equally displays this 'double integration' effect. 
Where the list materialized threats of 'Jews' and other 'abnormal populations' in 
modern Nazi times, and 'communists' in the Cold War era, and 'terrorists' in 
contemporary times, it also acts as the key instrument for the nullification of the 
movement of the threats it delimits. In other words, the list invokes the category threat, 
calls it, and its elements into reality, and then acts as the key instrument in the policing of 
the realities it itself invokes. Indeed, where list technologies delimit boundaries, they 
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equally open up questions of the classes they constitute, now serving apparatuses of 
security that take as their aim the delimitation and policing of the movement of risks and 
threats in milieus of circulation. As we will see in the next chapters, the list understood as 
a security technology exhibits this 'double integration.' On the one hand, it delimits a 
class called 'threat,' carving out the fundamental caesuras of 'us and 'them,' on the other 
hand, the list serves as the primary instrument for the identification and policing of the 
movement of the very threats it contains; all the while self-elaborating itself in the 
'truthful' fabrication of threatening 'facts.' 
A constant interplay between techniques of power and their object gradually 
carves out in reality, population and its specific phenomena. A whole series of 
objects were made visible for possible forms of knowledge on the basis of the 
constitution of the population as a correlate of techniques of power. In turn, 
because these forms of knowledge constantly carve out new objects, the 
population could be formed, continue, and remain as the privileged correlate of 
modern mechanisms of power (Foucault 2007a, p. 79). 
Like with statistics, the list serves to materialize populations, and at the same 
time, in materializing populations it provides a way of delimiting and policing the 
movement of risks and threats to populations, through disciplinary normalization. What 
Foucault gives this research with his articulation of the 'double integration' of security 
technologies—the delimitation, policing, and self-elaboration processes—is a way of 
unloosening the pivotal operations of risk management in the apparatuses of security. 
Risk is everywhere in the circulation of elements, but risks are never the same for 
everyone and everything, and vary according to condition, place, and milieu. Meaning 
that there are 'zones of higher' and 'zones of lower risk' and apparatuses of security 
concern themselves with the thresholds for identifying 'what is dangerous' within such 
milieus of circulation (Foucault 2007e, p.61). The explicit role that the list plays in 
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identifying 'what is dangerous,' and serving the apparatuses of security's management 
and policing of elements circulating in 'zones of higher and lower risk' is elaborated in 
depth in Chapter 3 on 'Fear and No-Fly Listing in Canada.' 
For now, suffice it to say, the double integration effects of lists in the delimitation 
and policing of what is dangerous makes them apolitical technology of security. At the 
same time, lists also serve the phenomena of 'sudden worsening, acceleration, and 
increase' of threats, or what Foucault calls 'bolting,' and 'the crisis' that appear with the 
milieus of circulation installed by the apparatuses of security. "The crisis is the 
phenomenon of sudden, circular bolting that can only be checked either by a higher, 
natural mechanism, or by an artificial mechanism" (Foucault 2007e, p.61). As we shall 
see in chapter 4 on no-blank list culture, when terrorist alerts bolt, or rather when a 
terrorist crisis is seen to be looming on the horizon, when risk alerts are heightened to 
code yellow, orange, and the dreaded red, more and more no-blank list technologies of 
security are deployed, in more and more zones of risk, listing more and more threatening 
populations and elements for management and policing (people, things, events, and 
knowledge). 
The list serves: freedom of circulation 
An apparatus of security, in any case the one I have spoken about, cannot operate 
except on condition that it is given freedom, in the modern sense that it acquires 
in the eighteenth century: no longer the exemptions and privileges attached to a 
person, but the possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of 
circulation of both people and things. I think it is this freedom of circulation, in 
the broad sense of the term, it is in terms of this option of circulation, that we 
should understand the word freedom, and understand it as one of the facets, 




For Foucault, 'the game of liberalism' hinges on the apparatuses of security 
ensuring 'freedom of circulation,' 'lettings things happen,' 'not interfering,' 'allowing 
free movement,' and 'letting things follow their course'—laisser faire, passer et aller— 
which "basically and fundamentally means acting so that reality, develops, goes its way, 
and follows its own course according to the laws, principles, and mechanisms of reality 
itself (p.48). And it is precisely this laisser faire milieu that the apparatuses of security 
install, and that lists serve as technologies of security. In essence, encouraging favorable 
over unfavorable circulation through the self-elaborating double integration effects of 
interweaving population and probabilities in the nullification of the movement of 
circulating risks. 
So this problem of freedom.. .can be considered and grasped in many ways. For 
sure, we can say—and I don't think it would be false, it cannot be false—that this 
ideology of freedom really was one of the conditions of development of modern 
or, if you like, capitalist forms of economy. This is undeniable...this freedom, 
both ideology and technique of government, should in fact be understood within 
the mutations of and transformation of technologies of power (p.48). 
Indeed, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, Foucault's tentative polemics bear 
out; freedom of circulation does not just characterize the space installed by the 
apparatuses of security in modern times, but equally in contemporary times. Moreover, 
the research presented here argues that the 'free' milieus of circulation installed by 
apparatuses of security are abetted by the redeployment of the list as a critical support 
technology of juridical-disciplinary mechanisms and as a technology of security in and of 
itself. In other words, the list continues to serve its historical role of administration, 
organization, and knowledge development in the apparatuses of security, but further, the 
list also emerges as a technology of security in its own right in the apparatuses of 
security: one that serves the fracture of 'threatening' populations from 'normal' 
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populations and installs the caesuras of 'us' and 'them,' and at the same time, takes on 
the new and critical self-elaborating role of managing, and policing the circulating threats 
it delimits. 
The list serves: governmentality 
So we should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a 
society of discipline, and then of a society of discipline by a society, say, of 
government. In fact we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline and governmental 
management, which has population as its main target and apparatuses of security 
as its essential mechanism (Foucault 2007a, p. 108). 
With the first attempts at managing the population in the eighteenth century, legal 
systems and discipline were more important and valuable than ever. Indeed, managing 
the population is not simply a task of managing the overall results of people, things, and 
events, all freely circulating, but rather, 'managing the population means managing it in 
depth, with all its finer points and detail' (p. 107). In Foucault's conception of 
governmentality, the administration, organization, and knowledge development of the 
mundane minutiae that the list has served since ancient times continues to be critical, as it 
is redeployed in the apparatuses of security and their attendant juridical-disciplinary 
mechanisms. But governmentality means more than just the management of populations 
and the minutiae of elements that circulate in milieus of security, and lists too serve a 
different role in this art: 
First, by 'governmentality' I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, 
procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the 
exercise of this very specific, albeit, very complex, power that has the population 
as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of 
security as its essential technical instrument (Foucault 2007a, p. 108). 
What we have seen thus far in our examination of how lists serve is that the 
essential issue of government in the eighteenth century was this introduction of 
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'economy' into 'political' practice. Indeed, where the word 'economy' in the sixteenth 
century designated a form of government, "in the eighteenth century, through a series of 
complex processes that are absolutely crucial for our history, it will designate a level of 
reality and a field of intervention for government" (p.95). So what Foucault argues we 
have from the eighteenth century forward is an economic mechanism that targets 
population, installing a field of intervention whose politics is to let things happen as a 
means of governing all of the elements circulating in its milieu. Wherein the list serves a 
uniquely new role of fracturing threats from populations, and at the same time, serves as 
the primary instrument for the enforcement, or the policing of the classes it contains. 
And maybe, in a completely general, rough, and therefore inexact way, we could 
reconstruct the major forms, the major economies of power in the following way: 
first, the state of justice, born in the feudal type of territoriality and broadly 
corresponding to a society of customary and written law, with a whole interplay 
of commitments and litigation; second, the administrative state that corresponds 
to a society of regulations and disciplines; and finally, a state of government that 
is no longer essentially defined by its territoriality, by the surface occupied, but by 
a mass: the mass of the population, with its volume, its density, and, for sure, the 
territory it covers, but which is, in a way, only one of its components. This state of 
government, which essentially bears on the population and calls upon and 
employs economic knowledge as an instrument, would correspond to a society 
controlled by apparatuses of security (Foucault 2007a, p. 109-110). 
In this way, by governmentality Foucault also understood that there is a 
'tendency,' 'a line of force,' that for a very long time, and particularly throughout the 
West, has constantly pushed its way into pre-eminence over the other types of power, 
particularly over sovereignty and discipline, and this is the kind of power we call 
'government' (ibid, p. 108). Indeed, government, as Foucault theorizes it, is a series of 
knowledges (savoirs), coupled with the development of a series of governmental 
apparatuses (appareils) that install an economic milieu of political circulation, and it is 
the space of movement that lists serve. 
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Finally, by 'governmentality' I think we should understand the process, or rather, 
the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became 
the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually 
'governmentalized' (Foucault 2007a, p. 108-9). 
Indeed, taking up Foucault's lines of force, blockages, and constrictions, the 
research into how the list serves that follows, argues, at its core, that his assertion is one 
that fully bears out: 
We live in the era of a governmentality discovered in the eighteenth century 
(P. 109). 
Questions of methodology and corpus 
One can understand what knowledge consists of only by examining relations of 
struggle and power, the manner in which things and men [sic] hate one another, 
fight one another, and try to dominate one another, to exercise power relations 
over one another (Foucault 2000c, p. 12). 
In this way, the lists serves is not a technological history, rather, it is an 
examination of struggles over governmentality in modern and contemporary formations 
of power. It consists of unloosening the relational bonds of the apparatuses of security 
that have historically correlated the development of fields, domains, and objects of 
knowledge, and propelling them into a contemporary analysis. In order to achieve this 
unloosening and propulsion, this research presents a series of four events that highlight 
how the list has served, and continues to serve, modern and contemporary formations of 
power. This involves oscillating analysis between analyzing the list as a technology of 
security, articulating the juridical-disciplinary mechanisms the list underpins in these 
events, and interrogating the kinds of knowledge/power formations it correlates, 
associates, and represents. How does the list contribute to greater ensembles of truth in 
these events? How does the list serve to fracture threatening populations, and at the same 
time act as the primary instrument for their management and policing1? Indeed, the four 
32 
33 
events studied here each provide their own unique insights into how the list serves 
apparatuses of security and governmentality as such. 
The problems of governmentality and the techniques of government have really 
become the only political stake and the only real space of political struggle and 
contestation (Foucault 2007a, p. 109). 
The first event explored in this research is the emergence of what this work calls 
'Nazi governmentality' in Chapter 1: an event wherein juridical-legal and disciplinary 
mechanisms underpinned by list technology were redeployed in a milieu of circulation 
(security) that privileged pseudo-scientific articulations of biology and 'natural history' in 
the establishment of populations. Overlapping in time with the first event is the second 
(chapter 2), the emergence of computer technologies and cybernetics, game, and systems 
theories in the 1940s and 1950s, and how this event came to install an apparatus of 
security that also pivoted on the technology of lists, but in a different way. Moving onto a 
contemporary examination of the interweaving of juridical-legal mechanisms, 
disciplinary mechanisms, and apparatuses of security underpinned by list technologies is 
the third event of this research project, chapter 3: an interrogation of the emergence of 
no-fly lists in Canadian and global culture. This event is followed up with an event called 
'no-blank list culture,'' chapter 4, an examination of how the no-fly list technology of 
security continues to grow, evolve, and expand outside any perceived territorial 
boundaries of aero-circulation, installing and normalizing no-[fill in the blank] list 
technologies of security in more and more milieus of circulation. 
Since this research is activated through a methodology of discourse analysis, 
which seeks to construct a cultural history of how the list serves, my corpus will 
ultimately consist of a series of 'texts' which will be "analyzed as parts of webs or 
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systems of signification that may be viewed as 'a set of language systems'" (Tuchman 
1998, p.245) that constitute the wider assumptions of an era, or epoque. Indeed, because 
language systems, like cybernetics, game and systems theories explored in chapter 2, are 
characteristic of specific eras and times, "one can analyze any particular text in 
relationship to other texts; that is, as part of a structure of meaning. Indeed, the analyst's 
(researcher's) task is to elucidate that structure" (ibid). In this way, Tuchman (1998) 
argues that 'poststructuralist analysis' (ibid) is more concerned with the variability of 
readings, than with any one perfect reading of a corpus of texts. Indeed, one of the tenets 
of poststructuralist discourse analysis is that there is no 'true,' or 'natural,' or 'objective' 
reading of historical texts. Rather, such forms of analysis concern themselves with the 
multiplicity of meanings invoked by texts. 
These theories also imply that the historian's account is an assembled text. It, too, 
is multivocal and bespeaks the context of its production. It, too, is an assemblage 
that bespeaks the historian's epoque rather than the voice of the historian-author 
(Tuchman 1998, p.246). 
On Foucault's insistence, I will begin to probe into, and pry apart these four 
events by searching for regularities and patterns in texts that I will look for across sites of 
academic and popular culture including the Internet, publications, and historic archives. 
Engaging discourse analysis as such means that materials are not arranged or sought in 
any particular order; the boundaries of the corpus are not delimited in advance. Indeed, 
the composition of the corpus evolves its coherence from where one starts, the questions 
one poses, and where the answers are found. In this way the corpus will be large and 
heterogeneous (Hamilton 1999). Indeed, contrary to ethnographic traditions involving 




.. .in some qualitative research texts and documents may be analyzed for a very 
different purpose. The aim is to understand the participants' categories and to see 
how these are used in concrete activities. The theoretical orientation of these 
qualitative researchers makes them more concerned with the processes through 
which texts depict 'reality' than with whether such texts contain true or false 
statements (p.826). 
Justification and precedence for treating textual research materials as narrative 
entities is provided not only in the research of Foucault, Silverman, and Tuchman, but 
also in Paula Treichler's (1988; 1992) research into AIDS as a 'cultural construction' 
explored in chapters 3 and 4, and further in the work of Gubrium and Holstein (1998). 
For Gubrium and Holstein (1998) textual materials are treated as storytelling, a practical 
means of production through which members of society attempt to establish coherence 
across accounts of practice. Gubrium and Holstein's (2000) methodological approach, 
called interpretive practice, involves juggling ethnographic descriptions of social 
processes with discourse-driven interrogations of practice. 
Interpretive practice engages both the hows and the whats of social reality; it is 
centered both in how people methodically construct their experiences and their 
worlds and in the configurations of meaning and institutional life that inform and 
shape their reality-constituting activity (Gubrium and Holstein 2000, p.488). 
Analyzing 'interpretive practice' as such means oscillating the research lens from 
documenting how people 'concretely construct and sustain social entities' (ibid)—how 
people do social life; and recognizing the patterns and regularities of discourses operating 
through the doing—what people see. 
Discourse not only puts words to work, it gives them their meaning, constructs 
perceptions, and formulates understanding and ongoing course of interaction. It is 
one thing to show in interactive detail that our everyday encounters with reality 
are an ongoing accomplishment; it is quite another matter to derive an 
understanding of what the general parameters of those everyday encounters might 
be (ibid, p.494). 
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It is Gubrium and Holstein's contention that where attention to social processes is 
useful for documenting the interactions that constitute the social construction of reality— 
what they label 'discursive practice'—Foucauldian interrogations of practice glean 
insights into the broader patterns, regularities and logic that constitute the boundaries and 
possibilities for action—what they label discourses-in-practice; and both can be held and 
considered in tandem. This methodological juggling act involves an ongoing emphasis 
on, and recognition of, the perpetual interplay and mutual constitution of the two. 
The emphasis on the interplay between the hows and the whats of interpretive 
practice is paramount. Interplay connotes a dynamic relationship. We assiduously 
avoid analytically privileging either discursive practice or discourses-in-practice. 
Putting it in ethnomethodological terms, the aim of an analytics of interpretive 
practice is to document the interplay between the practical reasoning and 
conversational machinery entailed in constructing a sense of everyday reality on 
the one hand and the institutional conditions, resources, and related discourses 
that substantively nourish and interpretively mediate interaction on the other. 
Putting it in Foucauldian terms, the goal is to describe the interplay between 
institutional discourses and the dividing practices that constitute local 
subjectivities and their worlds of experience (p.497). 
Although discursive practices and discourses-in-practice are presented as 
mutually constituted in analyzing interpretive practice, by engaging the methodological 
turn of what Gubrium and Holstein call 'analytic bracketing' (ibid, p.498) the particular 
subjectivities that listing practices contribute to and enable—what people see through 
listing, the greater ensembles of truth they call into reality—will become distinguishable 
from the practices and technological forms that constitute local subjectivities and 
experiences—how listing is accomplished; both held and considered in tandem. 'Analytic 
bracketing' involves the researcher oscillating indifference to whats and hows throughout 
analysis. By self-consciously, explicitly, and alternately critically bracketing out 
discursive practices, or discourses-in-practice, the researcher obtains a means of juggling 
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fine-grained descriptions of social processes, and technological forms, with Foucauldian 
interrogations of discourse. 
As analysis proceeds, the observer intermittently orients to everyday realities as 
both the products of members reality-constructing procedures and the resources 
from which realities are constructed. At one moment the analyst may be 
indifferent to the structures of everyday life in order to document their production 
through discursive practices. In the next analytic move, he or she brackets 
discursive practices in order to assess the local availability, distribution, and/or 
regulation of resources for reality construction.. .In Foucauldian terms, it leads to 
alternating considerations of discourses-in-practice on the one hand and the 
locally fine-grained documentation of related discursive practices on the other 
(Gubrium and Holstein 2000, p.499-500). 
When analysis highlights discursive practices, there is a critical opening into 
sedimented senses of security; the taken-for-granted common-sense reality on which 
everyday practices and technological forms rely. Emphasizing and describing how listing 
is something we do, this analysis probes list practices in order to rupture their logic. 
Questions here center on listing operations as reality-constructing activities: How does 
listing boundary and border knowledge? How does listing prescribe and prohibit action? 
How does listing contribute to 'regimes of truth'? 
By contrast, when discourses-in-practice takes center stage, analysis is more 
political than functional "...implicating a reality that doesn't rest completely on the 
machinery of talk or the constructive quality of social interaction. It turns us to wider 
contexts in search of other sources of change or stability" (Gubrium and Holstein 2000, 
p.503). Spotlighting the discourses that produce and sustain subjective realities and 
experience, questions here center on the greater ensembles of truth listing practices 
contribute to and enable: What discourses operate in and through listing? What 'truths' 
does listing produce? What does listing enable in terms of administration, organization 
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and the development of knowledge? What elements, arrangements, structures, and forms 
does listing help distribute and regulate in milieus of circulation? 
My work takes place between unfinished abutments6 and anticipatory strings of 
dots (Foucault and Faubion 2000b, p.223). 
In this way, like Foucault's interrogations of madness, incarceration, education, 
and sexuality (Foucault 1973; Foucault 1988; Foucault 1995; Foucault 2002), I focus my 
research lens between the unfinished boundaries and borders of power/knowledge—the 
abutments that the list cements—and, the forces that exert thrust and pressure on them— 
the bridges of people, things, knowledge, events, actions, associations, and 
representations they cantilever. Indeed, drawing on Foucault, I would like to suggest that 
just as the list abuts power, power abuts the list. Their boundaries are inseparable and 
intertwined, forced together and constituted in the differential tension of listing practices; 
on the one hand supporting disciplinary enclosures of power/knowledge—of truth—and 
on the other, operating as bridges to modifications, revealing new ways of doing the art 
of governmentality involving fracturing threatening elements from populations, and 
managing and policing them in the interest of 'free' circulation. 
I wanted to ask how these divisions are effected. It's a method that seems to me to 
yield—I wouldn't say the maximum of possible illumination—at least a fairly 
fruitful kind of intelligibility (Foucault and Faubion 2000b, p.224). 
It is this middle-ground, this practiced space-in-between, where threats are called 
into existence, and fractured from populations, delimited, their movements nullified— 
how these divisions are effected—to which I am attenuating the research lens. Therefore, 
6
 Oxford English Dictionary Definition of abutment: 1. The meeting end to end; the place where projecting 
ends meet each other; junction. 2. Arch. The solid part of a pier or wall, etc., against which an arch abuts, 
or from which it immediately springs, acting as a support to the thrust or lateral pressure. In a bridge, the 
masonry (or rock) at either end supporting the arches. 3. By extension, that upon which anything abuts or 
leans, or from which it receives firm support. 
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following Foucault's methodological approach rooted in discourse analysis (Foucault 
1995; Foucault 2000b; Foucault 2000c; Foucault and Faubion 2000a; Foucault and 
Gordon 1980a), rather than asking what in a given time is regarded as a list? I ask how 
divisions, boundaries and borders are constituted through the technologies and techniques 
of the list? How does the list support juridical-disciplinary mechanisms, and apparatuses 
of security? How does the list serve governmentality? 
...the target of analysis wasn't 'institutions', 'theories', or 'ideology', but 
practices—with the aim of grasping the conditions that make these acceptable at a 
given moment; the hypothesis being that these types of practice are not just 
governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic 
circumstances—whatever role these elements may actually play—but up to a 
point, possess their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence and 
'reason'. It is a question of analyzing a 'regime of practices'—practices being 
understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and 
reasons given, the planned and the taken-for-granted meet and intersect (Foucault 
and Faubion 2000b, p.225). 
Indeed, moving from a historical technological analysis of lists like Goody's, to 
engaging Foucault's discourse analysis, in many ways transforms my research object 
from the list, understood as a communication technology, to listing, understood as 
practices operating through technological assemblages that delimit and develop 
power/knowledge. This transformation, simply described, involves oscillating the 
research lens from the noun (the list) to the verb (listing). And while this does not negate 
material questions regarding the list as a technological form, what constitutes a list, it 
diminishes their priority from the outset in favor of asking how listing operates as a 
divisive practice central to human struggle. For Foucault, such analysis involves a study 
ofthe: 
.. .interplay between a 'code' that governs ways of doing things, and a production 
of true discourses that serves to found, justify, and provide reasons and principles 
for ways of doing things. To put the matter clearly: my problem is to see how men 
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govern (themselves and others) by the production of truth (I repeat once again that 
by production of truth I mean not the production of true utterances but the 
establishment of domains in which the practice of true and false can be made at 
once ordered and pertinent) (Foucault and Faubion 2000b, p.230). 
For all of these reasons, 'research' in discourse analysis is constructed around 
events, not objects, and the further one breaks down the operations associated with such 
events, 
.. .the more one is enabled and indeed obliged to construct their external relations 
of intelligibility. In concrete terms: the more one analyzes the process of say 
'incarceration' down to its smallest details, the more one is led to relate them to 
such practices as schooling, military discipline, and so on (Foucault and Faubion 
2000b, p.227). 
It is indeed my hope that these four events considered in harmony, oscillating 
analysis between interrogating what is seen through the list, and probing how listing is 
done, will demonstrate how the list is a political technology of modern and contemporary 
times, at once redeployed in juridical and disciplinary mechanisms of apparatuses of 
security, and at the same time, a technology of security in its own right, for managing and 
policing the fracture, enforcement, and nullification of the movement of threats. 
I am trying to work in the direction of what one might call 'eventalization'. What 
do I mean by this term?... A breach of self-evidence, of those self-evidences on 
which our knowledges, acquiescences, and practices rest: this is the first 
theoretico-political function of'eventalization'...Second 'eventalization' means 
rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages plays of forces, 
strategies, and so on, that a given moment establish what subsequently counts as 
being self-evident, universal and necessary. In this sense, one is indeed effecting a 
sort of multiplication or pluralization of causes (Foucault and Faubion 2000b, 
p.233). 
Each event will be considered in its own chapter, building one on the next, and 
finally culminating in a discussion—what Foucault calls the construction of a. polyhedron 
of intelligibility— in the conclusion, wherein the whats and hows of the four events are 
brought together; not to unearth a buried stratum of continuity, but rather to unloosen the 
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critical operations of power that the lists have served, and resituate them in the 
constitution of contemporary fields, domains, and the development of 'truthful' objects of 
knowledge. In other words, the research that follows examines how the list is a 
technology, redeployed in the juridical-legal and disciplinary mechanisms of apparatuses 
of security, which at the same time, has taken on the form of a technology of security in 
its own right, serving the management and policing of the 'threatening' populations and 
elements it itself calls into existence. 
Building on Foucault's methodology and work, it is my overall contention that the 
list is a technology of security characterized by a 'double integration' effect—the 
hallmark of the self-elaborating art of governmentality's apparatuses of security. Where 
lists reveal a way of seeing, listing practices provide a way of doing, and this is brought 
to light in examination of a series of struggles over power/knowledge, with the ultimate 
aim of resituating them where they belong: in relations of power operating in the 
constitution of fields, domains, and objects of knowledge. Where Goody's (1977) work 
provides a natural temporal starting point for this research in analyzing the list as an 
'intellectual technology' of ancient societies, I am far more compelled to begin this 
research by highlighting an event which marks the first conjuncture of listing practices 
with a powerful 'new' technological form: computers. Indeed, early information 
technologies, statistical techniques, and list practices, articulated by the Nazis, made self-
evident a very complex regime of listing practices, which resonate strongly today. By 
interrogating an early conjuncture of computers, statistical techniques, and list 
technologies, wherein a 'new' self-evidence regarding listing elements of populations 
was sutured, I hope to begin to exhume the list from our social woodwork, demonstrating 
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how juridical-disciplinary mechanisms and apparatuses of security were installed by the 
Nazis during WWII, which reinforced a regime of truth where struggles over 
power/knowledge were firmly rooted in the establishment of caesuras between 'healthy' 
and 'diseased' populations. 
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Chapter 1 - The list served: Nazi governmentality 
Introduction 
Mankind barely noticed when the concept of massively organized information 
quietly emerged to become a means of social control, a weapon of war, and a 
roadmap for group destruction. The unique igniting event was the most fateful 
day of the last century, January 30, 1933; the day Adolf Hitler came to power. 
Hitler and his hatred of the Jews was the ironic driving force behind this 
intellectual turning point (Black 2001, p.7). 
Through the ages, technologies for organizing people, things, and knowledge with 
aims towards governance have clearly evolved well beyond anything early papyrus and 
ink writers might have fathomed in their wildest administrative, organizational, and 
managerial dreams, capable of wrangling into focus endless amounts of information, and 
moreover, global populations. And yet despite the emergence of 'new technologies,' like 
early computer punch card technologies in the 1930s, and their effects of installing 
massively organized information as a primary way of seeing and doing governance, one 
technological form and its attendant practices, has continued to underpin such attempts at 
delimitation, and at the same time, to exercise new force—the list—an indispensable 
pivot of juridical-disciplinary mechanisms and the apparatuses of security || the site of 
caesuric fracture in Nazi governmentality. Indeed, lists were not only the primary 
intellectual technologies for administering, and organizing people and things, and also 
developing knowledge in ancient times, but additionally, in the period following the 
emergence of governmentality Foucault (2007) describes, begin to take on roles as 
critical security technologies in their own right, ones that exercise force in the 
delimitation and policing of the movement of 'threatening elements' circulating in 
uncertain milieus. And it is precisely these relations of power installed by Nazi 
governmentality that this chapter seeks to unloosen, and propel into contemporary times. 
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Following on Foucault's analysis of the events in the eighteenth century which 
saw the historian's role transformed from raconteur, to one who sees, names, classifies 
and articulates the 'truthful' natural history of living beings and things—the interweaving 
of taxonomy and biology—and inspired by Jack Goody's (1977) 'intellectual technology' 
conception of lists as fundamental to the administration and organization of people and 
things, and the development of knowledge, this chapter argues that with the event of Nazi 
Governmentality lists continued to serve their age old 'intellectual' roles, but also, and 
further, came to constitute a unique new way of seeing and doing in their own right: 
involving fracturing 'threatening populations' from 'healthy populations.' The list was at 
the heart of these schisms that marked modern Nazi governmentality—healthy || 
diseased; Aryan || Jew; us || them—serving the delimitation and policing of abnormal 
cases in populations; installing caesuric social fractures. 
The research presented here argues that in the same way that lists brought 
administration, organization and order to the management of people and things, and the 
development of knowledge for ancient cultures (Goody 1977), they equally played these 
roles in the milieu of circulation installed under Nazi governmentality, redeployed as 
critical support technologies of juridical-disciplinary mechanisms. At the same time, lists 
emerged under the Third Reich as critical to the delimiting, managing, and policing of 
'threatening' or 'diseased' elements of populations in their own right, becoming primary 
technologies of security in this biologically defined milieu of circulation. Equally, lists 
brought contradiction to Nazi governmentality, calling into question the veracity of 
'classes' they constituted; namely abnormal populations in relation to the Vdlk, beginning 
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with undesirables, valueless loafers, and the physically and mentally 'deficient,' and 
finally, culminating in the category and listing of 'Jews.' 
In the apparatuses of security installed by Nazi governmentality, the list fully 
exhibits the double integration characteristic of security technologies, serving the dual 
role of delimiting and policing the very threats it constitutes, and at the same time self-
elaborating its own operations, as well as those of statistics, and computers as the 
penultimate fabricators of such 'truth.' In this way, we will see how lists were as divisive 
as scythes under Nazi governmentality, fundamentally securing caesuras of 'diseased' 
versus 'healthy' populations, which pivoted on the severing and policing of 'threatening' 
groups from normal ones || fully divesting such populations of humanity. 
Indeed, under Nazi governmentality, the contradictory but interwoven fabrics of 
'microscopic examination' and 'taxonomies' as 'natural history' took hold in apparatuses 
of security characterized by 'double integration' technologies, including early computer 
technologies, statistical technologies, and list technologies, which served the delimitation, 
and policing of the movement of fractured 'threats' in the Third Reich. In this way, the 
list served a Nazi milieu of circulation where the naming and policing of elements of 
abnormal populations, Jews and other, was installed as a way of seeing and doing a 
'healthy' cultural body, in which elements circulate freely, but are distributed and 
regulated by apparatuses of security. 
The concept of 'security' is employed here as per Foucault (2007), who in 
Security, Territory, and Population refines his earlier notions of sovereignty and 
discipline into a theory of governmentality that hinges on the apparatuses (dispositifs) of 
security where statistical techniques including probabilities, calculations, populations, 
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and the prediction and limitation of 'bad' outcomes—risk assessments of the aleatory— 
rule the day. It is argued here that the centripetal force of juridical-legal and disciplinary 
mechanisms, and apparatuses of security, which Foucault describes in his lectures, were 
further correlated under Nazi governmentality, and it is precisely the interweaving of 
these relations of power that this chapter aims to unloosen and resituate in the 
constitution of fields, domains, and objects of knowledge that the list served in this 
modern event. 
The list, early information technology, and Nazi governmentality 
So, while it might strike one as odd that this research into modern and 
contemporary list technologies of security begins with a historical event not normally 
associated with the advent of 'new technologies,' but rather, with the unprecedented and 
abhorrent mass genocide orchestrated by the Nazis in Europe throughout the rise and fall 
of the Third Reich (Hilberg 1985); there is clearly precedence for looking at the Shoah as 
a technological event. Surprisingly, it was only at the turn of the millennium, when 
Edwin Black's (2001) IBM and the Holocaust was first published, that scholars and those 
touched by the Shoah in general began to even remotely consider the indispensable role 
that IBM made and owned Hollerith tabulators, sorters, and punch cards—early 
information technology—played in achieving the destruction of so many lives. Indeed, 
this chapter argues that the 'early information technology' Black (2001) describes in IBM 
and the Holocaust along with the technologies of statistics helped underpin the 
installation of a milieu of circulation that pivoted on biological classification, wherein the 
technology of lists continued to serve their administrative, organizational, and knowledge 
development roles under Nazi governmentality, through their redeployment in juridical-
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disciplinary mechanisms, but also took on a new role, serving a new purpose in managing 
the delimitation and policing of the movement of the 'threats' they themselves called into 
reality. 
I was haunted by a question whose answer has long eluded historians. The 
Germans always had the lists of Jewish names. Suddenly a squadron of grim-
faced SS would burst into a city square and post a notice demanding those listed 
assemble the next day at the train station for deportation to the East. But how did 
the Nazis get the lists? (Black 2001, pg.10) 
While the Holocaust has proven to be the most studied event in history, it is 
surprising to discover that before Black's publication, there had been virtually no 
mention of the underpinning early information technologies that were crucial to, and at 
the heart of the precise orchestration of mass human classification, control, and 
extermination the Nazis conducted in waging their racial war across Europe. Indeed, it is 
even more shocking that the lists, which hinged such endeavors, have equally never been 
taken up as objects of research in their own right. 
From Raul Hilberg's definitive and seminal three volume tome on The 
Destruction of the European Jews (1985); to precise studies on The Order of Terror \ The 
Concentration Camp (Sofsky 1997) and The Roots of Nazi Psychology (Gonen 2000); to 
interrogations into the Anatomy of the SS State (Krausnick, Bucheim, Broszat, and 
Jacobsen 1968), and into The Theory Practice of Hell: The German concentration camps 
and the system behind them (Kogon 1950); there is quite literally no mention of the IBM 
developed Hollerith punch card technologies, and only passing references to the lists, that 
were both at the heart of the one question surrounding the Holocaust that was seemingly 
unanswerable: "How did they know? How were they able to target, with such brutal 
accuracy, the homes of all people of Jewish decent?" (Rose 2001, p.91) 
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Edwin Black's research, a decade in the making, involving the investigative 
efforts and expertise of over 200 people across the world, finally provided a partial 
answer: The Nazis achieved such brutal accuracy and precision—they got the lists— 
through the use of IBM technologies; specifically, IBM's founder, Herman Hollerith's 
punch card tabulators and sorters that he developed while working for the U.S. Census 
bureau in the mid to late-eighteenth century (Pugh 1995). And this revelation shocked 
Holocaust scholars and the world at large, at once answering the long-standing mystery 
of how the Nazis got the lists, and at the same time opening the door to a range of new 
lines of research around this 'technological' event, including the research presented here, 
which owes a great debt to Black for his groundbreaking and highly illuminating 
historical investigation into the ties between one of America's most successful 
'technology' corporations and a brutal totalitarian regime bent on seeing, naming, 
delimiting, risk assessing, managing, policing, and ultimately nullifying, or exterminating 
undesirable and abnormal populations. 
Where the Nazis' use of Hollerith punch card technology really began with the 
tabulating, sorting, and analysis of the 1933 census (Aly, Roth, Black, and Oksiloff 
2004), the technology of punch cards, sorters, and tabulators had already been in 
existence for over fifty years in the United States (Sobel 1981). In 1879, Herman 
Hollerith, at the behest of a Columbia professor, became an assistant in the US census 
bureau. At the time, the decennial census that was held in the US was really nothing more 
than a basic head count; and the idea of gathering information pertaining to millions of 
individuals' occupations, ages, gender, or any other trait, while desirable, was seen as an 
insurmountable computational endeavor (Sobel 1981). 
48 
49 
Inventive Hollerith began to think about a solution. French looms, simple music 
boxes, and player pianos used punched holes on rolls or cards to automate rote 
activity. About a year later, Hollerith was struck with his idea. He saw a train 
conductor punch tickets in a special pattern to record physical characteristics such 
as height, hair color, size of nose, and clothing—a sort of 'punched photograph'. 
Other conductors could read the code and then catch anyone re-using the ticket of 
the original passenger.. .Hollerith's idea was a card with standardized holes, each 
representing a different trait: gender, nationality, occupation and so forth. The 
card would then be fed into a reader.. .The machines could render the portrait of 
an entire population—or could pick out any group within that population. Indeed, 
one man could be identified from among millions if enough holes could be 
punched into a card and sorted enough times. Every punch card would become an 
informational storehouse limited only by the number of holes. It was nothing less 
than a nineteenth-century bar code for human beings (Black 2001, p.25). 
Hollerith invented his first sorters and tabulators—machines that used 
electromagnetic contact brushes to detect holes punched in cards—which were capable of 
counting people and things as they had never been counted before, with the unparalleled 
and seemingly magical ability to track, identify and compute; almost instantly sorting 
elements and listing populations. "Suddenly, the government could profile its own 
population" (Black 2001, p.24). Because of their unprecedented speed in tabulating and 
sorting, Hollerith punch card systems revealed whole new dimensions of census and 
registration possibilities for government statisticians, and at the same time, unearthed 
whole new ranges of questions that could be asked of the US population. 
Before long, IBM technology demonstrated it could do more than just count 
people or things. It could compute, that is, the technology could record data, 
process it, retrieve it, analyze it, and automatically answer pointed questions 
(Black 2001, p.24). 
Such pointed questions included those pertaining to the risks surrounding 
elements 'freely' circulating in milieus; and as with all technologies that record data, 
process it, retrieve it, analyze it, the answers to pointed question are delivered in the form 
of outputted lists of people, things, or objects of knowledge—sorted lists of elements; at 
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once profiles, and at the same time, sites of prescription. Indeed, the world took notice of 
IBM's powerful 'double integration' technology as it became a 'global' company in the 
early part of the twentieth century (Pugh 1995). By 1933, in Nazi Germany, Hollerith 
technologies and IBM interests were represented by IBM Germany, or Deutsche 
Hollerith Maschinen Gesellschaft, simply known as Dehomag. Dehomag would 
eventually come to design, develop, supply, implement, and maintain the 'punch card' 
systems that would prove to be indispensable to the Third Reich's ultimate aim: 'the 
automation of human destruction' (Black 2001, p.7). 
Parallel to the use of Hollerith machines by the Third Reich to delimit populations 
was the emergence of immense infrastructure, including card-sorting operations across 
Nazi Germany, factories which processed punch cards day and night, as more and more 
acts of 'biopolitical' classification and delimitation insidiously crept into every aspect of 
daily life in the Third Reich, and ultimately across all of Nazi-occupied Europe. From 
train platforms, to factories and concentration camps; people, animals and goods were 
increasingly and systematically tabulated, sorted, identified, catalogued, coded, divided, 
listed, and moved about with 'icy automation' (ibid) in a biopolitically charged milieu of 
circulation. 
Statistics and the Volk: constituting Aryan natural history, or the normal in Nazi 
governmentality 
It is first through the anonymizing statistical process that individuals are reduced 
to pieces in a conceptual puzzle, with a so-called 'probability of fertility rate', 
'probability of divorce rate', 'individual social behavior', and so on. In this way 
people are categorized according to character profiles—traits that can be 
multiplied into almost infinitely precise components and grouped arbitrarily. It is 
also through statistics that people can be divided into increasingly smaller groups 
by means of social and demographic policies. In this way it is possible to enact 
laws, regulations and guidelines targeting ever smaller groups of people, laws and 
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regulations that to the individual subject are ever more opaque (Aly, Roth, Black, 
and Oksiloff 2004, p.xii). 
In order to understand the list as a self-elaborating double integration technology 
of security in Nazi governmentality, we will first examine another such technology: 
statistics. In 1941, Friedrich Zahn, President of the German Statistical Society, declared 
that: "In using statistics, the government has the road map to move from knowledge to 
deeds, from advice to action, in order to succeed in its enormous task of building society" 
(Aly, Roth, Black, and Oksiloff 2004, p.9)1. Indeed, Friedrich Zahn was on the vanguard 
of a new approach to understanding statistics that hinged on a vision for planning and 
working society and all its parts as populations, probabilities, and distributions of cases. 
"At first glance the term 'individual statistic' seems to be an oxymoron. It appears that 
statistics is the polar opposite of individuality. However, a 'new method' was appearing 
on the horizon" (Aly, Roth, Black, and Oksiloff 2004, p.65). The 'new method' that was 
emerging through the work of statisticians like Zahn in the Third Reich involved the 
reduction of individuals to risk factors—to cases—statistical objects that could be held 
constant in populations, and then repeatedly observed over time. Prior to World War II, 
statisticians had for the most part contained their observations and analyses to collective 
statistical objects, in large part due to technological limitations, but Nazi statisticians, as 
well as their American counterparts shifted the lens with their use of Hollerith tabulators 
and sorters, attenuating and focusing on 'individual cases' within populations as 
statistical objects (Aly, Roth, Black, and Oksiloff 2004). 
Instead of taking a ball out of the 'urn of nature' from time to time and then 
retuning the ball to the urn with others, now those balls are marked before they 
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are returned. After some time has elapsed, one can very carefully check to see 
how many of those marked balls are still there, how many have been destroyed in 
the mixing process, and how many have been added. One checks their weight 
increase and decrease, not just their color (ibid, p.65)2. 
In this way, where statistics served much of Nazi planning and order, they were 
more than a means of merely doing; they were also a way of seeing—one that pivoted on 
the delimitation of populations, and the specific observation of cases within populations, 
repeatedly and continually monitored and surveyed ad infinitum according to factors of 
risk. In this way, statisticians were very much 'soldiers of science in the new Reich' (Aly, 
Roth, Black, and Oksiloff 2004), further blurring the boundaries between people and 
things; both reduced to empirical statistical objects distributed in populations. Every 
invasion and conquest brought with it Nazi statisticians, who were always on the 
vanguard of the charge—at the tip of the spear—indexing, registering, tabulating, and 
sorting each and every population the Reich came to contain (Black 2001); and in turn, 
producing the statistically-derived racial roadmaps that would illuminate the way for the 
highest level of Nazi planners and organizers; who could now with more precision than 
ever generate the lists which would direct the storm troopers in their policing of 
'dangerous' elements. 
Raceology was enabled as never before. Statistician Zahn extolled the fact that 
'registered persons can be observed continually, [through] the cooperation of 
statistical central offices.. .[So] other statistical population matters can be settled 
and regulated,' Zahn proposed a 'single file for [the] entire population to make 
possible an ethnic biological diagnosis [to] turn today's theory into tomorrow's 
practice. Such a file would serve both practical considerations as well as science,' 
he argued, adding, 'Clarified pictures of the volume of genetic diseases within the 
population now gives science a new impetus to conduct research...which should 
promote good instead of bad genetic stock' (Black 2001, p.96). 
2
 Zahn translated and quoted from A. Schwarz 'Das Individuelle in der Statistik: Ein Beitrag zur 
statistisches methodenlehre' in ASA, 22: 1932, p.321 
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Good versus bad stock; pure versus impure genetics; Aryan versus Jewish 
bloodlines; healthy versus diseased populations: black and white categories and 
classifications of elements circulating in populations revolving around ascriptions of net-
social-worth and risk through biological frames of reference were at the heart of Nazi 
governmentality spawning divisive caesuric practices everywhere across the Greater 
Reich. As populations were increasingly delimited, cases risk assessed, and lists policed, 
more social policies emerged involving empirically reductive differentiation and 
enforcement. "The Nazi functionaries understood all too well what kind of differentiation 
it should be. They separated the productive from the unproductive, the useful from the 
useless" (Aly, Roth, Black, and Oksiloff 2004, p.95). Indeed, Nazi raceologists and 
statisticians, and increasingly, all German nationals, came to see society through the lens 
of black and white categories, classifications, and social divisions—all of which 
functioned on the reduction of populations and cases to statistical distributions and 
measures of productivity and risk. "As the egalitarian principle was systematically 
destroyed and as the population began to be categorized into superior and inferior, the 
power of statistics increased" (ibid, p.24). 
Indeed, in The Nazi Conscience, Claudia Koonz (2003) argues that Nazi pseudo-
science interweaving both statistics and eugenics provided scientific and rational 
validation for engaging the deplorable kinds of social divisions that marked much of life 
under the Third Reich; playing a central role in assuaging the consciences of German 
nationals everywhere. Racial science coupled with statistics had provided more than 
ample scientific proof of the threat the Jews and undesirables posed to the Volk, 
ultimately justifying and validating the delimitation and policing of the movement of 
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these unproductive, and moreover, 'diseased elements' through their reduction to 
trackable statistical objects and risk assessed scores. For German nationals, the 
delimitation, policing, and eventual nullification of abnormal populations was 
increasingly seen as the cost for maintaining a healthy and productive Volk. 
Indeed, Ian Hacking (1991) argues in his epistemological survey of statistical 
thinking in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that, 
Statistics has helped determine the forms of laws about society and the character 
of social facts. It has engendered concepts and classifications within the human 
sciences. Moreover the collection of statistics has created, at the least, a great 
bureaucratic machinery. It may think of itself as providing only information, but it 
is itself a part of the technology of power in a modern state (p. 181). 
Hacking (1991) in The Foucault Effect describes how with the advent of statistics 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries determinism as a way of practicing government 
was increasingly eroded, as milieus of circulation, governed by market mechanisms, 
which did not prevent, prohibit, or prescribe, but let things happen based on probabilities 
and populations, were increasingly installed by the apparatuses of security. Indeed, for 
Hacking, determinism was eroded precisely by the creation of these 'new places for 
freedom' (ibid, p. 189) in which elements circulated freely, coming to be governed by 
what Hacking calls the 'taming of chance' (Hacking 1990). "In short, almost no domain 
of human enquiry is left untouched by the events that I call the avalanche of numbers, the 
erosion of determinism and the taming of chance" (Hacking 1991, p. 189). Moreover, 
most of the modern categories through which we think about people, things, activities, 
and the development of knowledge—this interweaving—are installed by our attempts to 
collect numerical data and delimit populations (Hacking 2006). With the emergence of 
such statistical practice, different kinds of people came to be counted, as the categories 
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installed by censuses and the creation of other statistical bureaucracies began to establish 
the form of'class structure' in industrial societies (Hacking 1991). 
The bureaucracy of statistics imposes not just by creating administrative rulings 
but by determining classifications within which people must think of themselves 
and of the actions that are open to them. The hallmark of indeterminism is that 
cliche, information and control. The less the determinism, the more the 
possibilities for constraint (Hacking 1991, p. 194). 
Risk Assessment in the Third Reich 
In a 1934 essay entitled 'On the Economic Value of a Human Being as an Object 
of Statistics,' Friedrich Zahn wrote: 
The only value of a human being—and this is a direct object of statistics—is his 
economic value. In the money economy, this is the monetary worth of human 
labor productivity.. .Statistics is thus in its essence related to the Nationalist 
Socialist idea [which] has as its goal the dividing and classifying of the whole. 
Categorizing through an organic mode of thinking puts the whole before the parts. 
Thus it is relatively easy for statistics to work for German life in its entirety as 
long as it values the individual as a part of the community' (Aly, Roth, Black, and 
Oksiloff2004,p.94)3. 
According to Zahn, the only pertinent measure of a human being was that of their 
productive economic relation to the greater population, the Volk, and as such, the value 
ascribed to cases in the Nazis' statistical 'organic mode of thinking' (ibid) was based on 
exactly the same principles and measures accorded by the insurance industry: 'We must 
consider age, health, occupational hazards, and expected life earnings,' Zahn wrote4 (ibid, 
p.94). Indeed, the ties between the insurance industry and the apparatuses of security are 
profound and longstanding. Francois Ewald (1991) argues that one of the critical 
conditions that made possible the modern word 'sociopolitics' is the entry into 
3
 From F. Zahn 'Vom Wirtschaftswert des Menschen als Gegenstand der Statistik' in ASA, 24, 1934-35, 






governmental thought of a philosophy of risk. "Risk, enterprise, progress and modernity 
are genealogically interdependent social ideas" (Gordon 1991, p.39). In historicizing how 
the concepts of 'risk' and risk taking' are products of insurance techniques, wherein the 
insurer takes on the risk of a client, or statistical object, 'freely' circulating in a 
distribution of cases, in a population, all contained in a milieu of unpredictability, one of 
Ewald's critical insights is that 'risk is a capital, not a spirit of capitalism' (ibid). 
Risk becomes in the nineteenth century, as Ewald shows, a kind of omnivorous 
encyclopaedizing principle for the objectification of possible experience - not 
only in the hazards of personal life and private venture, but also of the common 
venture of society (Gordon 1991, p.39). 
Indeed, this 'organic mode of thinking'—a vision of human value as a measure of 
actual and expected cost-productivity, or socio-economic value over time, or the 
probability of risk for elements circulating freely in milieus—was promulgated 
throughout the Third Reich, insidiously woven into the minutiae of everyday practices: 
"The reduction of men to points on a cost-productivity curve, to shaded segments of a 
statistical bar, and to cost-benefit analyses had become a standard feature of the high 
school curriculum" (Aly, Roth, Black, and Oksiloff 2004, p.95). In this way, Nazi 
statisticians and eugenic pseudo-scientists advocated a belief system—a way of seeing— 
that pivoted on one crucial empirical reduction: 
'A man's right to live was determined by his net worth to Nazi society. Statistics 
is identical in character with the National Socialist idea.' Zahn5 called for a 
'registration of the various risks which threaten the value of productivity: 
illnesses, disability, unemployment and non-accomplishment of occupational 
goals. Population engineering,' he emphasized, 'would rely upon extensive data 
analysis, including statistics from a gamut of health bureaus, disability and 
liability insurers, unemployment offices, and even academic testing data from 





Indeed, the Nazi way of seeing human beings as reducible to points on a cost-
productivity curve—valuing and risk assessing human life as empirical scores distributed 
in populations—brought with it attendant ways of doing. "Quickly, the notion of 
sterilizing the physically undesirable expanded to include the socially undesirable. So-
called anti-socials, that is misfits who seemed to be unsuited for labor, became targets" 
(ibid, p.94). As the vision of 'human net value' was promulgated throughout the Third 
Reich, increasingly the German population became accustomed to and comfortable with 
delimitation and policing practices revolving around suspending the movement of, or 
outright removing 'undesirable elements' from everyday society. In this way, Germans 
began to overwhelmingly see the need to put the whole of society before its individual 
parts; and in turn, undesirable elements were being weeded out, sterilized, and/or 
exterminated for the good of the Volk. Indeed, for Zahn, 
.. .population politics, according to the principles of racial hygiene, has to focus 
on the propagation of valuable genetic stock, prevent the reproduction of inferior 
life, and be aware of genetic degeneration. In other words, population politics 
involves superior life selection, on the one hand, and the eradication of genetically 
unwanted stock on the other. An ethno-biological diagnosis is inevitable in order 
to carry out this task (ibid, p.105)6. 
By 1939, the Nazis' desire to significantly reduce 'genetically unwanted stock' in 
the Third Reich, including people with mental illnesses, loafers, and social misfits, was at 
its apex. Caesuric fractures had come to pivot almost all aspects of everyday life, as the 
Germans tabulated, calculated, and organized society more and more through the double 
integration of statistical techniques; the delimitation of biological populations, the 
calculation and policing of the risky elements they contained, in a self-elaborating 
Zahn quoted from H.W. Kranz and S. Roller's study 'The Anti-Socials,' "Die 
Gemeinschaftsunfahigen'—ein Beitrag zur wissenschaftlichen un praktischen Losung des sogenannten' 
Asozialenproblems', Teil I, II, and III. GieGen, 1939-1941 
57 
58 
process where statistics were increasingly seen as a 'natural' purveyor and fabricator of 
truth. Ethno-biological diagnoses and caesuric fractures were at a maxim in the Greater 
Reich, as lists were redeployed in juridical-disciplinary mechanisms, and also operated as 
technologies of security in their own right for managing the policing of threatening cases. 
Indeed, seeing the 'abnormal' as unproductive economic elements of society, who 
offered little or no return-on-investment, brought with it new social research, programs, 
and policies that would redeploy lists in a variety of functions. In the fall of 1939, a 
program named 'Economically Based Survey of all Mental Institutions and Nursing 
Homes' was introduced by the Administration of the Reich Interior Ministry and included 
a medical questionnaire. 
All patients who had been in these institutions for more than five years, who were 
incarcerated as criminals, or who, according to their medical records, suffered 
from schizophrenia, epilepsy, senility, feeble-mindedness, or 'irreversible 
paralysis' and 'did not work in institutional factories or were only able to perform 
mechanical tasks (e.g. plucking)' had to be reported.. .The source of the 
individual's financial support was to be identified, as well as the 'exact' 
productivity of the sick person... [A] reduction program began in autumn of 1939 
under the code word 'Euthanasia'. These 'useless eaters,' whose productivity was 
in the red anyway because of their health status, were singled out and 
exterminated (ibid, p.96). 
Seeing human beings as distributed and risk-assessed 'net-value' cases in 
populations, a view promulgated by Friedrich Zahn and the 'statistical soldiers of the 
Third Reich,' not only enabled the widespread social acceptance of mandatory 
sterilization, but also eventually, came to assuage collective conscience (Koonz 2003) 
with regards to the extermination of undesirable elements in this biopolitical milieu of 
circulation. Indeed, statistically speaking, extermination equaled success for the Nazis; 
the complete nullification of the abnormal, since any living and breathing human being 
whose productivity in society reduced to a negative number were seen as little more than 
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'economic dead weight,' or worse a threat to Aryanism itself (Aly, Roth, Black, and 
Oksiloff2004,p.98). 
The National Socialist State elevated the statistical sciences to a role that went 
well beyond research involving pure numbers and general economic conditions. 
Behind the pomp of the blood and soil, hereditary man, and the dying-V6Ik 
rhetoric lurked a social politics that cloaked itself in claims of objectivity. The 
person becomes a case, an example, an index card (Aly, Roth, Black, and Oksiloff 
2004, p.22-3). 
Moreover, as Claudia Koonz (2003) argues, such cases, examples, and index 
cards exert minimum weight on human conscience when nullified, least of all when 
reduced to numbers and scores. Indeed, by 1944, 'undesirables' in the Greater Reich were 
further reduced to one last statistical object—a 'talking number'—ein sprechende zahl; a 
concept introduced by Friedrich Zahn. 
It would simplify matters if every inhabitant of the German Reich were to receive 
a particular identification number, a number that accompanied him from birth to 
death.. .This number would not simply be a random one.. .It would have to be a 
talking number [sprechende Zahl], a number that would convey basic information 
about the bearer; information that had already been used in identifying the person 
other than through his or her name, such as sex and place and date of birth. 
However, it would also have to be a simple number without any special markings 
and without fractions, a number that could appear alongside other numbers. This 
would be a number that could easily be a part of a list or index (Aly, Roth, Black, 
and Oksiloff 2004, p. 121). 
By 1944, the transformation of individuals into listed or indexed cases, examples, 
and paper identities was increasingly seen as insufficient for the Nazis extensive and 
highly orchestrated plans; ".. .a number was now necessary to freeze things in their 
tracks" (ibid, p. 122). Thus a final reduction of the human species was at hand, from cases 
in populations, to worth/risk-assessed scores circulating freely in milieus, with 
'dangerous' elements listed for policing. "Even if these dreams of technocratic prowess 
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were only realized on a small scale, the last eight months of the National Socialist regime 
saw a feverish push to create a general identification numbering system" (ibid, p. 123). 
The most important component was the assignment of a numerically based code 
to each individual. If this 'talking number' were to be integrated into a central 
filing system based on the punch card principle, then it would be possible to 
create links to other existing card files. Then the era of 'final accounting of 
humans' would be ushered in, at which point individuals would not only be 
inventoried at certain levels, but on an individual and permanent basis. A site for 
central data collection, which the planners of the war so desperately needed in 
order to 'move the right person to the right location,' was in sight (ibid, p. 134). 
In this 'final accounting of humans' which would come to be seen as capable of 
distributing and regulating all elements of the Volk; the identification of individuals 
reduced to risk assessed numbers and subjected to delimitation and policing of circulation 
through massively organized information systems; paved the way for new revelations 
about the limitations of yearly, or bi-yearly census-taking practices, and the advantages of 
ongoing everyday registration of the populace. Increasingly the Nazis dreamed of an 
everyday registration system that could track the social, political, financial, and biological 
meanderings of the entire populace of the Reich, enabling up-to-date delimitation and 
policing of 'abnormal populations' and the 'diseased' cases they contained. In May of 
1944, Dr. Friedrich Herbst, a director at the Accounting Office for the Third Reich, 
succinctly summarized the revelations as such, 
While there have been occasional censuses in the past, which were inventories for 
a particular date, there needs to be an accounting of the deployment and status of 
each individual person. In this way, up-to-date statistical data would always be 
available that could be used in decisions regarding individual deployment. It 
would also provide us with statistical information about movements within the 
populace. The basis for this accounting is the continuous registration of arrivals, 




In other words, the Nazis were in many ways masters of Foucault's 
governmentality, deploying statistical mechanisms to delimit populations, and provide 
information about movements within them for policing purposes. Indeed, had the Nazis 
prevailed it might have only been a matter of time before they would have designed and 
developed a daily automated registration system—a final accounting of humans— 
providing up-to-date tracking and regulating the distribution of the financial, social, 
political, and biological meanderings of cases across the Greater Reich. Nazi 
governmentality had arrived and total information awareness of the apparatuses of 
security was really just around the corner; a hegemonic conjunction of technologies, 
divisive social practices, and juridical-disciplinary mechanisms that pivot on the 
delimitation and risk assessment of the movement of 'dangerous cases' had been 
established and cemented; all policed through the technology of lists. 
In everyday language the term 'risk' is understood as a synonym for danger or 
peril, for some unhappy event which may happen to someone; it designates an 
objective threat. In insurance the term designates neither an event nor a general 
kind of event occurring in reality, but a specific mode of treatment of certain 
events capable of happening to a group of individuals - or more exactly, to values 
or capitals possessed or represented by a collectivity of individuals: that is to say, 
a population. Nothing is a risk in itself, there is no risk in reality. But on the other 
hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one considers the danger, 
considers the event (Ewald 1991, p. 199). 
For Robert Castel (1991) also, the 'new' strategies of risk assessment that emerge 
with the apparatuses of security, further erode the notion of a 'dangerous' individual 
subject, and put in place a conjunction of factors, 'the factors of risk' (p.281), that delimit 
statistical objects. Indeed, it is through the techniques of risk assessment that the 
apparatuses of security establish and ensure flows of populations (people and things), and 
at the same time, delimit dangers, based on the calculation of a range of abstract factors 
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randomly deemed as liable to produce risk in the installed milieu of circulation. What is 
palpable here is the double integration effect of statistics and the techniques of risk 
assessment as technologies of security in policing assemblages. On the one hand, the 
apparatuses of security neither prohibit, nor prescribe, but simply install a space of free 
circulation for elements in milieus, established as populations, whose distribution and 
regulation is attended to by statistical worth/risk assessment techniques. But at the same 
time as installing a 'free' milieu of circulation, statistics become a key instrument in the 
policing of elements themselves, by materializing a series of abstract factors as risk, that 
serve to enforce the normalization of the populations that statistics itself calls into reality. 
Such a shift becomes possible as soon as the notion of risk is made autonomous 
from that of danger. A risk does not arise from the presence of particular precise 
danger embodied in a concrete individual or group. It is the effect of a 
combination of abstract factors which render more or less probable the occurrence 
of undesirable modes of behavior (Castel 1991, p.288). 
Thus we can see how the preventive policies advocated by statistical technologies 
and risk assessment techniques in apparatuses of security, in many ways promote a 'new 
mode of surveillance,' that of'systematic predetection' (Castel 1991, p.288). Castel 
describes the erosion of the individual subject, and the emergence of the 'case of risk 
factors' through an examination of contemporary techniques for gauging abnormalities in 
children, without actually observing the child in corporeal reality, but rather, through 
identity-based screening; a series of questions regarding factors of risk. In this regard, he 
argues, that 
To intervene no longer means, or at the least not to begin with, taking as one's 
target a given individual, in order to correct, punish or care for him or her.. .There 
is, in fact, no longer a relation of immediacy with a subject because there is no 
longer a subject. What the new preventive policies primarily address is no longer 
individuals but factors, statistical correlations of heterogeneous elements. They 
deconstruct the concrete subject of intervention, and reconstruct a combination of 
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factors liable to produce risk. They primary aim is not to confront a concrete 
dangerous situation, but to anticipate all the possible forms of irruption of danger 
(Castell991,p.288). 
As Castel also reminds us, eugenic practices were widespread during the first 
third of the twentieth century, and that even in a country like the United States, with its 
supposed preeminent liberty, special laws, like those enacted in Missouri in 1923, 
imposed sterilization for a wide range of abnormal persons. Indeed, it must be noted that 
it was not just the Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, and 'undesirables' of the Third Reich 
who were delimited, policed, rounded-up, and interned during World War II through a 
conjunction of security technologies (early computers, statistics, and lists), divisive social 
practices revolving around census and registration, as well as discourses of public health, 
security, and well-being. This conjunction also played a significant role in Allied war 
efforts too. 
In addition to the extensive use of Hollerith machines to crack enigma codes, IBM 
also developed powerful mobile Hollerith units for the United States military, which 
spawned IBM-trained military units (Machine Records Units) specializing in the 
deployment of IBM-made equipment. (Black 2001) "It was an irony of the war that IBM 
equipment was used to encode and decode for both sides of the conflict" (Black 2001, 
p.344), as well as to delimit and police populations not just in Nazi Germany, but around 
the globe. Indeed, IBM machines were not just used by Allied forces to wage war against 
the Nazis during World War II; they were also used to manage populations within and 
across nations. In addition to organizing millions of people for drafts and deployment, 
and locating servicemen around the world, as well as automating military payments; 
Hollerith sorters, tabulators and punch cards were also used extensively in analyzing the 
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results of the US census held in 1940 (Black 2001), risk assessing elements circulating in 
populations and identifying lists of dangerous cases in America too. 
In one radio address, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt promoted the 1940 census as 
'the greatest assemblage of facts ever collected by any people about the things 
that affect their welfare.' She acknowledged, 'Much doubt has been raised as to 
the propriety of some of the questions.' But she added, they were designed to 
yield 'facts which will provide illuminating data on problems which have become 
particularly pressing (Black 2001, p.345). 
Indeed, one of the 'pressing' problems confronted by President Roosevelt leading 
up to the United States' declaration of war in 1942 was the presence of 'threats' within 
American borders. Thanks in large part to their use of Hollerith sorters, tabulators, and 
punch cards; the United States Census Bureau began to track the racial ancestry of all 
American citizens beginning with the 1940 census. Indeed, immediately leading up to the 
US declaration of war, and in an eerily similar fashion to the Nazis, the United States 
began to leverage a conjunction of Hollerith technologies, census and registration 
practices, statistics, and lists as a theoretical and practical way and means of delimiting 
and policing the movement of 'threats' within their populations. 
Using IBM applications, the Census Bureau had tracked the racial ancestry of 
Japanese Americans based on their responses to the 1940 census.. .Census 
Director J.C. Capt confirmed, 'we didn't wait for the [American] declaration of 
war. On Monday morning, we put our people to work on the Japanese thing.' 
Since only 135,430 Japanese-Americans lived in the United States, the results 
were tabulated quickly. A single sort was necessary: race (Black 2001, p.345-6). 
Racial maps displaying Japanese population densities across the United States by 
the presence of dots—one for every ten Japanese-Americans—became a roadmap for 
identification and control in the United States. In this way, both "American and Dutch 
[Nazi-occupied] census bureaus simultaneously used Hollerith systems in 1943 to create 
racial 'dot maps' as a means of organizing transfers to concentration camps" (Black, 
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P.346). Just as the fate of Jews and 'undesirables' across the Greater Reich was 
determined by a conjunction of Hollerith technological systems, statistics, and lists, as 
well as a population's acquiescence to, and compliance with census and registration 
policies and practices with a view towards 'safe' and 'healthy' society, the fate of 
Japanese-Americans was equally assured in the US—delimitation, policing, and eventual 
internment in concentration camps. 
"By February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt could confidently sign Executive 
Order 9066 authorizing the internment of Japanese Americans on the West Coast" 
(Black, P.346-7). Roosevelt's confidence stemmed from the knowledge that virtually no 
Japanese-American could escape the net cast by the conjunction of Hollerith punch card 
systems, statistics, and lists of threats. But in addition to their reliance on IBM 
technology, what the Allies and Hitler also had in common was a need for extensive 
delimitation and policing of the movement of 'abnormal' cases within populations, which 
despite the use of Hollerith technologies, could never have been achieved without the 
adoption of ubiquitous census and registration policies and practices, and moreover, 
without the promulgation of a way of seeing humanity through a lens of net-worth and 
risk—seeing groups of people as populations and individuals as risk assessed statistical 
objects (cases) policed through lists. 
Statistics and the policing of dangerous elements 
The modern ideologies of prevention are overarched by a grandiose technocratic 
rationalizing dream of absolute control of the accidental, understood as the 
irruption of the unpredictable. In the name of this myth of absolute eradication of 
risk, they construct a mass of new risks which constitute so many new targets for 
preventive intervention (Castel 1991, p.289). 
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In this conjuncture of the apparatuses of security installed by Nazi 
governmentality, interventionist technologies, like statistics and their techniques of 
calculation, risk assessment, and prediction, as well early information technology, and list 
technologies, 'makes it possible to 'guide' and 'assign' individuals without having to 
assume their custody.' As Castel argues, the policing that statistics enable, "could well 
prove to be a decisive resource" (p.295). Indeed, for Foucault too, the instrument that 
guides, assigns and integrates, and is common to both the military-diplomatic technique 
of balance, and to policing, is statistics (Foucault 2007g). "Statistics is the state's 
knowledge of state, both of itself and other states" (p.315). 
Police makes statistics necessary, but police also makes statistics possible. For it 
is precisely the whole set of procedures set up to increase, combine, and develop 
forces, it is this whole administrative assemblage that makes it possible to identify 
what each states forces comprise and their possibilities of development. Police 
and statistics mutually condition each other (Foucault 2007g, p.315). 
Like all technologies of security, police and their attendant assemblages of 
techniques, are equally characterized by double integration effects: Assemblages of 
police technologies and techniques are deployed expressly to patrol the populations that 
statistics call into reality, both internal and external to the state. In this way, assemblages 
of police concern themselves with the distribution and regulation of elements circulating 
in populations and milieus, helping to ensure balance through the statistical operations of 
prediction, normalization, and steering of the movement of elements that other 
technologies of security, like computers, statistics, and lists materialize and call into 
reality. In this way, we can say that in 'securing' the 'freedom of movement' that 
governmentality takes as its maxim, computers, statistics, lists, and police all mutually 
condition and self-elaborate each other. 
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What is characteristic of a police state is its interest in what men do; it is 
interested in their activity, in their 'occupation.' The objective of police is 
therefore control of and responsibility for men's activity insofar as this activity 
constitutes a differential element in the development of the state's forces 
(Foucault 2007g, p.322). 
It is argued here that it is precisely for these reasons that statisticians like 
Friedrich Zahn derived their notions of 'talking numbers' as a means and ends to 
delimiting, policing, and normalizing the movement of threatening, abnormal cases. For 
if one is to manage the overall 'health' of the cultural organs of the Volk—the 
naturalness of the social—policing will take as its concrete task to provide itself with 
whatever juridical-disciplinary mechanisms are necessary and sufficient for efficiently 
and effectively assigning, guiding, and integrating the activity of people into the state's 
objectives, thus ensuring that the state, "in turn, can stimulate, determine, and orientate 
this activity in such a way that it is in fact useful to the state" (Foucault 2007g, p.322-3). 
And as statisticians like Zahn advocated, this form of policing was most efficiently 
practiced and expressed as a single risk-based 'talking' number. 
In this way, it is argued here, that double integration technologies of security, like 
statistics, computers, and lists, and their attendant techniques, hinge the apparatuses of 
security's assemblage of police, wherein the list is redeployed as a disciplinary 
mechanism which concerns itself with the administration, organization, patrol, and 
regulation of the distribution and circulation of people and things. But lists are also 
technologies of security in and of themselves in this picture of policing: ones which serve 
this assemblage in a unique way—instruments for both calling into reality, and efficiently 
and effectively assigning, guiding, integrating, and policing modern and contemporary 
caesuras of'us' and 'them.' 
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According to Foucault (2007g), assemblages of police concern themselves with 
numbers and populations (p.323); knowing how many elements are circulating in order to 
ensure that necessary and sufficient distributions of elements are present in populations to 
best meet the objectives of the state. When the apparatuses of security identify that 
necessary elements are not well distributed, lists are redeployed in assemblages of police 
to administer, manage, and organize the necessary distribution of sufficient resources. 
Indeed, when the apparatuses of security identify that there is a redundancy of elements 
in populations and milieus, and moreover, when elements are predicted to be risks to the 
'free' movement of 'normal' populations, lists are equally redeployed in assemblages of 
police, operationalized to delimit and nullify the movement of 'dangerous' elements, and 
in turn, secure 'free' circulation; the chief objective of governmentality. 
In this way, in the operations of policing milieus of circulation, the list continues 
to serve the administrative, organizational, and knowledge development roles it has 
historically played. But, at the same time, it also becomes an instrument for policing the 
whole material network that the apparatuses of security install: milieus that allow not 
only for the 'free' circulation of people, things, and knowledge, but also for circulating 
the concept of this kind of 'circulation' and 'policing' itself. That is to say, the whole 
self-elaborating set of constraints and blockages, including assemblages of police, that 
neither prohibit, nor prescribe but let things happen over and above any perceived notion 
of territory. 
Generally speaking, what police has to govern, its fundamental object, is all the 
forms of, let's say, men's coexistence with each other. I mean by this that police 
must ensure that men live, and live in large numbers; it must ensure that they have 
the wherewithal to live and so do not die in excessive numbers, but at the same 
time, it must also ensure that everything in their activity that may go beyond this 
pure and simple subsistence will in fact be produced, distributed, divided up, and 
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put in circulation in such a way that the state really can draw its strength from it 
(Foucault 2007g, p.326). 
In this way, early information technologies, statistics, and list technologies are the 
hinges of the technological assemblage of police, and it is indeed these further 
correlations of power of the state—the redeployment of juridical-disciplinary 
mechanisms in the installation of milieus of circulation—that allowed assemblages of 
police, like the Nazi Gestapo, to ensure that the forces and resources of the state— 
populations and their distributed elements—were put to good use in the protection and 
evolution of the Volk under Nazi governmentality. 
Now that we have seen how early information technologies, statistics, risk 
assessment, assemblages of police, and lists served Nazi governmentality, let us turn our 
attention to how juridical-disciplinary mechanisms underpinned by list technologies were 
redeployed in this modern art of governmentality, characterized by practices surrounding 
census and registration. 
Juridical-legal and disciplinary mechanisms in Nazi governmentality 
Precisely in the light of historical experience, censuses, with their seemingly 
objective data and usefulness for policymaking, constitute an assault on the social 
imagination. Humanity is in danger of being run over by a steamroller of data. 
The continuous counting and singling out of the weakest and those who are 
isolated by sociological constellations only serves to deepen inequality and break 
up social existence, rendering it into splinters and particles (Aly, Roth, Black, and 
Oksiloff2004,p.7). 
Germany had a long history of census-taking prior to the pivotal 1933 census7 
including early counts in states like Prussia all the way back to 1816 (Aly, Roth, Black, 
and Oksiloff 2004). Indeed, it was the Imperial Office of Statistics that conducted the first 
7
 Pivotal, in that the results of the 1933 census were calculated through the use of Hollerith tabulators, 
sorters and punch cards (Black 2001; Aly, et al. 2004) 
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general, all-German census in 1871, and subsequently, censuses were held in 1875, and 
for every five years up until 1915 (ibid.). Like those held in the United States in this era, 
these censuses were little more than basic head counts. During and post-WWI, such 
counts were conducted in Germany in 1916,1917, and 1919, all of which were 
specifically geared toward the maintenance of post-war society, focusing on basic 
questions of food rations and vocational and business registration (ibid). Another census 
was held in 1925 with a focus on 'economic and social-statistical evaluation' of 
populations in Germany (ibid p. 16). But due to financial objections by various states, the 
Weimar Republic's last government postponed the census planned for 1930 repeatedly. 
However, immediately upon seizing power in January 1933, Hitler ignored any 
objections and made the census one of his government's first priorities, calling it into law 
on April 12, 1933 with a decree for counting on June 16, 1933 (ibid). 
Indeed, a series of seemingly banal, but highly exclusionary laws were put into 
effect in April of 1933, which ultimately paved the way for intense registration in Nazi 
Germany and the emergence of caesuric social fractures. Carrying innocuous names such 
as The law for the re-establishment of the career civil service (April 7), and The law for 
preventing overcrowding in German schools (April 25), these decrees served as the basis 
for the dismantling and splintering of the German Volk starting with the delimitation of 
Jewish and other 'diseased' populations (ibid). Indeed, these laws were the precursor to 
the intense delimitation and policing that would come to mark almost every aspect of 
daily life in Nazi Germany. 
As with the 1925 census, 'household lists' served as the basis for registration for 
the 1933 census (ibid). But the 1933 census proved to be different than those that had 
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been held prior, constituting a critical turning point in Nazi Germany. The 1933 census 
revealed two important implications for future registration and census taking (Black 
2001). Firstly, it clearly demonstrated that a mere head count was insufficient; not all 
Jews and 'diseased elements' could be delimited through such basic census taking 
measures alone, as more complex statistical operations would be required to trace genetic 
bloodlines and lineage. The complexities of what such massively organized information 
revealed were that while the 1933 census identified nearly half a million Jews, these were 
only the visible layer of Jews, the practicing Jews; and if all Jews were to be identified, 
including those that had been assimilated through generations, new statistical practices 
involving delimitation and risk assessment would have to be developed in order to police 
such 'dangerous' elements. 
Between 1933 and 1939, The Reich Office of Statistics doubled its personnel to 
approximately 5,000 civil servants and employees (Aly, Roth, Black, and Oksiloff 2004). 
During these years, registration and the delimitation of populations quickly became the 
pivot and bureaucratic cornerstone of the Third Reich's power. Where the 1933 census 
aimed to list all Jews in the Reich, it only managed to capture the so-called 'practicing 
Jews', and as a result had the consequence of also raising questions as to what constituted 
a Jew in this first place; and further, how to efficiently and effectively go about 
delimiting, distributing, and policing more precise populations. Nazi race theory coupled 
with statistical technologies sought to categorize ' Jewishness' more broadly than as a 
function of religious practice, through bloodline, and subsequent to the 1933 census, a 
fierce debate raged amongst Nazi theoreticians as to how far back to look. "Nazi 
theoreticians debated tracing parentage. Some looked at grandparents. Some suggested 
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searching back four generations. Still others focused on the year 1800, before Jewish 
emancipation, before assimilation into German society" (Black 2001, p.89). Indeed, 
subsequent to the 1933 census, Nazi race scientists began to devise 
.. .bizarre pseudo-mathematical formula[e] that grouped ancestral Jews into a 
series of grades, such as fully-Jewish, half-Jewish, and quarter-Jewish, depending 
upon how many Jewish parents and grandparents could be calculated from their 
past.. .Linguistics played a dynamic role. Words such as public health and 
medicine, nationality, foreigners, family, and. family genealogy, hereditary, and 
even the word, German, took on a special anti-Semitic implications. Jews were 
foreigners, and in many cases thought to be disease carriers. Racial impurity was 
a public health issue. Only Aryans could be Germans. The word German became 
exclusionary (Black 2001, p.90). 
Everyone In Nazi Germany was being forced to confront his or her racial 
ancestry. At the center of these debates was the Reichssippenamt, or Reich Family Office, 
a section of the Reich Interior Ministry, which ultimately had the final authority in 
ascribing Jewish or Aryan status (Black 2001). Indeed, the second implication of the 
1933 census was how the census itself morphed; no longer was it to be just about 
evaluating current and future population trends, but became something more akin to 
racial road-mapping; a means of not only delimiting the disease-ridden organs of the 
Volk, namely Jews and undesirables, but also a ".. .vehicle for calculating the expected 
number of births by 'biologically valuable' women in the years to come" (Aly, Roth, 
Black, and Oksiloff 2004, p. 17). In other words, a new way of seeing and doing the 
distribution of necessary and sufficient elements that would ensure the 'healthy' 
evolution of the Volk. Where the results of earlier censuses provided very limited 
snapshots of populations, the Nazis came to see that the census could effectively provide 
a platform, or a milieu of circulation in which statistical delimitation and nullification, 
through list technologies deployed in assemblages of police, would be seen as critical to 
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securing the preservation of Aryan lineage itself. This way of seeing censuses, 
registration, statistics, early information technologies, and lists as ways of doing 'racial 
roadmaps' laid the groundwork and paved the way for even more juridical-legal and 
disciplinary mechanisms aimed at promoting a 'healthy' Volk. 
Starting in 1933 special loans for married couple were offered as an incentive for 
promoting marriage. These loans could be paid off by having offspring: Nazi-
demographic politicians raised the monetary incentives by offering cash payments 
for each child born to a couple. The sum increased substantially with the fourth 
child. However, families could only claim these payments if the wife (if possible) 
stopped working, if the applicant was Aryan and a German citizen, and if the 
'applicant' was 'free from any hereditary diseases' (Aly, Roth, Black, and 
Oksiloff2004,p.l8). 
In practice, what these two implications of the 1933 census had in common— 
calling into question what constituted a Jew, and the promotion of healthy Aryan stock 
through the effective use of racial roadmaps—was the fostering of what Foucault (2007) 
and also Giorgio Agamben (2000) refer to as 'caesuras'; biopolitical fractures that 
culminated in Nazi governmentality with the establishment of strict divisions between 
Germans and Jews; equally functioning to install schisms between all 'undesirables' and 
the German Volk. The registration of bodies through strict and utterly divisive juridical-
legal mechanisms were thus seen as paramount to the survival of Aryan lineage itself, 
and quintessential to the protection of Aryan hereditary stock were disciplinary lists of 
threats. 
Indeed, "after 1933 National Socialism was publicized as 'the biological will of 
the German people', and as 'political biology'" (Krausnick, Bucheim, Broszat, and 
Jacobsen 1968), as increasingly, census and registration practices in Nazi Germany were 
inextricably tied to the statistical derivation of eugenic and racial pseudo-scientific 
imaginings, paving the way for the invocation of numerous divisive laws from 1933 
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through 1945, with their attendant caesuric practices, all aimed at diagnosing, policing, 
and ultimately cleansing German society of its diseased elements. In late June of 1933, 
Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick detailed an extensive program aimed at evaluating the 
Volkskorper, or "... 'ethnic body politic,' according to 'genetic value' as a crucial 
dimension of a comprehensive moral revolution that would revive communal values" 
(Koonz2003,p.l03). 
On July 14, 1933...the law for the 'prevention and continuance of hereditary 
disease' was promulgated, stipulating that 'those afflicted with a hereditary 
disease may be sterilized by a surgical operation if there is medical evidence to 
suggest that their descendants will most likely be afflicted by serious hereditary 
disorders of the body or the mind' (Agamben 1998, p. 148-9). 
Indeed, such juridical-legal mechanisms pivoted on a eugenic 'natural history' 
that imagined and classified Jewishness as a population, hereditary disease, and risk in 
the 'biological' milieu of circulation Nazi governmentality installed. And such 
'hereditary disease' would be delimited by statistical techniques, policed through list 
technologies, and ultimately normalized en masse in gas chambers. On October 18, 1933, 
caesuric legislation was extended to marriage through the law for the protection of the 
hereditary health of the German people (Agamben 1998, p. 149). In 1934, The Law for 
Simplification of the Health System required doctors and other clinicians to fill out 
detailed forms constituting intense racial profiling, file them with local Health Offices, 
and eventually up to the Reich Statistical Office in Berlin (Koonz 2003). The Law for the 
Prevention of Genetically Sick Offspring was also invoked in 1934, involving the 
determination of bloodlines based on the statistical probability of 'endowing defective 
genes.' Sterilization was initially specified for individuals deemed insane, retarded, 
epileptic, or manic-depressive, but ultimately came to contain 'anti-socials' in general, 
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including loafers—those who routinely missed or were late for work—and of course to 
Jews (Koonz 2003). 
What is decisive is that for the Nazis these laws had an immediately political 
character. As such, they are inseparable from the Nuremberg laws on 'citizenship 
in the Reich' and on the 'protection of German blood and honor,' which 
transformed Jews into second-class citizens, forbidding among other things, 
marriage between Jews and full citizens.. .The laws authorizing discrimination 
against Jews have almost completely monopolized scholarly interest in the racial 
politics of the Third Reich. And yet the laws concerning the Jews can only be 
fully understood if they are brought back to the general context of National 
Socialism's legislation and biopolitics. This legislation and this praxis are not 
simply reducible to the Nuremberg laws, to the deportations to the camps, or even 
to the 'Final Solution': these decisive events of our century have their foundation 
in the unconditional assumption of a biopolitical task in which life and politics 
become one (Agamben 1998, p. 149). 
Indeed, revelations garnered from the lists of 'diseased elements' generated by the 
1933 census, coupled with the invocation of subsequent registration decrees and laws, 
compounded by the widespread acceptance of the pseudo-science of Nazi raceology and 
eugenics, coalesced as biopolitical praxis in Nazi Germany, or an art of governmentality, 
involving the redeployment of juridical-disciplinary mechanisms in apparatuses of 
security, wherein registration, delimitation and the policing of divisive social caesuras 
through lists came to increasingly mark all facets of daily life. Moreover, citizens of the 
Greater Reich became accustomed to and comfortable with a form of governmentality 
based on the functional installation of caesuras and the increasing delimitation of all 
'dangerous' people, things, and knowledge. And at the hub of it all were lists, whose 
'double integration' effects wielded the greatest force in the gloved-hand of a storm 
trooper. 
As such, registration laws proliferated like wildfire under Nazi governmentality: 
The Labor Book, requiring all Germans to register by occupation, was enacted in 1935; 
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The Health Pedigree Book was a national registry focusing on isolating genetic 
deficiencies amongst the entire populace which was also enacted in 1935; the Duty to 
Register invoked in 1938 was a precursor to the 1939 census, a legally decreed registry 
intended to yield a comprehensive and alphabetized listings of the entire populace, or 
Volkskartei. 
Lists were everywhere. Non-Germanic Registries were maintained in police 
stations, employment bureaus, professional associations, church organization, 
local Nazi departments, and the SS Security Office (Black 2001, p.92). 
Indeed, the series of registration laws, decrees and juridical-legal mechanisms 
invoked between 1933 and 1939 paved the way for a bureaucratic foundation on which 
the intense delimitation and policing of the movement of 'diseased elements,' or rather 
their eradication could be enacted. 
Lists were distributed, exchanged and updated continuously, often in a haphazard 
fashion. To cope with the growing bureaucratic fascination with punch-card 
records, senior Interior Ministry officials reviewed one fanciful proposal for a 
twenty-five-floor circular tower of data to centralize all personal information. The 
proposal was rejected because it would take years to build and stock. But the 
futuristic concept opened the eyes of Reich planners. Each of the twenty-five 
floors in the imagined tower would be comprised of 12 circular rooms 
representing one birth year. Every circular room would contain 31 cabinets, one 
for each day of the month. Each cabinet would in turn contain 7,000 names. 
Registrations and updates would feed in from census bureaus. All 60 million 
Germans could then be organized and cross-indexed in a single location 
regardless of change of residence. Data could be retrieved by some 1,500 couriers 
running from room to room like so many magnetic impulses fetching files (Black 
2001, p.91-92). 
Despite such grand 'panoptic' visions of how the list could serve the 
administration and organization of people and things, and equally, the development of 
knowledge on such a massive scale, there was no list in Nazi governmentality that 
represented more risk to the milieu of circulation installed by Nazi planners and 
organizers, than the list of all 'racial Jews' in the Greater Reich, traced back generations, 
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through the delimitation of increasingly particularized populations. On September 15, 
1935, The Reich Citizenship Act was brought into law, stipulating unequivocally that, 
"No Jew can be a Reich citizen. The right to vote on political questions is not extended to 
him and he may not be appointed to any office of State" (Aly, Roth, Black, and Oksiloff 
2004, p.32). Jews were on their way to being not only fully delimited, but also, at the 
same time, fully denationalized in the Third Reich, increasingly policed at every turn by 
lists. 
Indeed, in order to fully enforce all of these biopolitical laws, the Nazis needed 
comprehensive listings of the Jews. Beginning in 1936, the Gestapo and Criminal Police 
became increasingly involved and active in registration processes (Aly, Roth, Black, and 
Oksiloff 2004). As Foucault (2007) describes, politics and policing became increasingly 
indistinguishable, doubly integrated in this assemblage of security. Indeed, after 1938, 
whenever the Nazis invaded a foreign country, the frontline consisted of Security 
Services (Gestapo and Criminal Police) who would immediately register, count, and 
separate whole populations. "Residential registers, church books, Jewish books, and files 
of any kind were the primary items of interest for the German occupation 
commissioners" (Black 2001, p.84-5). And the more the Nazis registered and delimited 
populations, the more they trapped Jews and undesirables in a conjunctive net from 
which there was no escape. 
The Reich Registration Order of January 6, 1938, accustomed the German 
people—up through May 8, 1945—to police surveillance of their comings and 
goings, a control that was hitherto unknown in most states and regions.. .This was 
invoked for 'the protection of the people against criminals and the Security 




For these were no ordinary criminals; they were racial criminals, whose bare 
lives threatened the German Volk's very biological existence and natural history, and the 
disease that such cases represented would be contained by the assemblage of early 
computers, statistics, and lists as a mechanism of police. By May 1939 the Nazis could 
identify with almost one hundred percent precision every 'practicing Jew' in the Reich; 
but still this was insufficient. 
The 1939 census was to be different. [Friedrich] Burgdorfer [Director of the 
Office of Statistics] wrote, 'I hope that we will now approach the goal of the total 
registration of all Jews and mixed Jews in the old Reich and in Austria with the 
help of a general and far-reaching registration of family trees' (Aly, Roth, Black, 
and Oksiloff 2004, p.71-2). 
Indeed, the 1939 census had a far more elaborate agenda than those held prior: To 
delimit, police, and ultimately, nullify the so-called 'racial Jews' across the Reich, those 
that had been assimilating since the 1800s. At the same time the 1939 census intended to 
also classify all 'racial Jews' from the new, expanded Reich (Black 2001); delimiting 
populations of Jews everywhere across Nazi-occupied Europe and locating each specific 
case, all as a precursor to the necessary and effective re-distribution of such diseased 
elements of the Volk into ghettoes, concentration camps, and ultimately gas chambers. 
It was the Reich Office for Statistics, rather than any quasi-official Nazi 
organizations, that perfected the registration process on a step-by-step basis. The 
1939 census was the cornerstone in the ongoing registration of Jews. Artur Kaab, 
the organizer of the Volkskartei [people's registry], formulated the goal publicly: 
The Jews will be identified through the processing of their cards in past for 
present considerations and in part in preparation for future plans. It is absolutely 
clear that we must have an overview that includes information on residential 
address. The communities, state police administrators, and county counselors 
must have an overview of whether any Jews live in their districts and, if so, where 
(Black 2001, p.84). 
A special envelope containing a Supplemental Card (Hollerith punch card) was 
created expressly for the 1939 census, and these punch cards carried but a single column, 
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coded for descent—a column that had been designed into the card prototype long before 
the census was engaged (Black 2001). Indeed, this Supplemental Card, containing the 
crucial 'bloodline data,' would ultimately produce the lists that would operate as the pivot 
for the delimitation and nullification of Jews and undesirables across the Third Reich. 
The data assembled from the 1939 census, and specifically the Supplemental Card, 
provided the Nazis with a crucial component of the 'Final Solution', a single national 
register of the entire Third Reich; a comprehensive listing of all Jews and 'diseased 
elements' of the Volk. By the end of 1939 all populations and cases in the Greater Reich 
that had been classified in any way as Jewish—whether full-Jewish, half-Jewish, or 
married Jews—were delimited and listed many times over, readied for statistical 
nullification, or rather, eradication. 
Racial purity was not just a catchphrase for the Nazis, it was an obsession. 
Germany wanted more that a society of Aryans, it wanted a master race: tall, 
strong, blond, and blue-eyed, intellectually and physically dominant. Eugenics 
became an elite cult. Nazis sought to weed out the weaker elements of its 
population, regardless of parentage—even from among their own people. The 
mentally ill, diseased, handicapped, homosexual individuals, and certainly Jews, 
Gypsies, and a group of misfits termed 'anti-social' were not to be part of 
Germany's future (Black 2001, p.93). 
By 1939, stringent delimitation and policing of'undesirables' across the Greater 
Reich became accepted practices, and in many ways, became a modus operandi of 
everyday life for all German nationals. And all of this had been achieved through 
increasingly ubiquitous tracking and registration practices. And ultimately, for most, 
there would be no escaping their registration, and the coded numerical reductions that 
came to mark their lives in the Greater Reich. 
A few hours before Eichmann's execution, his Israeli prison warden asked him to 
respond, as an 'expert', to the following question: What should the Jews have 
done? How could the Jews have resisted, in your view? Eichmann: By 
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disappearing. We would have been at a loss if they had disappeared before being 
registered and concentrated. The number of our commandos was very small, and 
even if local police had helped us with all they had, their chances would have 
been at least fifty-fifty. A mass flight would have been disastrous for us (Aly, 
Roth, Black, and Oksiloff 2004, p.93)8. 
The biopolitical milieu of circulation: managing the Volk's cultural organs 
The relation between the individual and the collective, between the totality of the 
social body and its elementary fragments, is made to function in a completely 
different way: it will function differently in what we call population. The 
government of populations is, I think, completely different from the exercise of 
sovereignty over the fine grain of individual behaviors (Foucault 2007f, p.66). 
Indeed, to speak of caesuras, list technologies, and Nazi governmentality is to 
speak of a conjuncture of technologies of security that installed a milieu of circulation, 
wherein the categorization, classification, naming, and 'securing' of'threatening 
biological populations' was valued above all else—a way of seeing and doing the human 
species as an empirical and ordered reduction where probabilities, populations and the 
intermingling of'natural history' and 'biology' ruled the day. Indeed, in leveraging early 
punch card computing technologies, statistics, and lists, and through the redeployment of 
juridical-disciplinary mechanisms, Nazi governmentality took the fracture of 'threatening 
populations' from 'normal populations' to a new extreme; infusing a definite biopolitical 
tone to the classification and ordering of the human species, to the point of using 
metaphors of disease to describe the fundamental caesuras that were at once the hallmark, 
and pivot of Nazi governmentality: Aryan || Jew. 
This is no better evidenced than in a speech delivered at the opening of a 'new' 
IBM facility in Berlin on January 8, 1934 by Willy Heidinger (an IBM salesman who in 
1910 founded Dehomag—IBM Germany—and was its major shareholder in 1934): 
8
 Translated and quoted from H. Kipphardt, Bruder Eichmann, Rowohlt, p. 114 
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The physician examines the human body and determines whether all organs are 
working to the benefit of the entire organism... We [Dehomag] are very much like 
the physician, in that we dissect, cell by cell, the German cultural body. We report 
every individual characteristic on a little card. These are not dead cards, quite the 
contrary, they prove later on that they come to life when the cards are sorted at a 
rate of 25,000 per hour according to certain characteristics. These characteristics 
are grouped like the organs of our cultural body, and they will be calculated and 
determined with the help of our tabulating machine. We are proud that we may 
assist in such task, a task that provides our nation's physician [Adolf Hitler] with 
the material he needs for his examinations. Our Physician can then determine 
whether the calculated values are in harmony with the health of our people. It also 
means that if such is not the case, our Physician can take corrective procedures to 
correct the sick circumstances. Our characteristics are deeply rooted in our race. 
Therefore we must cherish them like a holy shrine which we will—and must— 
keep pure. We have the deepest trust in our Physician and will follow his 
instructions in blind faith, because we know that he will lead our people to a great 
future. Hail to our German people and der Filhrer9. 
What we can clearly glean from this speech is how fundamental to Nazi 
governmentality was a way of seeing and doing built on the 'double integration' of 
'microscopic' statistical science—the dissection, cell by cell, of the German cultural 
body, revealing all of its 'healthy' and 'diseased' organs—and the pseudo-science of 
Nazi eugenics and race theory, which together emerged as a powerful regime of truth 
under Nazi governmentality that delimited and sought to nullify 'threatening' populations 
in a the unique space of 'Aryan natural history' in which people, things and knowledge 
circulated. In other words, a way of seeing and doing that took as its primary metaphor 
the need to calculate, delimit, examine, determine, police, and nullify 'diseased cultural 
organs' and all of their circulating elements; populations and their individual cases. 
Indeed, when quantitative analyses are made of'cultural organs,' or populations, 
like they were under Nazi governmentality, in terms of 'disease' and 'health,' and when 
9
 Translated and quoted form Denkschrift zur Einweihung der neuen Arbeitstdtte der Deutschen Hollerith 
Maschinen Gesellschaft m.b.H. in Berlin-Lichterfelde, January 8th, 1934, p.23, U.S. Holocaust Memorial 
Museum Library. Translated in (Black, 2001, p.50-1). 
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the different possibilities for 'contamination' are calculated and determined, the result is 
that the notion of 'disease' is unloosened from its relationship with individual human 
bodies, and is now seen as a statistical problem of distribution, of cases in populations 
that are delimited, and risk assessed as dangerous, nullified or normalized; all 
circumscribed in a milieu of circulation that privileges the policing of the 'natural 
biological' classifications and history Nazi governmentality itself called into reality; in 
this way, exhibiting the 'double integration' effect that is the hallmark of the apparatuses 
(dispositifs) of security. Indeed, like with Foucault's epidemics of the eighteenth century, 
the apparatuses of security that were installed under Nazi governmentality were about 
populations and probabilities. 
It is not the division between those who are sick and those who are not. It takes all 
who are sick and all who are not as a whole, that is to say, in short, the population 
and it identifies the coefficient of probable morbidity, or probable mortality, in 
this population, that is to say the normal expectation in the population of being 
affected by the disease and death linked to the disease (Foucault 2007f, p.62). 
The more the Nazis registered, tabulated, named, sorted, categorized and divided 
society through conjunctions of juridical-disciplinary mechanisms and technologies of 
security, like the list, the more social policies and practices emerged that revolved around 
ascribing and predicting quantifiable net-worth values to cases in populations, fracturing, 
naming and risk assessing 'diseased elements of populations;' all in the interest of 
securing the 'healthy,' or normal Volk. Indeed, with each sort of data by a Hollerith 
system, human beings in the Third Reich were increasingly registered as populations 
constituted in cases of lists; identifiable, trackable, value-laden, and risk assessed 
commodities. Like with epidemics and food insufficiency, the apparatuses of security in 
Nazi governmentality installed a milieu of circulation that was fundamentally marked by 
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population and probability and the need to ensure the free circulation of necessary and 
sufficient elements, and the policing of 'dangerous' cases. 
In this way, where IBM developed punch card technologies did ultimately provide 
a crucial means of orchestrating mass extermination and genocide, as Black argues, 
underpinning a Nazi security order that pivoted on intense seeing, naming and risk 
assessing of threats to the Volk, these technologies and techniques did not by any means 
emerge in a vacuum. Indeed, juridical-legal and disciplinary mechanisms involving strict 
social policies surrounding census, registration, and the fracture of populations were both 
prior and parallel developments to the Third Reich's adoption of IBM's Hollerith punch 
card technology, and the installation of Nazi governmentality. 
How such early 'computerized' information technology served to materialize 
fractured 'threatening populations' in Nazi governmentality, or what Aly, Roth, et al 
(2004) call 'identification and control in the Third Reich,' did not begin with IBM's 
Hollerith technologies, but rather with census and registration processes; juridical-
disciplinary mechanisms which had been effect in Germany for almost 50 years by 1930, 
having laid the groundwork for a governmentality that would pivot on seeing, naming, 
predicting, limiting, and neutralizing the aleatory effects of 'threats' to a normal 
population called the Aryan Volk and steering all others towards it through statistical 
'microscopic' observations, the delimitation and nullification of abnormal elements; all 
interwoven within a 'natural history' seen and named by Nazi eugenic and racial 
scientists. 
And while it was quite clearly IBM's Hollerith tabulators and sorters, first used to 
decipher the 1933 German census (Black 2001), that helped crystallize this intermingling 
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of classification and biology in Nazi governmentality, Herman Hollerith, the father of 
IBM, had been making this a reality since the late 1870s in the United States, from the 
time he was brought on as a clerk in the U.S. census bureau and began applying his early 
ideas in information technology to questions of social statistics and populations (Pugh 
1995). But ultimately, it was under Nazi governmentality that a conjunction of juridical-
disciplinary mechanisms, redeployed in apparatuses of security, coalesced as a 
governmentality that sought to delimit, police and nullify 'threatening' populations to an 
extreme; and it is in this moment and in these conditions that Nazi governmentality 
deployed the list as a security technology for identifying and policing threats in a wide 
variety of milieus of circulation. In this way, the list would emerge as the pivot of an 
everyday existence marked at every turn by the caesuras of 'Aryan' and 'other'—at once 
a way of seeing and naming—for calling 'threats' into reality—and at the same time a 
practical basis for nullifying them. 
So while this research is inspired and informed at many moments by Black's 
illuminating revelations, beginning with an investigation into the moments leading up to 
the Nazis' integration of IBM's Hollerith punch card technology with social practices 
surrounding census, registration and selection, it is intended to extend this history to an 
articulation of this modern art of governmentality. Indeed, this research contends that the 
Nazi conjunction of juridical-legal and disciplinary mechanisms, and technologies of 
security, and specifically how the list served the policing and enforcement of caesuras, 
represents a crucial event in list culture, wherein through their interweaving with early 
'computer' systems, and statistical technologies, lists began to serve the delimitation, 
policing, and nullification of threatening, abnormal and undesirable populations, whose 
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circulation in zones of 'higher' and 'lower' risk required the management, administration, 
organization and knowledge development that only the list affords. 
Thanks to their installation of this unique conjunction of security technologies, the 
Third Reich, in its quest for racial supremacy, came to see that virtually all aspects of life 
could be automated and organized; from military personnel, to individual citizens; from 
the largest industries, to the smallest grocers and dry-goods stores; from the biologically 
desirable, to the Jews and anti-socials. "Just as people would be categorized and 
regimented down to the least characteristic, so would all of German business be analyzed 
to the smallest detail—and then subject to Nazi discipline." (Black 2001, p.86-7). In this 
way, in the Third Reich, the list was much more than a functional means of administering 
and organizing people and things, and developing knowledge, it also represented a whole 
new way of seeing the world; marked by fractured 'threatening' biological populations; 
the caesuras between 'diseased elements' and the Volk, and the need to police and nullify 
such 'threatening' milieus of circulation. Indeed, IBM's Dehomag explicitly embraced its 
critical role in the Nazi apparatuses of security and governmentality, producing a 
publicity poster, circa 1934, that depicts an all-encompassing, omnipresent eye floating in 
the sky, its gaze directed downwards, in the form of a punch card, subsuming a city 
skyline (image below). The text simply reads, 'See everything with Hollerith punch 
cards' (translation from Black 2001), but as this research argues, it could also read 'See 
everything with statistics,' or equally, 'See everything with lists;' as early computer 
systems, statistics, and list technologies would all come to critically serve Nazi 
governmentality and its apparatuses of security. 
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'See everything with Hollerith punch cards' . 
The list served: 'seeing everything' through Nazi apparatuses of security 
Unless we understand how the Nazis acquired the names, more lists will be 
compiled against more people (Black 2001, p.7). 
Seeing everything under Nazi governmentality started with seeing Jews. As all the 
security technologies (statistics, computers, and lists) became more refined in Nazi 
governmentality; as the sorting, cross-indexing, classifying, and predicting routines 
became more sophisticated, statistical race researchers were able to probe deeper and 
deeper into Jewish bloodlines and lineage, and produce more and more lists of diseased 
elements and cases for policing. Indeed, as the Nazi apparatuses of security were installed 
across larger swaths of Europe, Jews and those sorted as 'anti-social' increasingly found 
nowhere to hide from the endless punch cards clattering through Hollerith machines 
10
 Image and translation from Black, Edwin. 2001. IBM and the Holocaust: the strategic alliance between 
Nazi Germany and America's most powerful corporation. New York: Crown Publishers. 
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across the Greater Reich, and their statistically-derived lists of 'dangerous cases;' 
"...comparing names across generations, address changes across regions, family trees and 
personal data across unending registries" (Black 2001, p. 107). By 1944, life in Nazi-
occupied Europe was unequivocally marked by delimitation, policing, and nullification. 
But not only were people tabulated, sorted, and delimited; they were coded, and 
".. .it was the code that branded the individual and sealed his destiny. Each code was a 
brick in an inescapable wall of data" (Black 2001, p.365). Everywhere throughout the 
Greater Reich, the human species was being valued and reduced to risk and net-worth 
scores, and subdivided as such. With each and every conquest, the art of governmentality 
the Nazis were perfecting was being installed further and further, enmeshing unlimited 
territory in an apparatus of security designed to trap Jews and 'undesirables' of all kinds 
in a fiery hell where one's code and score would very much come to determine one's 
fate. 
Hollerith tracking worked so well that the SS economic Administration was able 
to authoritatively challenge the slave labor reports they were receiving on any 
given day. For instance, at one point in the latter part of 1943, the central office 
asked for the number of Auschwitz Jews fit for reassignment to an armaments 
plant. On August 29, Auschwitz replied that only 3,581 were available. Senior SS 
Economics Administration Officer Gerhard Maurer knew from [their own] 
Hollerith sorts that fully 25,000 Jews were available for work transfers. Four days 
later, Maurer dispatched a brash rejoinder to Auschwitz Camp Commandant 
Rudolf Hoess himself. 'What are the remaining 21,500 Jews doing?' Maurer 
demanded. 'Something's amiss here! Please again scrutinize this process and give 
a report (Black 2001, p.355). 
Critical to 'seeing everything' in Nazi Germany was the highly complex 
administration, organization and orchestration of millions of elements in motion across 
Nazi-occupied Europe, an increasingly large milieu of circulation. Indeed, a key 
'industry' that was radically transformed by Nazi governmentality was the railway 
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industry. Prior to the deployment of Nazi apparatuses of security to railroads, tracking 
trains and their contents was an odious affair for railway companies, requiring weeks to 
manually identify and locate boxcars. But Nazi governmentality now made it possible to 
efficiently and effectively schedule, locate and deploy trains, stock and boxcars within 
forty-eight hours. 
During the war years, IBM supplied elaborate Hollerith systems to nearly all the 
railways of Nazi-dominated Europe. Knowing how many freight cars and 
locomotives to schedule on any given day in any given location, anywhere across 
the map of Europe, required the computational capabilities of Hollerith. Punch 
card systems identified the exact location of each freight car, how much cargo it 
could accept, and what schedule it could adhere to for maximum efficiency. In 
fact, the main method of tracking freight cars was a network of Hollerith systems 
installed at railroad junctions across Europe (Black 2001, p.265). 
The Nazis relied heavily on the apparatuses of security, and specifically, Hollerith 
technologies, to track their trains and schedule delivery of the 'desirable' and 
'undesirable' cargo their boxcars contained. "Trains were Himmler's most valuable 
tool—and railroads were among IBM's most lucrative clients in Europe" (Black 2001, 
p.387). Indeed, it was not only Hollerith identification and control that provided 
unmatchable efficiency and effectiveness in railway and boxcar tracking, satisfying the 
Nazis' highly-complex and fully-integrated scheduling needs; managing the flow of 
millions of bodies, and tones more cargo across their occupied lands, it was the whole 
agglomeration of the apparatuses of security and their technologies, including the list 
which continued to serve its historical 'intellectual technology' role, but also now served 
to delimit, manage, and police the fundamental caesuras that marked day to day life. 
Now it seems to me that through the obviously very partial phenomena that I have 
tried to pick out we see the emergence of a completely different problem that is 
no longer of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to 
take place, of controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things 
are always in movement, constantly moving around, continually going from one 
88 
89 
point to another, but in such a ways that the inherent dangers of this circulation 
are canceled out (Foucault 2007f, p.65). 
By January 1944, this art of governmentality, of ensuring the 'secure' circulation 
of living beings and things, had become so prevalent and ubiquitous across Nazi-
occupied Europe that a special 'central' statistics bureau was established by Hitler to sort, 
tabulate, analyze and coordinate all of the information that flowed in from the many 
Hollerith operations across the Third Reich. While there is little that is known about this 
highly secret centralized card sorting facility, the Zentral Institut (Central Institute), as it 
was known, served as a clearinghouse for ".. .all new registrations, death lists, daily 
strength reports and transfers from site to site" (Black 2001, p.360). Indeed, the Zentral 
Institut was the pivot for railway and concentration camp coordination and scheduling— 
tabulating, sorting, analyzing and tracking with cold mechanized automation and 
precision the extent of destruction the Nazis were waging across Europe. 
It was enough to inform Zentral Institut that the people had boarded a train. 
Hence the machines only tabulated the evacuations. No more was necessary. 
From these trains, there was no escape, no need for tracking, no further utility, 
and no further cost would be expended. At this point, the Jews were no longer 
worth a bullet, nor the price of a single punch card.. .Only at the moment of 
extermination did the Jews of Europe finally break free from Hitler's Holleriths 
(Black 2001, p.372). 
But for those who had yet to break free, who were still in the concentration 
camps, there was no way of escaping their branded code. 
Every hell has its hierarchy. Each Hollerith code carried consequences. In the 
concentration camps, the level of inhumanity, pain, and torture were not the 
happenstance of incarceration as much as a destiny assured by Hollerith coding. It 
was impossible to shirk one's Hollerith code (Black 2001, P.362). 
Almost every concentration camp opened and operated a Hollerith facility, known 
as a Hollerith Abteilung (Black 2001, p.351), and at these facilities all prisoner cards and 
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labor transfer rosters were processed. These operations yielded a constant flow of traffic, 
primarily consisting of lists including departure lists, transfer lists, and work assignment 
lists. Lists were the primary output of the Hollerith Abteilung, which assembled the 
detailed information contained on punch cards, outputting daily lists that came to 
regiment every aspect of prisoner existence including their exterminations (Black 2001). 
Punch cards for camp prisoners detailed everything; date of birth, marital status, number 
of children, nationality, physical characteristics, work skills; and even, at the Mauthausen 
concentration camp in Austria, the kinds of torture and punishment the prisoner had been 
subjected to. "Hollerith erfasst, or 'Hollerith registered.' That designation was stamped in 
large letters on hundreds of thousands of processed Personal Inmate Cards at camps all 
across Europe" (Black 2001, P.353). 
Most critical to existence in the concentration camps were sixteen categories, 
classifications, or score, that were established for the reason for incarceration, and the 
code that was punched on one's card in this category most assuredly determined one's 
fate. Among the codes, homosexuals were given the number 3, anti-socials were coded 
with the number 9, and Gypsies with the number 12; but the code that was reserved for 
the worth threat, and ultimately ensured the most violent torture and treatment was for the 
Jews, the number 8. 
As horrific as camps were for all, Jews coded by number experienced an 
additional nightmare of unspeakable dimension. Because Jews were instantly 
recognizable by their patches, they could be denounced at every turn as ' Jewish 
swine' or 'Jewish muck' with the attendant physical abuse. One could never 
escape his code (Black 2001, p.363). 
Among the most ominous codes that appeared on prisoner punch cards were those 
contained in Column 34, which was labeled 'Reason for Departure.' 
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Code 2 simply meant transferred to another camp for continuing labor. Natural 
death was coded 3. Execution was coded 4. Suicide was coded 5. The ominous 
code 6 designated 'special handling', the term commonly understood as 
extermination, either in a gas chamber, by hanging or by gunshot (Black 2001, 
p.l l) . 
Indeed, the column 34 code was the last code, the last hole punched, the last bit of 
humanity reduced and divested; a final dehumanizing number assigned in a column, on a 
punch card, in a process that began with divisive and caesuric practices, and ended with 
extermination. By 1944 millions of human beings had been identified, sorted, assigned, 
guided, integrated and transported in this way, by means of an apparatus of security, 
which tracked them mercilessly along their journeys; from their homes, to the ghettos, to 
the train platforms, boxcars, camps and ultimately, gas chambers. Not surprisingly, "to 
obliterate all evidence of the mass murders documented by Hollerith records, Himmler 
ordered all camp card indices destroyed before the Allies arrived" (Black 2001, p.359). 
But not everything was destroyed at the camps; evidence remained of the apparatuses of 
security. 
At Mauthausen [Austrian concentration camp] 'Departure Lists' were 
fundamentally roll calls of the dead. A typical handwritten 'Departure List' ran on 
for many pages. No names were used, just the inmate's five- or six-digit Hollerith 
identity, listed on the left in numerical order for efficient punching into column 22 
of the Dehomag cards printed for camp death tallying (Black 2001, p.359). 
Columns and numbers appearing on seemingly innocuous punch cards had killed 
millions of people, and ironically, numbers were all that remained of them—outputted on 
l ists—ready as ever to be punched, tabulated, sorted and analyzed in an endless 
mechanized cycle that began with fracturing caesuras, and ultimately turned on a 
population's compliance with, and acquiescence to stringent governmental registration 
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policies that sought to dismantle and secure society through the delimitation, policing, 
and nullification of listed 'threats.' 
The list serves: governmentality or bare life? 
For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the 
additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose 
politics places his existence as a living being in question. 
—Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, Volume I (1988) 
The correct question to pose concerning the horrors committed in the camps is, 
therefore, not the hypocritical one of how crimes of such atrocity could be 
committed against human beings. It would be more honest, and above all more 
useful, to investigate carefully the juridical procedures and deployments of power 
by which human beings could be so completely deprived of their rights and 
prerogatives that no act committed against them could appear any longer a crime. 
—Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer (1998) 
This chapter has attempted to critically address the 'juridical procedures and 
deployments of power' that Agamben points to in examining how Nazi governmentality 
came to reduce human beings to statistical objects, risk assessed numbers on lists; and 
further, how such complex bureaucratic laws, policies, procedures, and practices would 
ultimately so fracture a people, the Volk, and so dehumanize individuals as 'diseased 
cases' that an entire nation's collective conscience would barely stir while with cold 
efficiency its government delimited, policed, and ultimately exterminated 'undesirable' 
elements in its installed 'biopolitical' milieu of circulation. Indeed, the interweaving of 
Nazi 'raceology' and eugenics provided a veneer of pseudo-scientific validation to a 
vision of social control that pivoted on the reduction of the human beings to net-values of 
worth and risk under Nazi governmentality; legitimizing the ongoing ethno-biological 
diagnoses of what was called a 'disease-ridden' Volk; diagnoses that involved splintering 
and fracturing the Volk in the interest of isolating the cancer within. From there, the 
prescription was clear: delimit, police, and exterminate. 
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At the hub of this 'biopolitical' praxis are the minutiae of bureaucratic practices 
that Hannah Arendt (1994) first pointed to in Eichmann in Jerusalem. But where Arendt 
illuminated how banal everyday practices in Nazi Germany did contain within them the 
incunabula for profound evil, absent in her analysis is precisely this biopolitical element; 
specifically an interrogation of how caesuric practices in the Third Reich came to at once 
provide a means of ordering and organizing society, and at the same time served to divest 
individuals of their humanity. Indeed, no juridical-legal mechanisms and practices of 
discipline were as pivotal to Nazi governmentality as those involving census and 
registration; and Gotz Aly and Karl Roth's (2004) The Nazi Census: Identification and 
Control in the Third Reich has significantly helped us to see the origins of these social 
mores and means in Nazi Germany. This book was originally published in 1983 ".. .in 
connection with a political and legal conflict surrounding the planned census, which was 
later called off by the German Federal Constitutional Court" (Aly and Roth 2004, p.xi). 
Not surprisingly, the book contains a foreword by none other than Edwin Black, who in 
addition to having sponsored its English translation hails Aly and Roth's work as 
pioneering, asserting that, 
Aly and Roth correctly comprehended and documented that registration in all its 
forms—from primitive paper and pencil records to the use of high-speed Hollerith 
machines—was the first step in Hitler's war against the Jews and other enemies. 
The types of registration covered all modalities, from massive censuses to 
ongoing population registrations, labor pools, and human numbering systems (Aly 
and Roth 2004, p.viii-ix). 
Indeed, Nazi governmentality pivoted on census and registration practices, and 
the precise march of death the Nazi apparatuses of security orchestrated could never have 
been achieved had the groundwork for delimitation, policing and nullification of bare life 
not been laid with the 1933 census; followed up with extensive registration policies and 
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practices; all culminating in the 1939 census which effectively registered by name all 
German Jews and 'Jewish half-breeds' in the Third Reich. But where census, registration 
and their attendant statistical techniques clearly played a pivotal role in delimitation, 
policing, and nullification in Nazi Germany, surprisingly, like IBM's Hollerith 
technology, and list technologies, scant Holocaust research has treated these questions. 
"In fact, the crucial minutiae of registration are barely mentioned in any of the thousands 
of books on the Third Reich" (Black in foreword to Aly and Roth 2004, p.ix). And it is 
the crucial minutiae of registration practices, redeployed in apparatuses of security that 
serves as the bureaucratic basis around which caesuric divisions are brought into reality 
and enacted, and how 'dangerous cases' of living beings and inanimate objects are listed. 
Indeed, a politics that calls into question the existence and categorization of living 
beings is the quintessential essence of the biopolitics that Giorgio Agamben (Agamben 
1998; Agamben 2000; Agamben 2005) asserts. When Agamben argues that: "There is no 
clearer way to say that the first foundation of political life is a life that may be killed, 
which is politicized through its very capacity to be killed" (1998, p.89), he is striking a 
biopolitical stance, arguing that 'bare life; is the fundamental political unit around which 
sovereignty is practiced. But therein, it is a biopolitical stance that is decidedly different 
from the one associated with Michel Foucault's governmentality. 
One of the most persistent features of Foucault's work is its decisive 
abandonment of the traditional approach to the problem of power, which is based 
in juridico-institutional model (the definition of sovereignty, the theory of the 
State) in favor of an unprejudiced analysis of the concrete way in which power 
penetrates subjects very bodies and forms of life.. .In his final years Foucault 
seemed to orient this analysis according to two distinct directives for research: on 
the one hand, the study of the political techniques with which the State assumes 
and integrates the care of the natural life of individuals into its very center; on the 
other hand, the examination of the technologies of the self by which processes of 
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subjectivization bring the individual to bind himself to his own identity and 
consciousness and, at the same time, to power (Agamben 1998, p.5). 
As the research presented here clearly demonstrates, Foucault never 'decisively 
abandoned' 'juridico-institutional models,' but rather refined his conception from 
sovereignty, to discipline, to governmentality; in fact, arguing in his later years, that 
juridical-legal, institutional, and disciplinary mechanisms are far from abandoned in 
modern and contemporary forms of government, but rather, are redeployed within 
apparatuses of security that seek to regulate and distribute elements in the milieus of 
circulation to meet the objectives of the state. 
The population is not, then, a collection of juridical subjects in an individual or 
collective relationship with a sovereign will. It is a set of elements in which we 
can note constants and regularities even in accidents, in which we can identify the 
universal of desire regularly producing the benefit of all, and with regard to which 
we can identify a number of modifiable variable on which it depends. Taking the 
effects specific to population into consideration, making them pertinent if you 
like, is, I think, a very important phenomenon: the entry of a 'nature' in to the 
field of techniques of power, of a nature that is not something on which, above 
which, or against which the sovereign must impose just laws. We have a 
population whose nature is such that the sovereign must deploy reflected 
procedures of government within this nature, with the help of it, and with regard 
to it (Foucault 2007f, p.74-5). 
Where for Foucault technologies of sovereignty are redeployed in the apparatuses 
of security with the aim of specifically effecting populations—the reflected procedures of 
government—as Agamben (1998) argues it, modern and contemporary existence 
continues to constitute 'political life' as a simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of what 
Aristotle called natural life, or 'bare life,' from 'good life.' Drawing on Aristotle's 
fundamental ideas surrounding the sovereign politics of man, Agamben (1988) argues 
that humans are animals born to life, the Greek zoe, which expresses the basic 'fact of 
living common to all living beings' (Agamben, 1998, p.l), giving them name. But at the 
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same time, this simple fact of living (to zeri) is set in opposition to a politically qualified 
life (to eu zeri), or the Greek bios, which indicates the form or way of living proper to an 
individual group. In Aristotle's ancient way of understanding and conceiving of political 
sovereign existence, 'bare life,' or zoe, is that which is transformed via the State into a 
representation of 'good life,' bios, as we are 'born with regard to life, but existing 
essentially with regard to the good life' (Agamben 1998, p.2). In this way, 'bare life' is 
understood as all that is excluded from the higher aims of the state, yet is included 
precisely so that it may be transformed into a regard for 'good life.' According to 
Agamben, this biopower, which takes the bare lives of individual citizens into political 
calculations from birth, imprinting a sovereignty of rights onto the bodies of babies in 
birth, has essentially existed since ancient times, as per Aristotle. And for Agamben, this 
structure of ex-ception is essential to the core concept of contemporary Western 
sovereignty, and how 'bare life' is thus, the fundamental political unit around which 
power pivots. 
So, where Foucault sees the juridical-legal mechanisms of sovereignty as 
redeployed along with disciplinary mechanisms in the apparatuses of security that install 
populations and milieus of circulation through the art of governmentality, Agamben 
nostalgically looks back to questions of individual rights, will, and agency, reinvigorating 
concepts of docile and revolting bodies in contemporary power formations. But, as we 
have seen through the work of Foucault, as well as the research presented here, these 
issues are far more complicated than such models of sovereignty can contain. Indeed, 
there has clearly been a shift from sovereignty, to discipline, to governmentality, 
involving the installation of milieus of circulation, market mechanisms, statistics, 
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probabilities, and populations in modern and contemporary formations of power that 
Agamben's articulation of'bare life' decisively ignores. Indeed, so says Foucault of the 
juridical-legal mechanisms of sovereignty that are redeployed in the apparatuses of 
security: 
They do not attempt, at least not primarily or in a fundamental way, to make use 
of a relationship of obedience between a higher will, of the sovereign, and the will 
of those subjected to his will. In other words, the mechanism of security does not 
function on the axis of the sovereign-subjects relationship, ensuring the total and 
it were passive obedience of individuals to their sovereign. They are connected to 
what the physiocrats called physical processes, which could be called natural 
processes, and which we could also call elements of reality. These mechanisms do 
not tend to a nullification of phenomena in the form of prohibition, 'you will do 
this,' nor even 'this will not happen,' but in the form of a progressive self-
cancellation of phenomena by the phenomena themselves. In a way, they involve 
the delimitation of phenomena within acceptable limits, rather than the imposition 
of a law that says no to them. So mechanisms of security are not put to work on 
the sovereign-subject axis or in the form of prohibition (Foucault 2007f, p.66). 
So where Foucault, and the research presented here takes as its focus milieus of 
circulation, populations, and their indeterminacy, Agamben attenuates to sovereignty's 
disciplinary enclosures, and specifically the clearly delimited space of the concentration 
camp, where he argues that identification and control of human life—biopolitical order— 
is at its extreme. It is precisely in the concentration camp that Agamben articulates 'bare 
life,' meaning life that no longer deserves to live, but cannot be martyred; life that cannot 
be sacrificed, yet may be killed; the last vestige of the body that violence is wholly 
permitted against; corporeal, passive-flesh utterly exorcised of humanity—what he 
describes as the pivot of modern and contemporary biopolitical order. Indeed, the space 
of the concentration camp is characterized by what Agamben calls the originary nomos— 
with the strongest hand comes order and power—a realm wherein violence and law, 
policing and politics become indistinguishable. At the extreme of this order, and unique 
97 
98 
to this indeterminate space, is the production of the Muselmann, the emergence of the last 
biopolitical caesura || the final transformation of the prisoner into one indivisible entity || 
the last layer of the onion peeled || a body that no longer carries any markers of humanity 
|| a body that can be exterminated without conscience. 
But where Agamben's 'passive flesh' conception of docile bodies—stripped of 
their rights by sovereigns, layer by layer, in closed disciplinary milieus of circulation like 
concentration camps, where sovereign policing is unconditional and brutal—serves as a 
nostalgic description of and way of remembering a violence and power that has 
historically been imposed downwards by sovereigns onto the bodies of subjects, this 
highly deterministic was of seeing power does not bear out in modern and contemporary 
formations of power, particularly given the complications of political economic milieus 
of circulation that Foucault has elaborated far more deeply. Where Agamben provides us 
with a description of the atrocities of concentrating populations in disciplinary 
enclosures, stripping them of their fundamental rights and exposing bare life, the camp as 
such, is not emblematic of governmentality, which we have seen is a space of circulation 
that is characterized as letting things happen. In this way, where Agamben argues that: 
Fascism and Nazism are, above all, redefinitions of the relations between man and 
citizen, and become fully intelligible only when situated -no matter how 
paradoxical it may seem—in the biopolitical context inaugurated by national 
sovereignty and declarations of rights (Agamben 1998, p. 130), 
The research presented here into how the list served Nazi governmentality is 
'decisively' at odds with Agamben's conclusion. Indeed, it is argued here that the 
redefinition of the relations between people that Nazism represented were not about the 
rights and wills of individual bodies in relation to disciplinary enclosures of sovereignty, 
but were in fact the polar opposite. Indeed, Nazism, or Nazi governmentality, installed 
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apparatuses of security, wherein juridical-disciplinary mechanisms were redeployed in 
the installation of a milieu of circulation that let things happen, neither prohibiting, nor 
prescribing rights on individual subjects, but assessing individuals as statistical factors of 
worth and risk circulating in uncertain milieus. Indeed, as we will see in chapter 4, it is in 
the redeployment of juridical-legal mechanisms by the apparatuses of security to police 
global milieus of circulation that Agamben's 'bare life' and Foucault's 'governmentality' 
may just be reconcilable. But for now, rather than an enclosed space of legal rights, we 
have seen how Nazi governmentality installed a milieu of circulation that did not prevent, 
nor prohibit, nor impose power downwards, from sovereigns to subjects, but rather, 
flattened the playing field, ensuring the efficient and effective circulation of necessary 
and sufficient elements in a milieu where the delimitation, policing, nullification, and 
extermination of dangerous biopolitical elements, or threats, was at a maxim. 
Conclusion 
In the same way that lists brought contradiction to questions of who constituted a 
Jew or an undesirable in Nazi biopolitical order, today, they bring contradiction to 
questions of who constitutes a contemporary terrorist. 'You are either with us, or you're 
with the terrorists!' But who are the terrorists? And how can we identify and control them 
most efficiently? What caesuric social practices are required? What are the most effective 
technologies for such operations? While the answers remain fluid and elusive, such 
questions are the eerie remnants of Nazi governmentality. And where Nazi 
governmentality dreamed of an everyday registration system that could track, organize 
and order the political, social, and financial meanderings of massive populations on an 
up-to-the-minute basis, it is only in the last 15 years, with the widespread global adoption 
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of the Internet (and networked technologies in general) that such dreams have taken 
shape as reality. No longer are houses the markers of residence, nor the focus of 
registration. Registration is now everywhere, as increasingly all facets of our lives are 
logged, tracked, and mirrored in our networked milieus of circulation. The tabulation, 
sorting, analysis, and coding of human beings as worth/risk objects, is ubiquitous in the 
global age of the Internet, receding further and further into the fabric of everyday culture. 
In this way, where Hitler and the Third Reich lost, Nazi governmentality 
prevailed; as the conjunction of computer technologies (explored as event in the next 
chapter), statistics, and list technologies assembled by the Nazi apparatuses of security 
continued to serve modern and contemporary formations of power. The Nazi dream of 
daily registration is now a reality. In this way, Nazi governmentality correlated a way of 
seeing and doing revolving around a conjunction of technologies of security—computers, 
statistics, and lists—where the installation of caesuras was at a maxim, that continues to 
haunt us today. As such, the emergence of Nazi governmentality in fact represents the 
first correlation of the apparatuses of security as a massive computerized 'biofeedback 
system' that would inevitably come to serve the purpose of delimiting and policing global 
threats to social order. Indeed, it is with the emergence and widespread adoption of 
systems theory in the 1940s and 1950s, as well as attendant evolutions in computing 
technologies, which saw the form of governmentality installed through the apparatuses of 
security go well beyond global. 
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Chapter 2 - The list serves: entropy and governmentality 
Introduction 
Contemplate now for a moment the great movement of Western science since the 
days of Galileo Galilei, its pioneer and quite properly its hero. The subsequent 
centuries may be viewed metaphorically as a journey of discovery and 
exploration, away from the medieval world, the personal and subjective, the 
moral, the theological, and the political, and into an objective, empirical, public 
reality in which measurements fit into abstract mathematical patterns with a claim 
to universality and the human observer is eliminated. The eye-opening insights of 
a Newton, a Gauss, an Einstein are among the great treasures discovered on the 
journey.. .It was part of the same journey of Western civilization to create 
machinery of many kinds: elaborate tools, weapons, methods of mass production 
and complex organization, magical and diverse gadgets—in short modern 
technology. And this civilization, drunk with the power of this amazing 
technology and the benefits it seemed to bring, so forgot itself that it lost all 
perspective. It let its mode of existence be determined by science and technology. 
The Nazi gas chambers which came out of that civilization and nuclear bombs, its 
latest high technology, were like a shot of cold water in the face, awaking us to 
the discovery, once we had seen past the dazzling treasure, that our journey hadn't 
taken us as far as we had imagined. It was a familiar landscape because what 
dominated it, after all, was people—play and affections, politics and passions, 
pleasures and pains (Heims 1980, p.414). 
Despite the Nazi gas chambers and nuclear bombs seemingly being 'a shot of cold 
water in the face' of civilization, the fundamental ironies of progress Steven J. Heims 
(1980) points to in his historical account and cultural interrogation of the meaning of the 
lives of John Von Neumann and Norbert Wiener: From mathematics to the technologies 
of life and death, are experiences we continue to live today. Indeed, have we really been 
awakened to these modern discoveries, as he suggests? Have we yet seen past the 
dazzling treasures of contemporary computer networked technologies and their 
underpinning statistical and list technologies? And as such, have we yet to see that this 
modern conjunction of computer, statistical, and list technologies is critical to the 
constitution and policing of contemporary fields, domains, and objects of knowledge; and 
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as such, is critical to the association, representation, and correlation of contemporary 
power? 
As we will see in this chapter, this assemblage of technologies and techniques of 
power that emerged with Nazi governmentality would exert equal force in the 
development of the 'political technology' of modern and contemporary computers and 
network infrastructures. Moreover, the emergence of the modern computer—this event in 
the journey of civilization—would come to install secure milieus of circulation of many 
kinds, increasingly elaborate integrations of technologies and techniques for the 
administration, organization and development of living beings, things and knowledge; 
and equally for the delimitation and policing of the movement of 'dangerous' circulating 
elements in unpredictable and ever-expanding entropic milieus. Lastly, as we shall see, 
the emergence of the 'modern computer' in the 1940s and 1950s, would also serve to 
install a new classification for the human species—as cyborgs: a further suffusing of 
taxonomy and biology, wherein the 'computer' and 'the brains' and 'bodies' of living 
beings and things would be inextricably linked in their classification and subdivision as 
natural 'digital' elements, circulating, distributed, and steered in 'global classification 
infrastructures' the world over. Indeed, in these ever-expanding, and highly unpredictable 
milieus, circulating elements are assigned values of worth/risk at increasingly every turn. 
In short, this chapter argues that the emergence of modern computer technology 
in the 1940s and 1950s, underpinned by statistical and list technologies, served to further 
correlate a series of disciplinary and security mechanisms that would ultimately install a 
massive unpredictable and ever-expanding classification milieu of circulation in which 
threatening elements and populations would be delimited and policed on a global scale. 
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As Heims (1980; 1993) argues, the emergence of computer technology did in fact 
eliminate the human observer, automating decision-making at almost every level of life, 
but it also increasingly rendered the boundaries between people, things, and knowledge 
even blurrier (Haraway 1991; Haraway 1997). Moreover, the emergence of the modern 
computer in the 1940s and 1950s also represents a moment when the 'double integration' 
effects of technologies like statistics and lists—the hallmark characteristic of the 
apparatuses of security—would help install a self-elaborating milieu of circulation, that 
would once and forever, transcend any preconceived, or perceived territorial boundaries, 
opening spaces as expansive, disordered, and never-ending as the globe, and even the 
universe at large. Spaces, that despite their indefiniteness could be probed for regularities 
and patterns through statistical mechanisms, and further, acted upon through circular 
causal feedback operations. Indeed, through the installation of such a massive playing 
field, a battle, or game, as immense as the 'space race' could be waged. Indeed, 
beginning in the 1940s and 1950s, in this endless, indefinite, and highly unpredictable— 
entropic—milieu of circulation that would be installed by the apparatuses of security, the 
delimitation and policing of the movement of 'threatening' elements from 'normal' 
populations would also be elevated to epic proportions: 'the free world' versus 'the 
communist threat.' 
In this way, the interweaving of computers, statistical, and list technologies as 
they operate in assemblages of policing, and apparatuses of security which install milieus 
dominated by probabilities and predictions, as well as practices involving the necessary 
and sufficient regulation and distribution of'risky' and 'worthwhile' elements circulating 
in populations, continues to be a central trope of this chapter. Picking up on how the 
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apparatuses of security served the delimitation and policing of 'threatening' elements 
circulating in populations under Nazi governmentality, this chapter examines how this 
assemblage of security continued to evolve, grow, and be redeployed in the post-World 
War II Cold War era, which was marked at every political turn by eerily similar 'us' vs. 
'them' discourses and divisive social practices revolving around the quantification and 
classification of living beings. Indeed, the delimiting, assigning, managing, listing, 
policing, steering, and nullification of'abnormal' elements distributed in populations, 
installed under Nazi governmentality—these biopolitics—are equally implicated in the 
emergence of the modern computer. 
Between the First World War and the present, biology has been transformed from 
a science centred on the organism, understood in functionalist terms, to a science 
studying automated technological devices, understood in terms of cybernetic 
systems. Organic form.. .gave way to systems theory with its control schemes 
based on communication networks and a logical technology in which human 
beings become potentially outmoded symbol-using devices (Haraway 1991, p.45). 
In the same spirit as Foucault's conceptualization of the event of 'natural history' 
(Foucault 2001:1970; Foucault, Senellart, and Davidson 2007), for Donna Haraway 
(1991) the fusing of biology to functionalist automated technologies in the 1940s and 
1950s also served to further render the organic form of living beings increasingly 
irrelevant, producing the 'natural' classification cyborg. And in this spirit, this chapter 
builds on research that has interrogated cybernetics, game, and systems theories post 
World War II and the emergence of massive computing technologies as a critical event in 
the history of communication and cultural research (Bowker 1993; Bowker and Star 
1999; Eco 1989; Edwards 1996; Hamilton 1999; Haraway 1985; Haraway 1991; 
Haraway 1997; Heims 1980; Heims 1993; Simpson 1994; Turkle 1984; Turkle 1995; 
Waldrop 2001; Weizenbaum 1976; Wiener 1948; Wiener 1950; Wiener 1954; Wiener 
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1956). Specifically examining the leveling of living beings and things in the constitution 
of fields, domains, and objects of knowledge, this chapter will ultimately establish the 
intersection of computer technologies, and mathematical, classification, and listing 
techniques stemming from the transformation of statistical practices in cybernetics, game, 
and systems theory, and the widespread circulation of myths about the battles between 
'us' and 'them' in the post-World War II, Cold War era, as installing a milieu of 
circulation characterized by expansion, disorder, and unpredictability, or rather, entropy. 
In this way, this chapter, and this work as a whole, can also be positioned as a part 
of a stream of discursive counter-histories of computer technology including Edwards 
(1996), Simpson (1994), Heims (1980; 1993), Black (2001), Haraway (1985; 1991; 
1997), Poster (1990; 1995; 2001; 2006); all of which aim to set the history of 
intersections of people and machines, and questions of technoscience in general into new 
and uncharted waters and directions. By exploring not the instrumental history of 
computer technology, but a discursive history, constructed around the fictions, fantasies, 
and myths that circulate around computers, statistics, and lists as critical supports of 
modern and contemporary governmentality, this chapter and this work is a part of a 
research movement that attempts to shift the focus of historical inquiry from the scientific 
power associated with technologies like the computer, to their meanings in terms of 
contemporary social practices, and political and cultural divisions and struggles. In this 
way, this research resituates computer technologies in the constitution of contemporary 
fields, domains, and objects of knowledge correlated by relations of power. 
Precedence for approaches to constituting counter-histories of cultures by 
interrogating economies of discourses comes from the work of Foucault (Foucault 1973; 
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Foucault 1975; Foucault 1988; Foucault 1995; Foucault 2000a; Foucault 2000b; Foucault 
2000c; Foucault 2001:1970; Foucault 2002; Foucault 2007a; Foucault 2007d; Foucault 
2007e; Foucault 2007f; Foucault 2007g; Foucault, Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991; 
Foucault and Faubion 2000a; Foucault and Faubion 2000b; Foucault and Faubion 2000c; 
Foucault and Gordon 1980a; Foucault and Gordon 1980b; Foucault, Senellart, and 
Davidson 2007) and those who have engaged his work in the unloosening of power 
relations (Agamben 1998; Agamben 2000; Agamben 2005; Bowker 1993; Bowker and 
Star 1999; Butler 2007; Castel 1991; Donzelot 1991; Edwards 1996; Ewald 1991; 
Gordon 1991; Hacking 1990; Hacking 1991; Hacking 2006; Hamilton 1999; Poster 
2006). Indeed, all of these contributions, taken as a whole, can be understood as a call for 
paying attention to competition and collaboration amongst discourses; how they operate 
as economies that are centrally motivated by the correlation of power, and unequivocally 
situated in human struggle. 
In a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold relations 
of power which permeate, characterize, and constitute the social body, and these 
relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor 
implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of 
a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain 
economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this 
association (Foucault and Gordon 1980a, p.93). 
In this way, Foucault's discursive economies, and those presented here, are 
constantly changing, and created ad-hoc. They are understood as collections of fragments 
of knowledge, interconnected around a support or supports, in this case computers, 
statistics, and list technologies. 
A discourse, then, is a way of knowledge, a background of assumptions and 
agreements about how reality is to be interpreted and expressed, supported by 
paradigmatic metaphors, techniques and technologies, and potentially embodied 
social institutions (Edwards 1996, p.34). 
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Computers, statistics, and lists are understood here as such an ever-changing and 
self-elaborating ensemble of heterogeneous elements, that combine other technologies, 
techniques, institutions, metaphors, language, practices, fictions, fantasies and fragments 
of competing and collaborating discourses, to form an assemblage of policing that is a 
critical support in the 'securing' of entropic milieus of circulation installed under modern 
and contemporary governmentality. For Foucault (2007), technological supports are the 
objects that are at once studied, and at the same time invented by the discourses 
surrounding them, and this is the precise role computer, statistics, and lists play in the 
work presented here. Recognizing that "a tool is also a model for its own reproduction 
and a script for the reenactment of the skill it symbolizes" (Weizenbaum 1976, p.25), this 
chapter rests in many ways on the theoretical assertion of double integration outlined in 
the proceeding chapters: That just as the conjuncture of computers, statistics, and lists 
have shaped modern governmentality, contemporary governmentality continues to be 
equally shaped, authorized, and self-elaborated through this assemblage for policing 
disordered, chaotic, and ever-expanding—entropic—milieus of circulation. In this way, 
the calculation, prediction, delimitation, and policing of the movement of threatening 
elements distributed in populations not only continues to serve governmentality with the 
event of the emergence of the modern computer, but also serves as further proof of its 
power to reproduce its own praxis, delimiting evermore particularized populations, and 
predicting evermore risks for policing in ever-expanding milieus. The entropic milieus of 
circulation which the conjunction of computers, statistics, and lists installed post-World 
War II, not only dramatically altered how living beings, things and knowledge would be 
classified, but also radically changed how people would come to see themselves as digital 
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elements distributed in 'global classification infrastructures' (Bowker and Star 1999); 
'new' entropic milieus that would not only come to govern how we do life, but equally 
the possibilities and limitations we see for life from within such disordered and 
unpredictable, but 'secured' spaces. 
Picking up on the historical trajectory established in the first chapter, we now find 
ourselves in post World-War II America, a cultural landscape which was increasingly 
fascinated by, and in awe of the circulating myths and stories surrounding cybernetics, or 
what Hamilton (1999) has called the 'cybernetic imaginary'; how conjunctions of 
humans and machines could operate in tandem to protect and secure the nation and defeat 
the arch-enemy Communist forces. In the tradition of Foucault, and specifically Edwards 
(1996), Heims (1980; 1993) and Haraway (1985; 1991; 1997), it is argued here that we 
can make sense of how computers, statistics, and lists serve apparatuses of security, 
assemblages of policing, and contemporary governmentality, only when we understand 
the history of this modern technological conjuncture as critical to post World-War-II 
Cold War science, politics and culture. Indeed, the language and discourses this security 
conjuncture authorized, reinforced, and self-elaborated laid down the foundations for a 
global cultural politics that would increasingly be articulated through automated regimes 
of truth marked by divisive 'us' vs. 'them' fractures. Marked by what Edwards (1996) 
has called open-world and closed-world discourses, it is argued here that the emergence 
of modern computer technology, and the assemblage of global policing it installed, 
continued to serve the authorization and self-elaboration of fractures of 'us' versus 'them' 
as a preeminent way of doing and seeing the necessary and sufficient management and 
108 
distribution of elements, circulating in populations, subsumed in entropic milieus of 
circulation the world over. 
Computers, statistics, and lists serve: entropic milieus of circulation 
Certain organisms such as man tend for a time to maintain and often even to 
increase the level of organization, as a local enclave, in the general stream of 
increasing entropy, of increasing chaos and de-differentiation. Life is an island 
here and now in a dying world (Wiener 1950, p.95). 
To characterize the milieus of circulation installed by the apparatuses of security 
underpinned by the computer, statistical, and list technologies in the 1940s and 1950s, 
and further, to propel this conjuncture into an analysis of contemporary governmentality, 
this research engages the term 'entropy,' redeployed here as Norbert Wiener (Wiener 
1948; Wiener 1950; Wiener 1954; Wiener 1956; Wiener 1993), the father of cybernetics, 
intended it: as characterizing the milieu of circulation in which the governing of complex 
interactions between 'men [sic] and things' takes place. Indeed, entropy is a fundamental 
physical law around which physics, cybernetics, game, and systems theories are based, 
yet remains a seldom-explored language and enabling theoretical construct for 
investigating technological, social and cultural phenomenon. In this way, this chapter and 
this thesis overall, seek to reinvigorate entropy as an analytical construct for techno-
cultural investigation. 
Rehashing the theoretical insights first gleaned by Norbert Wiener (1948) in his 
seminal book, Cybernetics: Control and Communication in the Animal and Machine, this 
section examines and highlights Wiener's social model of cybernetics, investigating how 
entropy is not merely to be understood from the perspective of the hard sciences as the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics, but is also very much constitutive of social, cultural, 
and human existence; both a way of doing and seeing living beings, things and 
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knowledge. Indeed, the lens of cybernetics can be focused from the universe, to the sky, 
all the way down to the molecule and the atom, seeing spaces as disordered and 
expanding—entropic—milieus of circulation, susceptible to systematic and automated 
probing, calculation, and prediction for regularities and patterns that factor the worth 
and/or risk of the movement and distribution of circulating elements. 
What is entropy, and why are we sailing in a sea of it? 
Consider.. .the chaotic effect (resulting from a sudden imposition of uniformity) 
of a strong wind on the innumerable grains of sand that compose a beach: amid 
this confusion, the action of a human foot on the surface of the beach constitutes a 
complex interaction of events that leads to the statistically improbable 
configuration of a footprint. The organization of events that has produced this 
configuration, this^orm, is only temporary: the footprint will soon be swept away 
by the wind. In other words, a deviation from the general entropy curve 
(consisting of a decrease in entropy and the establishment of improbable order) 
will generally tend to be reabsorbed into the universal curve of increasing 
entropy. And yet, for a moment, the elemental chaos of this system has made 
room for the appearance of an order, based on the relationship of cause and effect: 
the cause being the series of events interacting with the grains of sand (in this 
case, the human foot), and the effect of being the organization resulting from it (in 
this case, the footprint) (Eco 1989, p.49). 
In the same way that Umberto Eco sketches out the fleeting appearance of order 
in footprints left in the sand, the semblance of cause/effect relationships that mark 
temporary moments of decreasing entropy, we can also begin to see how entropy plays a 
pivotal role in the milieus of circulation installed under contemporary governmentality. In 
Eco's case of the footprint in the sand, cause is attributed to the interaction of a series of 
living beings, things, and activities, which produce the fleeting effect of order. But like 
with any acts where order is established, such as when a list of laws or prohibitions is 
invoked, that posit a series of norms for good life out of the great disorder of human 
interaction (though shall not steal, murder, etcetera), or when computer code is listed, 
compiled and executed as a program; the semblance of order produced, like footprints in 
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the sand, is almost instantly swept right back up into the general curve of entropy. In 
these processes, the double integration effect of technologies like lists, or statistics, or 
computers, or any juridical-disciplinary mechanism that administers, organizes and 
develops knowledge out of chaos and disorder, leads to an inevitable avalanche of more 
questions—to more missing information—to more possibilities for delimitation, 
prediction, re-configuration, re-assembling, and re-listing. 
Indeed, in Eco's example of the footprint, there is missing information as to the 
veracity of the classification of the footprint itself, is it in fact a human footprint, or that 
of some other species, maybe, say, a yeti? Also questions arise as to its precise origins, 
specifically, whose footprint is it? And further, as to the endless series of things and 
events that led up to the 'foot' being there in the first place. We must investigate further. 
For each answer to our list of questions, will surely and inevitably generate infinitely 
more lists of questions, calling into effect more lists, in these self-elaborating processes 
of knowledge development. 
In order to extrapolate Eco's insights into an analysis of contemporary 
governmentality, let us briefly consider today's web-based 'cookies' and how they not 
only 'automate the process of demographic solicitation,' and offer the possibility for 
surveillance (Elmer 2004, p.26), but also, it is argued here, produce the effects of 
endlessly new questions of all sorts, highlighting all kinds of missing information in the 
vast seas of entropy. 
When a user visits a Web site, the site sends a small identifying piece of 
information, or 'cookie,' to a personal computer within a hypertext transfer 
protocol (HTTP) header. When users stop to view certain Web sites and pages, 
therefore, they receive text, graphics, streaming media, and so forth on their 
screens, but they also receive a small packet of information that is stored in the 
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browser's memory and then stored in their own hard drives when the browser is 
closed (Elmer 2004, p.l 17). 
Like Eco's footprint in the sand, the 'cookie' produces the effect of a semblance 
of stability, or order, wherein a trace of the user is left behind that can be used to not only 
decipher their past movements, but also to materialize, predict, and reassemble future 
interactions between them, other users, and web site owners. But like Eco's footprints in 
the sand, the semblance of order that cookies fleetingly delimit, are swept right back up 
into the general curve of entropy, leading to an avalanche of even more questions, 
missing information, and the self-elaborating need for more cookies, 'spiders' 'intelligent 
agents,' 'web-bots,' etcetera. Is this footprint, this cookie, really reflective of the 
registered user of the computer? If not, who surfed to the site, and how did they get 
there? How can we further identify who left the trace? What other kinds of information 
can the cookie gather that would be useful to predicting the future movements of the user 
on the web and beyond? How can the user be more efficiently and effectively steered to 
desired and optimal norms in this highly uncertain and ever-expanding milieu? 
In The Dream Machine Michael Waldrop (2001) sketches out the history of 
information theory and its direct ties to physicists' understanding of entropy, recounting 
an anecdote about John von Neumann's insistence to Claude Shannon, the father of 
'Information Theory', that information and entropy were quite simply, one in the same 
concept. The story has it that von Neumann in a heated debate with Shannon insisted that 
'Information' in his 'Theory' be re-named 'Entropy'. Firstly, because "...[Shannon's] 
formula for the information content of a message [was] mathematically identical to the 
physicist's formula for entropy," but more importantly, because "most people don't know 
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what entropy really is, and if you use the word entropy in an argument, you will win 
every time!" (P.81). 
Despite such stuffy offhandedness, von Neumann's point was valid and Shannon 
considered it as such: In physics, entropy is understood as an indicator of the randomness 
of molecules in an isolated or closed system; and randomness, according to the 2nd law 
of thermodynamics, always increases, never decreases. In other words, an isolated or 
closed system (or a milieu of circulation) will always tend towards maximum disorder— 
the greatest homogeneity known—unless acted upon. Indeed, the larger the organism, or 
the population, or the milieu of circulation, the more random it will be at the molecular 
level, and thus the 'less information' we will have about the arrangement of the 
molecules, or the digital elements, or the individual people. Information from von 
Neumann's perspective, and from the perspective of physics in general, is merely the 
observation of patterns or regularities within an isolated or closed system. And for any 
physicist, the presence of entropy would always far outweigh that of information in 
'closed' systems; for entropy, in physics, means 'missing information,' an expression of 
the natural tendency of molecules in isolated systems to tend towards maximum disorder, 
unless acted upon. 
Building on such lines, one could argue that since ancient times, and earlier, we 
have been engaged in a never-ending battle to manage never-ebbing flows of entropy. 
Indeed, the earliest writings were lists of debits and credits owed, lists of events, and 
lexical lists of concepts (Goody 1977), which seemingly represent very early attempts at 
bringing order to, and decreasing the entropy of life through isolated/closed systems and 
mechanized processes aimed at organizing living beings, things, and knowledge into 
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materialized classified milieus of circulation, establishing kinships between all kinds of 
things, and equally, questioning such classifications and relations, all on an ongoing 
basis. And as we have seen, where list technologies have proven to be tremendously 
efficient and effective in the management of living beings, things and knowledge as such, 
they also produce the effects of endlessly new questions of all kinds. Moreover, when 
probed for regularities and patterns, disordered milieus of circulation can highlight all 
kinds of 'missing information' for those who wield the technologies for factoring 
worth/risk; ultimately subjecting elements circulating in populations to increasingly 
invasive forms of delimitation and policing through lists. 
Indeed, it is the overall argument of this thesis that contemporary governmentality 
pivots on the reduction of human beings to net-worth and risk-assessed scores; distributed 
digital elements derived from the observation of regularities and patterns from within 
entropic milieus of circulation, like the Internet and networked technologies today, which 
self-elaborate a state and milieu of pervasive and ubiquitous policing by assemblages of 
computers, statistics, and lists. Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapters on 
contemporary no-fly lists and no-blank lists, such apparatuses of security are the legacy 
of the global milieus of circulation installed with the emergence of modern computer 
technologies. 
It is also my argument here that no one understood entropy and its critical tie to 
governmentality better than Norbert Wiener, the father of cybernetics, and this despite 
him never having encountered Michel Foucault (a fact of which I am almost quite sure!). 
Wiener was first and foremost a self-professed patriotic American, an MIT professor, 
who applied his tremendous intellect to questions of artillery and ballistics during WWI, 
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and ultimately solved the greatest impediment to the defeat of the Axis powers in WWII; 
namely, how to track and target a moving airplane in the sky so as to shoot it down 
before it has a chance to strike. It was in such a climate of uncertainty and dire 
consequence, where unlocking the key to identification and control in the wide-open 
skies was preeminent, that Norbert Wiener came to apply cybernetics and notions of 
feedback in isolated or closed systems to military-based problems (Wiener 1948). 
Despite the seemingly wide-open nature of the sky, Wiener recognized that like 
the universe, the sky, and more specifically a pilot in symbiosis with their plane in the 
sky, could be seen as isolated or closed systems; a milieu of circulation that despite 
tending towards maximum disorder could through mechanized processes be probed for 
recognizable and predictable patterns—the basis of identification, control and 
communication in animals and machines. Wiener came to see that where isolated or 
closed systems, like anything from the universe, down to the atom, do by nature tend 
towards maximum expansion and disorder—entropy—they can nonetheless be controlled 
by uncovering and honing in on regularities and patterns which can be observed and 
subsequently manipulated through feedback operations. And his cybernetic theory, and 
its language of'causal-circular feedback loops' in 'closed-systems' proved to be 
invaluable to scientists and the US government, and ultimately helped found the military-
industrial complex; providing a series of underlying mathematical operations that solved 
a wide variety of identification and control issues in weapons, security and surveillance 
design and development throughout the end of WWII, in the Cold War era, and also in 
today's techno-cultural landscape (Heims 1980, 1993; Edwards 1996; Simpson 1994). 
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Indeed, where there is order, optimism and progress to be found in cybernetic 
conjunctions of humans and machines that probe entropic closed systems, or entropic 
milieus of circulation, for regularities and patterns as Wiener imagined, such couplings 
also have the inherent capacity to pose grave risks to human survival, rights, and liberties 
when applied as large-scale social systems. In lieu of this, Wiener penned the first edition 
of The Human Use of Human Beings in 1950 in which he invests significant time in 
considering and warning against the social consequences and the possible de-humanizing 
effects of mass adoption of mechanized feedback systems as social order, or 
govemmentality, arguing that the 'mechanization of man (sic)' through 'isolated systems' 
is the simplest and easiest path to power. Recognizing that isolated systems applied as 
social order allow people with ambitions for power to craft social organizations where 
orders come from the top and go down unquestioned, Wiener wrote The Human Use of 
Human Beings (1950) as a protest and warning against the dehumanizing possibilities 
inherent in such practice and the dire implications of identification and control in isolated 
systems to human survival. For Wiener (1950) enveloping a country, the world, or all of 
humanity in an isolated, mechanized feedback system could provide the incunabula for a 
new global totalitarianism, where the tendency is to maximum disorder, but for those 
who wield the technologies to observe the regularities and patterns, and act on the 
molecules distributed in closed systems. 
In a world and universe marked by unpredictability and expansion, Wiener 
conceived of cybernetics as a theory for decreasing entropy through the application of 
'circular causal feedback' systems for the 'good of man [sic].' Indeed, the Latin root 
cyber, in cybernetics, was expressly engaged by Wiener (1948) to denote the steering 
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(decision-making) potential inherent in conjunctions of humans and machines for 
navigating the endless expansion of maximum disorder that marks organic life—entropy. 
Like a ship in rough, stormy, and unpredictable waters, Wiener imagined man [sic] as a 
'helmsmen,' engaging the ship's integrated technologies and techniques to right and 
balance the boat and steer the vessel towards homeostasis. For Wiener, this was the 
preeminent metaphor for cybernetics, if not human existence and survival as a whole in 
the face of maximum disorder and expansion, or entropy. 
In his social model of cybernetics, 'homeostatic mechanisms' are extremely 
valuable, as human beings navigating precarious and rough seas need to receive accurate 
and precise information about the unpredictable entropic environments that surround 
them, in order to achieve balance, both in self, and in the small, interactive, physical 
communities in which their lives take place. In his conception, machines, or homeostatic 
mechanisms, are engaged by humans in decision-making. Functioning as instruments that 
observe patterns and regularities, indicating changes in milieus of circulation, like the 
high seas, homeostatic mechanisms serve the administration and organization of people 
and things, like unexpected leaks in the hull of the ship, and equally, predicting 
precarious dangers, such as the risks of ramming approaching icebergs, or colliding with 
treacherous reefs, or succumbing to rocks in shallow-lying waters. Onboard Wiener's 
ships, the achievement of homeostasis, or the normalization of unpredictable things 
circulating in the boat's milieu supercedes the goal of destination. The primary objective 
of the helmsmen is to keep the ship afloat and right, making decisions, steering and 
assigning elements, with the preeminent aim of ensuring the security and well being of all 
passengers and cargo onboard. 
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Indeed, for Foucault (Foucault 2007a) the very essence of government is also 
clearly wrapped up in the metaphor of righting and balancing the ship in the 
unpredictable, but tamable, vast, stormy seas of disorder that fundamentally mark human 
existence. 
That government is concerned with things understood in this way as the 
intrication of men and things is readily confirmed by the inevitable metaphor of 
the ship that is always invoked in these treatises on government. What is it to 
govern a ship? It involves, of course, being responsible for the sailors, but also 
taking care of the vessel in and the cargo; governing a ship also involves taking 
winds, reefs, storms, and bad weather into account. What characterizes 
government of a ship is the practice of establishing relations between the sailors, 
the vessel, which must be safeguarded, the cargo, which must be brought to port, 
and their relations with all those eventualities like winds, reefs, storms and so on 
(Foucault 2007a, p.97). 
In this way, Wiener's 'social model of cybernetics,' the topic he takes up at length 
in the Human Use of Human Beings is, in essence, the governmentality to which Foucault 
focused his lens, but with a moral and political spin, and polemic, that Foucault was 
hesitant to elaborate. For both, the essential and main element of control, or government, 
is the complex integration of people and things, their delimitation and regulation in 
unpredictable environments, that serve the 'best,' or 'good' interests of the overall 'state' 
of balance. In this way, in both Foucault's governmentality, and Wiener's 'social model 
of cybernetics,' territory, property, and cargo (animate and inanimate) are considered 
strictly as variables in milieus of circulation that concern themselves with the complex 
administration, organization, and development of living beings, things, and knowledge, 
like captains aboard ships battling stormy seas. 
But where Wiener's social model of cybernetics placed the moral and ethical 
dimensions of decision-making firmly in the hands of human beings, in the ability of 
individuals in small, interactive, physical communities to achieve homeostasis, such is 
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not the case with all systems theory that emerged from the 1940s onwards, and in this 
way, the legacy of Wiener's cybernetics and its technoscientific language cannot be 
separated from its theoretical and mathematical twin, John Von Neumann's game theory 
(Von Neumann 1964; Von Neumann and Burks 1966; Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
1953), which equally contributed to the critical paradigm shift the emergence of systems 
approaches to the hard and soft sciences ultimately represented post World War II 
(Heims 1980). Where Wiener's social model of cybernetics emphasized human decision-
making, extolled the merits of small interactive, physical communities, and shunned any 
concentration of administrative, economic, and political power, von Neumann's game 
theory advocated probability based automated decision-making, lending itself to global 
approaches to governance, administration, economics, and the concentration of political 
power that were rippling through the US post World War II. 
Von Neumann's 'winners' and 'losers' 
Indeed, statistical techniques involving delimiting populations, and reducing 
individuals to cases, and 'numerical estimations of utility' (p. 12) played a pivotal role in 
von Neumann's (1953) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In his theory, 
questions of 'good' and 'bad' are removed from the decision-making capacities of 
Wiener's helmsmen, through their automated reduction to the 'mixed strategies' of 
statistical mechanisms which not only express through distributions a 'picture' of the 
distance of the 'bad ' from the 'good ' but also prescribe a means for the normalization, or 
nullification of abnormal elements. In other words, von Neumann (1953), in his own 
way, embraced the 'double integration' effects of statistics in his positing of a theory of 
games, which could at once automate the delimitation of populations, and also serve the 
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dual role of prescribing mechanisms for the normalization of mistakes, or identified risks 
in the delimited populations. Among von Neumann's (1953) elaborate writings of 
mathematical formulae, we find section 17.10.1, on 'Mistakes and Their Consequences: 
Permanent Optimality.' 
We want to express the distance from 'goodness' for those strategies which are 
not good; and obtain some picture of the consequences of a mistake—i.e. of the 
use of a strategy which is not good. However, we shall not attempt to exhaust this 
subject, which has many intriguing ramifications (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1953, p. 162). 
Unlike Wiener who took the 'dangers' inherent in conjunctions of people, math, 
and machines very seriously, and wrote extensively about his fear of subsuming life in 
such conjunctive apparatuses, particularly in The Human Use of Human Beings (Wiener 
1950; Wiener 1954), von Neumann, despite his extensive contributions to the RAND 
corporation, and the US Department of Defense during the Cold War (Heims 1980), 
never published many detailed thoughts on the social implications of his theories, 
preferring to nest his writings for the most part in the field of applied mathematics to 
computers, and economics, and later to the biology of the human brain in The Computer 
and the Brain (Von Neumann 1964). 
It is essential to realize that economists can expect no easier fate than that which 
befell scientists in other disciplines. It seems reasonable to expect that they will 
have to take up first problems contained in the very simplest facts of economic 
life and try to establish theories which explain them and which really conform to 
rigorous scientific standards. We can have enough confidence that from then on 
the science of economics will grow further, gradually comprising matters of more 
vital importance than those to which one has to begin (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1964, p.7). 
Indeed, in the footnote to this text in the 1964 edition of Theory of Games 
(originally published in 1953), von Neumann notes: 
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The beginning is actually of a certain significance, because the forms of exchange 
between a few individuals are the same as those observed on some of the most 
important markets of modern industry, or in the case of barter exchange between 
states in international trade (p.7). 
As von Neumann's later research into The Computer and the Brain (1964), and 
his Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata (1966) reveal, von Neumann saw his Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior (1953; 1964) as providing a mathematical platform on 
which not only global economic life, but the life of all living beings could be approached 
from the standpoint of the 'zero-sum game,' which took at its maxim the statistical 
delimitation, policing, and nullification of opponents in metaphorical battles involving 
exchanges. As the games got larger, von Neumann mathematically transformed the zero-
sum game into what he called the constant-sum game. "We are widening the domain of 
games which we consider, by passing from the zero-sum games to the constant-sum 
games. At the same time, we widen the concept of strategic equivalence introduced 
[earlier]..." (p.347-8). But regardless of how the concept was mathematically widened, 
the functional results were the same: the clear delimitation of winners and losers engaged 
in games of exchange. 
In order to express these 'new' complexities of modern economics his game 
theory introduced in metaphorical terms, von Neumann (1953) drew on the story of 
Robinson Crusoe, stranded on a deserted island with a cast of subjects, and how it relates 
to questions of managing populations. In this way, in the Introduction to Theory of 
Games we can see the operations and enclosures of sovereignty's juridical-disciplinary 
mechanisms, wherein Crusoe the sovereign, faces what von Neumann calls a 'maximum 
problem' in satisfying the needs and desires of his set of subjects, the other deserted 
island dwellers. 
121 
Crusoe is given certain physical data (wants and commodities) and his task is to 
combine and apply them in such a fashion as to obtain a maximum resulting 
satisfaction. There can be no doubt that he controls exclusively all the variables 
upon which this result depends—say the allotting of resources, the determination 
of the uses of the same commodities for different wants, etc. (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1964, p. 10). 
Indeed, we see with Crusoe the same kinds of maximum problems faced by the 
sovereign in managing subjects, who, to solve such conundrums, leveraged the enclosing 
spaces of discipline in the administration, organization and development of living beings 
and things, a space that technologies like statistics, and its probability techniques could 
equally serve. In the footnote to the preceding text, von Neumann (1964) notes: 
Sometimes uncontrollable factors also intervene, e.g. the weather in agriculture. 
These however are purely statistical phenomena. Consequently they can be 
eliminated by the known procedures of the calculus of probabilities: i.e., by 
determining the probabilities of the various alternatives and by introduction of the 
notion of'mathematical expectation' (ibid, p. 10). 
But for von Neumann, probabilities, or 'mathematical expectations' alone, could 
never serve the 'social exchange economy' of this irruptive modern economic order, 
where the complexities of populations of elements in various exchanges introduced 
problems of an entirely different nature. For in such 'games' in social exchange 
economies, each participant is attempting to obtain not a prescribed result, but rather an 
optimum result. Unlike in the case of Crusoe's sovereign deserted island, where the king 
Crusoe administered and organized living beings and things from the top down, 
exchanges in 'social economies' occur in an unpredictable milieu of circulation where no 
participant controls all the variables—a space where the calculation of 'optimums' and 
'risks,' and the vanquishing of players, rules the day. 
Thus each participant attempts to maximize a function (his above mentioned 
[optimum] 'result') of which he does not control all variables. This is certainly no 
maximum problem [like in the case of Crusoe], but a peculiar and disconcerting 
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mixture of several conflicting maximum problems. Every participant is guided by 
another principle and neither determines all variables which affect his interest 
(ibid, p. 11). 
Indeed, von Neumann's milieus of disconcerting, or irruptive economic 
circulation, are spaces where 'all maxima are desired at once—by various participants' 
(ibid, p.l 1), and it is precisely this milieu of circulation that his theory of games was 
devised to meet, constructing 'individuals' as probability-based statistical elements, 
'numerical estimations of utility' (ibid, p. 12) that provide "mathematically complete 
principles which define 'rational behavior' for the participants in a social economy, and 
to derive from them the general characteristics of that behavior" (ibid, p.31). Herein, we 
can also see how the economic techniques of von Neumann's 'game theory,' are 
characterized by the 'double integration' effects of disciplinary normalization, in the 
calculation of 'optimums' and 'risks,' or norms for rational behavior from out of the great 
disorder of entropy, which serve as the basis for the articulation of the relational 
abnormal. In von Neumann's theory of games, complete normalization, or nullification of 
the opponent, is the primary objective and goal. In other words, the economic techniques 
of von Neumann's game theory installed a mechanism for declaring unequivocal winners 
and losers in a highly uncertain and ever-expanding milieu of global circulation. 
So, where Wiener's humane 'social model of cybernetics' emphasized the 
intermingling of humans and machines to serve small, interactive, physical, milieus of 
circulation, as a strategy for navigating the entropy that marks organic life—the 
privileging and achievement of cooperation and homeostasis within and between people 
as the primary means to the humane deployment of 'security' technologies; in contrast, 
von Neumann's game theory emphasized competition between individuals and 
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collectives, stressing the statistical nullification of opponents. Indeed, in such games, the 
prize for winners is the absolute delimitation, policing and vanquishing (nullification) of 
losers, in milieus that themselves further reinforce and self-elaborate such never-ending 
games. Indeed, in this way, game theory was laced with biases for Wiener (1948), forcing 
humanity into a black and white procrustean bed of 'winners' and 'losers', of 'us' and 
'them:' 
In many cases, where there are three players, and in the overwhelming majority of 
cases, when the number of players is large, the result is one of extreme 
indeterminacy and instability. The individual players are compelled by their own 
cupidity to form coalitions; but these coalitions do not generally establish 
themselves in any single, determinate way, and usually terminate in a welter of 
betrayal, turncoatism, and deception, which is only too true a picture of the higher 
business life, or the closely related lives of politics, diplomacy, and war. In the 
long run, even the most brilliant and unprincipled hucksters become tired of this, 
and agree to live in peace with one another, and the great rewards are reserved for 
the one who watches for an opportune time to break his agreement and betray his 
companion. There is no homeostasis whatsoever. We are involved here in the 
business cycles of boom and failure, in the successions of dictatorship and 
revolution, in the wars which everyone loses, which are so real a feature of 
modern times (Wiener 1948, p.185-186). 
Wiener's social model of cybernetics and von Neumann's game theory are 
positioned here as two competing and collaborating discourses, open-human and closed-
world discourses respectively, operating in conjunction with computer, statistical, and list 
technologies in modern and contemporary formations of power. Through an analysis of 
these discourses, we will now see how conjunctions of computer technologies, and 
statistical mechanisms revolving around the probing of milieus of circulation for 
regularities and patterns throughout the Cold War and beyond served to further reduce 
living beings and things to classes, increasingly identifying them on lists of all kinds, and 
ultimately subjecting them to more invasive and complex forms of computerized 
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statistical delimitation, policing, and nullification; all in power struggles over knowledge, 
and the constitution of truthful and factual classifications of human beings. 
Open-human discourse: islands in a sea of entropy 
Our view of society differs from the ideal of society which is held by many 
Fascists, Strong Men in Business, and Government. Similar men of ambition for 
power are not entirely unknown in scientific and educational institutions. Such 
people prefer an organization in which all orders come from above and none 
return. The human beings under them have been reduced to the level of effectors 
for a supposedly higher nervous organism. I wish to devote this book to a protest 
against this inhuman use of human beings; for in my mind, any use of human 
beings in which less is demanded of him than his full status is a degradation and a 
waste. It is a degradation to chain a human being to an oar and use him as a 
source of power (Wiener 1950, p. 15). 
Critical to Wiener's warning against enveloping human life in isolated or closed 
automated feedback systems is the relationship between progress and entropy; between 
the openness of human beings and the isolation of machines that probe milieus for 
patterns and regularities. Indeed, for Wiener, it is only in the 'non-isolated parts of 
isolated systems' that optimism is to be found: namely and exclusively, in human beings, 
who are inherently and uniquely open, existing as islands in a vast but isolated sea of 
entropy, the ever-expanding universe; and who defy this greatest of all chaos and disorder 
by displaying unique instincts, traits, and tendencies towards order, optimism, and 
progress—openness towards each other. But where openness towards each other is 
Wiener's hallmark for 'order,' 'optimism,' and 'progress,' and is the strict realm of 
humanity, it is not a given, as 'disorder,' 'pessimism,' and 'isolation' are equally the 
preeminent characteristics of entropy, and the predisposition of molecules in closed 
systems such as the universe, the world, religions, nations, universities, and corporations, 
to name but a few of the isolated social systems Wiener (1950) cautioned against 
enclosing life. 
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Those who suffer from a power complex find the mechanization of man a simple 
way to realize their ambitions. I say, that this easy path to power is in fact not 
only a rejection of everything that I consider to be of moral worth in the human 
race, but also a rejection of our now very tenuous opportunities for a considerable 
period of human survival (Wiener 1950, p. 15-16). 
For it is precisely the potential for closed/isolated systems to reduce people to 
effectors in machines—to quantifiable cogs in a wheel, or to molecules circulating in an 
organism—susceptible to probing for patterns and regularities, that makes the second law 
of thermodynamics more than a cornerstone of physical science, but also for Wiener 
(1950), a dire warning that life can be isolated and subjected to intense identification and 
control (delimitation and policing); despite an everyday existence that most experience as 
disorder and entropy. For Wiener, the danger of closed/isolated systems applied as social 
systems is an obfuscation of the wide-open possibilities and light inherent in human 
beings, who despite existing in a miasma of ever-expanding entropy find optimism, 
progress and order in our openness to each other. In this way, human beings are the only 
inherently open systems, and the danger is that the closed/isolated systems in which we 
live (from the universe, to the internet, to science in general) have a natural propensity to 
move us towards maximum disorder, highlighting more and more 'missing information,' 
and thus making it difficult to see our openness and humanity through the dense closed 
isolation of cybernetic systems and machines (Werbin 2006). It is precisely for these 
reasons that Wiener insists that such homeostatic mechanisms serve small, interactive, 
physical communities, and where the adoption of any larger social mechanisms should be 
approached with extreme caution and trepidation. 
The question of whether to interpret the second law of thermodynamics 
pessimistically or without gloomy consequence depends on the importance we 
give to the universe at large, on the one hand, and to the islands of locally 
decreasing entropy we find in it, on the other. Remember that we ourselves 
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constitute such an island of decreasing entropy, and that we live among other such 
islands (Wiener 1950, p.25). 
Indeed, although we are embedded in closed/isolated systems where 
communication and information flow freely and endlessly towards entropy, we are 
nonetheless in constant feedback with those around us; capable of critiquing, making 
decisions, imagining other possibilities, acting, learning and growing together. Far from 
being isolated automatons, or circulating elements in populations and milieus, it is our 
continual, and critical interaction with our environment and those around us, and the 
optimism, order and progress we find in each other, that makes us open (Werbin 2006). 
But that is not to say that openness, progress, and optimism are a given. Placing the 
weight of our beliefs in humanity over and above our isolated mechanized systems is a 
choice, and such practices and fundamental beliefs must be fostered and maintained, and 
their demise must be guarded against vigilantly; at least for Norbert Wiener (1950: 1954). 
The more life is mechanized, the more we must place the weight of our belief in 
the non-isolated parts of isolated systems—in each other's openness. This was Wiener's 
(1950) warning and message in The Human Use of Human Beings with respect to 
viewing life as enclosed in entropic milieus of circulation. But where his warnings were 
dire, few picked up on his line of thinking, as cybernetic milieus of circulation, supported 
by and supporting the computer, statistics and list technologies, were increasingly 
installed in endless fields and domains, and were equally further subsumed in the 
collective imaginary, in the social woodwork, eventually becoming a taken for granted 
part of everyday life. 
The real power of new technologies does not appear during their mythic period, 
when they are hailed for their ability to bring world peace, renew communities, or 
end scarcity, history, geography, or politics; rather their social impact is greatest 
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when technologies become banal—when they literally (as in the case of 
electricity) or figuratively withdraw into the woodwork (Mosco 2004, p. 19). 
For Vincent Mosco in The Digital Sublime (2004), new technologies embody and 
drive the Utopian myths of their times. Whether the myths were about the telegraph, 
radio, television, modern computer, or cyberspace today, Mosco suggests that continuity 
rests in the Utopian visions people engage around the advent of these technologies, how 
through the use of 'new' technologies, people will ".. .experience an epochal 
transformation in human experience that [will] transcend time (the end of history), space 
(the end of geography), and power (the end of politics)" (p.2-3). In this way, he argues 
that myth is 'congealed common sense', that although the taken-for-granted is 
"continually transforming itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and with 
philosophical opinions that have entered ordinary life" (p.29), there are nonetheless 
'powerful philosophical currents' that leave behind 'sedimented common sense' about 
'new' technological forms, establishing 'folklores of the future' that require 
interrogation. And this is precisely what the work of Norbert Wiener provides the 
research presented here. Indeed, Donna Haraway's (1997) description of her role as 
cyborg researcher would seem to succinctly bear out the 'folklore of the future' Wiener 
urgently cautioned against. 
I want to use the beady little eyes of a laboratory mouse to stare back at my fellow 
mammals, my hominid kin, as the incubate themselves and their human and 
nonhuman offspring in a technoscientific culture medium (p. 52). 
The incunabula for Haraway's now prevalent and ubiquitous beady-eyed research 
mice—the founding cyborgs—were first incubated in popular culture with the publication 
of Wiener's Cybernetics in 1948, at which point the language, ideas, metaphors and 
myths of human-machine couplings began to increasingly circulate and be absorbed 
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throughout the United States and beyond (Bowker 1993; Hamilton 1999; Heims 1993). 
The more communication and computer technologies became familiar everyday objects 
in people's lives, the more they produced a unique and new 'cybernetic imaginary' 
(Hamilton, 1999) filled with awe and wonder over computers, in which life was 
increasingly being understood as the 'transmission of information' and as 'programmed,' 
wherein society was increasingly seen as one large 'system' or 'organism.' 
Feedback has come to mean information about the outcome of any process or 
activity. No single word for the general idea seems to have existed in the English 
language before feedback was introduced in the context of cybernetics, and the 
analogy filled a gap. The ubiquity of feedback meant interaction is everywhere. It 
shifted attention from an individualism that had highlighted noncircular cause-
and-effect and from the individual person—as if he or she could be independent 
of others and even independent of chance events occurring in the environment. 
Still, the word betrays its mechanical origins and encourages ignoring much that 
happens between people (Heims 1993, p.271-2). 
With the emergence of cybernetics and the unique language of systems theory it 
brought forth, a whole new way of seeing and doing life was invoked, increasingly 
understood in analogy to computers, which in turn introduced a one-sidedness in our 
understanding of our societies and ourselves; as large systems of computerized programs, 
in which humans are increasingly positioned as transmittable bits of information, or 
information processors in their own right, distributed digital elements in programmed 
populations. 
In all, the language of cybernetics, like any system of concepts and their 
associated metaphors, illuminates one fact of our world and experience at the 
price of masking others (Heims, 1993, p.272). 
So, it is not surprising that Wiener's warnings were barely heard, as the language 
of cybernetic systems, and in turn, the cyborgs it produced, circulated pervasively 
through American popular culture at the beginning of the Cold War, as his theoretical 
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ideas, and attendant mathematical practices began to be pervasively applied in more and 
more diverse research contexts, fields, and domains of knowledge (Bowker 1993). And 
where many writers and intellectual luminaries in Wiener's time, such as von Neumann 
(1953; 1964) began to use the concepts of cybernetics and systems theory as a language 
to promote the centralization of social, economic, and political power, Wiener (1950) 
went out of his way to "argue passionately against the concentration of political and 
administrative power, and to extol the merits of small interactive communities" (Heims 
1980, p.312). Indeed Wiener, true to his idea of people being the only open entities in a 
vast and isolated sea of entropy, privileged their values and decision-making, over and 
above the cold programmed automated decision-making of machines, for he understood 
that values are deeply embodied in patterns of communication and control, and the 
'power elite' being unscrupulous, would always favor 'instrumental rationality in the 
service of'maximizing power' (Wiener 1950, p. 160). 
For these reasons, in his writings beginning with Cybernetics and moving forward 
to The Human Use of Human Beings, and later in I Am a Mathematician (1956), Wiener 
argues for the privileging of small, interactive, physical, local communities. Deep in 
Cybernetics, we can find Wiener (1948) speaking passionately to the corporately 
controlled mass media, and the concentration of economic and political power such 
behemoths contained even in 1940s; cautioning against the limitations of how people 
experience community when messages are transmitted from such vast seas of entropy. 
Wiener (1950) goes out of his way to warn that "of all of these anti-homeostatic factors in 
society, the control of the means of communication is the most effective and most 
important" (p. 160), adding, 
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In a society too large for the direct contact of its members, these means are the 
press, both as it concerns books.. .and newspapers, the radio, the telephone 
system, the telegraph, the posts, the theater, the movies, the schools, and the 
church. On all sides we have a triple-constriction of the means of communication: 
the elimination of the less-profitable means in favor of the more profitable; the 
fact that these means are in the hands of the very limited class of wealthy men, 
and thus naturally express the opinions of that class; and the further fact that, as 
one of the chief avenues to political and personal power, they attract above all 
ambitions for such power. That system which more than all others should 
contribute to social homeostasis is thrown directly into the hands of those most 
concerned in the game of power and money, which we have already seen to be 
one of the chief anti-homeostatic elements in the community. It is no wonder then 
that the larger communities, subject to their disruptive influence, contain far less 
communally available information than the smaller communities, to say nothing 
of the human elements of which all communities are built up (p. 161-2). 
Indeed, this not only attests to Wiener's (1948; 1950) insistence on privileging 
small, local, physical, interactive communities, but also is emblematic of his highly 
democratic, and perhaps Utopian, 'folklore of the future' outlook in terms of communal 
practice; a testament to his unwavering belief in human beings to make the right choices, 
and do the right things. Openness and community, for Wiener, are uniquely human values 
and traits, and according to his analysis, any society which privileges and places its 
highest values on competition for, and concentration of money and power, like the mass 
media, is anti-homeostatic to community, limiting and precluding individual open-human 
possibilities. In this way, Wiener found any large-scale society, whether communist or 
capitalist, to be anti-homeostatic, and instead advocated small communities in which 
people have direct contact with each other; for these were the only communities which 
Norbert Wiener believed could support the true open-nature of human beings. 
Closed-world discourse: game theory a la von Neumann 
The story of Wiener and von Neumann can be brought to bear on present 
concerns and options, even though circumstances have changed considerably 
since their day. The dimensions relevant to technology and the available options 
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can be viewed abstractly and thus propelled out of the realm of history (Heims 
1980,p.408). 
Where Wiener's social model of cybernetics positioned people as the only truly 
open entities, who require depthful and careful critical engagement with their integration 
with new technologies; this was not the legacy that the cybernetic systems thinking 
revolution would leave behind; indeed, quite the contrary. For it was game theory that 
would provide the underlying theoretical orientation of closed-world global governance 
discourses which would ultimately come to dominate questions of social and global order 
and power in the Cold War era, and into today—games with clear winners and losers, 
marked by epic battles between 'us' and 'them,' self-elaborated in computer technologies 
themselves. Indeed, game theory's closed-world conception of opponents in exchange 
battles would achieve near-hegemonic status as the preeminent force in the development 
of computers, networks, and social and military systems of control (Edwards 1996). 
With its disciplinary emphasis on the convergence and concentration of economic 
and political power, closed world discourse would also come to define the globe as 
reducible to a system of capital competition, wherein forces of good and evil—of us and 
them—are positioned in a constant struggle to liberate and inhibit the forces and 
enclosures of market economies. Indeed, as early as 1948, Wiener accepted his own 
culpability for the emergence and widespread circulation of such closed techno-scientific 
dehumanizing approaches to social control, which inevitably would come to underpin 
bilateral positions of good vs. evil between the 'free world' and the 'communists:' 
Those of us who have contributed to the new science of cybernetics stand in a 
moral position which is, to say the least, not very comfortable. We have 
contributed to the initiation of a new science which, as I have said, embraces 




Gregory Bateson, the eminent psychologist, in a personal communication with 
Wiener in 1952 which is held in the MIT archives and published in Heims (1993), later 
provided substance to these concerns, particularly regarding the widespread application 
of game theory. Bateson wrote, 
What applications of the theory of games do, is to reinforce the players' 
acceptance of the rules and competitive premises, and therefore make it more and 
more difficult for the players to conceive that there might be other ways of 
meeting and dealing with each other.. .The theory may be 'static' within itself, but 
its use propagates changes, and I suspect that the long-term changes so 
propagated are in paranoidal direction and odious. I am thinking not only of the 
propagation of the premises of distrust which are built into the von Neumann 
model ex hypothesi, but also of the more abstract premise that nature is 
unchangeable. This premise is the reflection or corollary of the fact that the 
original theory was set up only to describe the games in which the rules are 
unchanging and the psychological characters of the players are fixed ex hypothesi. 
I know as an anthropologist that the 'rules' of the cultural game are not constant; 
that the psychology of the players is not fixed; and even that the psychology at 
times can be out of step with the rules (Heims, 1993, p. 307-8: From Gregory 
Bateson to Norbert Wiener, September 22, 1952, MIT archives). 
Where Wiener never saw the post World War II globe, or any people in us vs. 
them terms, as players in exchange competition, but rather concerned himself with the 
inhuman use of human beings as the primary enemy; John von Neumann, in contrast, 
concerned himself with the Russians and Communism as the primary enemy in the Cold 
War landscape (Heims 1980). Indeed, von Neumann would pay no mind to the hazards 
Wiener cautioned against, including highly centralized, technocratic governments, in 
which "political leaders may attempt to control their populations through political 
techniques as narrow and indifferent to human possibility as if they had, in fact, been 
conceived mechanically" (Wiener, 1954, p. 181). Quite the contrary really, for von 
Neumann's game theory took as its fundamental premise competition through optimum 
or mistake-driven 'statistical strategies' (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1964) in which 
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life and political contexts were analyzed exclusively as mathematical games of chance; a 
tradition which Eco in The Open Work (1989) as well as Hacking in The Taming of 
Chance and The Emergence of Probability (1990; 2006) trace back to Hieronimo 
Cardano (1501-1576) who first articulated a set of mathematical procedures for making 
wise decisions while gambling, in effect founding a theory of games and probability. 
Indeed, Galileo Galilei's (1564-1642) subsequent elevation and sophistication of 
analyses of games to social and political contexts saw such approaches ultimately begin 
to encompass more complex interpersonal and political decision-making well beyond 
their 16th century applications in gambling (Eco, 1989). In this way, the traditions of 
probability and statistical decision theory on which von Neumann's game theory were 
based, had always ignored other aspects of human decision making including how people 
conceptualize themselves in the world at large, how they take into account paradox and 
irony, how multiple objectives are achieved by people simultaneously, and how they 
know when to take action, or sit back and gather data (Eco, 1989). 
In game theory's statistical nullification worldview such human considerations 
were merely factors of probabilities and populations, and the deployment of 'optimum 
statistical strategies' were engaged precisely to counter such 'aleatory' effects—the worst 
possible outcomes. In this way, like with Foucault's (2007) conception of the apparatuses 
of security 'letting things take their course,' von Neumann's theory equally embraced a 
statistical model for reacting to reality in a way that allows for a 'freedom of movement' 
of players, but at the same time involves predicting, limiting and neutralizing random, or 
aleatory effects. Indeed, the game is won through the engagement and application of 
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statistical strategies involving delimiting and predicting odds, risks, and optimums that 
provide both a picture of reality, and also a roadmap for victory. 
The formulae above make clear how much of a loss a player risks—relative to the 
value of a play for him—by using this particular strategy. We mean here 'risk' in 
the sense of the worst that can happen under the given conditions (Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern 1964, p. 163). 
Indeed, the emergence of game theory represented a whole new way of seeing, 
and doing, where any number of players («-players) are assigned measures of utility and 
risk in gaming milieus that extend upwards in their applications, from the most basic 
organisms, to simple one-on-one economic barters, to modern complex milieus of 
economic circulation, to the vanquishing of global opponents of war, and all of their 
constituent populations. 
This was the era of the rise of a new style of thinker in military and world affairs, 
the 'strategic analyst'; in particular, von Neumann's mathematical game theory 
became part of the arsenal of conceptual tools of American strategic thinking. At 
a time when social scientists were becoming increasingly disillusioned with the 
usefulness of game theory, the military strategists were becoming more and more 
enthusiastic about it. The Rand Corporation became the world center for studies 
in and promotion of game theory, and retained von Neumann as a consultant... 
von Neumann was not only a consultant to the Rand Corporation but an active 
and respected participant in the making of government weapons policies (Heims, 
1980p.313-15). 
Indeed, this new style of 'strategic analyst' in social, military and world affairs, 
epitomized by von Neumann, and his theory of games, became so highly coveted, 
precisely because they effectively connected questions of technology, strategy 
(practices), and culture and contained them in a disciplinary closed-world discourse, a 
quintessentially semiotic space of game theory, in which there were clear protagonists 
and enemies, the free world and communist forces respectively (Edwards, 1996). Indeed, 
the installation of such global automated 'semiotic spaces' completely removed any 
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culpability for decision-making from individuals, as the onus for mistakes in the 
administration, organization and management of 'threats' could be turned back on the 
machines themselves, thus insulating those in power from faults in policy. 
As we have seen repeatedly in popular culture, in classic films like Stanley 
Kubrick's 1964, Dr. Strangelove or: How I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb, 
as well as in Sidney Lumet's 1964 Fail-Safe, and also in contemporary television shows 
like Fox's 24, and Hollywood blockbusters like the 2002 film The Sum of All Fears, as 
well in lesser seen b-movies like Deterrence from 1999; the US President's insertion and 
turning of the key in the 'nuclear suitcase,' this apocalyptic decision, is based exclusively 
on the nation's automated predetection systems, whose operations self-elaborate the 
'natural' decision to obliterate the planet through the use of atomic mechanisms and 
devices that have themselves called the possibilities and predictions for this reality into 
effect. 
In this sense, the technological embodiment of computers as tools for fighting 
atomic battles and defeating Communist foes, allowed game theory to proliferate, 
entwine, and self-elaborate itself into other discourses, whereby "systems analysis 
formalized this discursive connection between technology, strategy, and culture. It 
generated what Foucault called a 'regime of truth,' a set of implicit conventions about 
what could count as facts and reasons and who was authorized to elucidate them" 
(Edwards, 1996, p.120). Indeed, Edwards (1996) clearly recognizes the integration and 
interplay of Foucault's disciplinary and security mechanisms that involve the ongoing 
correlation of power through the further integration of such mechanisms in the 
constitution of fields, domains, and objects of knowledge. In this way he uses the phrase 
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...'closed-world-discourse' to describe the language, technologies, and practices 
that together supported the visions of centrally controlled, automated global 
power at the heart of American Cold War politics. Computers helped create and 
sustain this discourse in two ways. First, they allowed the practical construction of 
central real-time military control systems on a gigantic scale. Second, they 
facilitated the metaphorical understanding of world politics as a sort of system 
subject to technological management. Closed-world discourse, through 
metaphors, techniques, and fictions as well as equipment and salient experiences, 
linked the globalist, hegemonic aims of post-World War II American foreign 
policy with a high-technology military strategy, an ideology of apocalyptic 
struggle, and a language of integrated systems (p.7-8). 
Contrary to Wiener's conception of a humane social model of cybernetics, such 
closed-world discourse frames the global social and economic environment of the Cold 
War in terms of players—heroes, and enemies, winners and losers-all defined by cost-
benefit, net-worth, risk analyses, and the efficient and effective management of 
populations. In this way, game theory, and closed-world discourse was very useful to the 
US government because it paralleled and reinforced the epic tale of good and evil that 
was beginning to unfold on the world stage, between the free world and communist 
forces. On the efficient and effective role that game theory played in postwar American 
mythology of the 1940s, Heims (1980) writes: 
It favored thinking in terms of 'them and us'; was as mechanical and impersonal 
as possible; had a simplistic model of purposes and a simple, one dimensional, 
quantitative view of human nature; emphasized efficaciousness; and was 
conservative and uncritical of existing institutions (p.319). 
Indeed, although books like Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict (1960), and 
Rapoport's Strategy and Conscience and Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas 
(1964; 1969) reveal that game theory as a tool or social analysis can be engaged in 
imaginative and depthful ways, we also have seen, as Wiener has argued, that game 
theory's tendency to reduce complex social problems to black and white players, where 
the parties are understood to be in total and complete opposition, makes it extremely 
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fallible as a social model when anything more complex or realistic, involving more than 
two players enters the equation; and this, despite von Neumann's mathematical 
transformations from 'zero-sum games' to 'constant-sum games' in 1953. Yet still, 
closed-world discourse authorized and reinforced by game theory drove American 
foreign and domestic policy throughout the Cold War, and in many ways continues to 
today, precisely because it supports fantasies, fictions and metaphors that depict a 
contained but highly uncertain globe in an epic and eternal struggle of good and evil that 
can be efficiently and effectively managed through conjunctions of computer 
technologies, statistics, and lists. Game theory as a global approach came to dominate US 
foreign and domestic policy during the Cold War because 'the game' was perfectly 
aligned with, and a perfect metaphor for American domestic and foreign policy of the 
time: President Harry S. Truman's disciplinary doctrine of'containment.' 
Containment, with its image of an enclosed space surrounded and sealed by 
American power, was the central metaphor of closed-world discourse.. .it differed 
from its predecessors, however, in its genuinely global character, in the 
systematic, deliberate restructuring of American civil society that it entailed, and 
it its focus on the development of technological means to project military force 
across the globe (Edwards 1996, p.8). 
Consistent with Foucault's 'double integration' security technologies, Edwards 
(1996) describes how the Truman Doctrine and McCarthyism served to authorize and 
reinforce a disciplinary closed-world political and cultural environment in a 'triple sense' 
during the Cold War. In one respect, the closed-world was deeply linked to a clandestine, 
secretive, and repressive communist society, which found itself contained within an open 
world of democracy and capitalism. At the same time, the closed-world could also be 
positioned to contain the capitalist system, understood as threatened at its margins by 
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Communist invasion. And finally, in the largest sense, the closed-world could be seen as 
containing the overall globe, as a closed political and economic battlefield, 
.. .within which the struggle between freedom and slavery, light and darkness, 
good and evil was being constantly joined in every location—within the 
American government, its society, and its armed forces as well as abroad. Each 
side of the struggle had, in effect, a national headquarters, but the struggle as a 
whole went on everywhere and perpetually (Edwards, 1996, p. 10). 
Post World War II, the bilateralism that such 'us vs. them' tendencies in closed-
world discourse enabled served to authorize and reinforce the systematic reduction of the 
conflicts of the world to one grand battle, between the free world and its wicked, insipid 
communist enemies. And this epic and perpetual tale of real life-or-death struggle 
between good and evil is the primary metaphor of closed-world discourse. Indeed, the 
next chapter which investigates the contemporary emergence of no-fly lists will 
demonstrate how closed-world discourse enabled through the conjunction of computers, 
statistics, and lists continues today to leverage this same epic tale of good vs. evil, in 
which the world is seen as a bounded scene of conflict, a closed-world susceptible to 
technoscientific probing for regularities and patterns, where words, actions and thoughts 
are increasingly tracked, and ultimately self-referentially directed back to the same epic 
struggle between the free world and those who might stand in its way; thus continuing to 
exhibit the hallmark 'double integration' of the apparatuses of security that computers, 
statistics, and lists all serve. In this continuing story of governmentality, the modern 
communist slowly morphs into the contemporary terrorist. 
Closed-world discourse also sets up a global stage, on which the world is always 
divided against itself, wherein actions consist of attempts to invade, and parries at 
containment. Closed-world discourse supports a taken-for-granted view of the globe as a 
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closed stage of action, where the mise-en-scene consists entirely of the struggles between 
the free world and its foes. Indeed, post World War II, the grand tale of closed-world 
discourse allowed the United States to increasingly be viewed as ".. .the manager, either 
directly or by proxy, of the entire global political, economic, and military scene" 
(Edwards, 1996, P.13-14). 
Moreover, early massive computer systems developed by the US Defense 
Department to act as nuclear warning and control devices (i.e. SAGE), can be seen as 
epitomizing closed-world discourse, fully embodying, supporting, and self-elaborating 
through their technological structure and practices the globe as the stage of this epic and 
undeniable struggle between good and evil. "SAGE was far more than a weapons system. 
It was a dream, a myth, a metaphor for total defense, a technology of closed-world 
discourse" (Edwards 1996, p.l 11). And such disciplinary notions of global technological 
enclosure quickly spread as the computer's extension of mathematical formalizations to 
military planning and global politics were equally applicable in social and economic 
fields and domains, bringing forth a new sense of progress and order through the 
automated technological delimitation and policing of abnormal or 'threatening elements' 
in global uncertain entropic milieus. 
Both Edwards (1996) and Heims (1980: 1993) analyze in detail how such 
'systems discourses' of the Cold War, along with their attendant techniques and tools, 
authorized and reinforced a language and ideology of technical control across a large 
swath of research fields, domains, and objects of knowledge, including social structures, 
institutions, and government bodies, and their specific programs, policies, procedures and 
activities. From their work we can conclude that systems, or closed-world discourse can 
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also be understood as unequivocally linking technology to social, military and global 
strategy through the methods associated with mathematical and computer modeling. The 
more computers enabled the modeling and simulation of complex social, economic, and 
military problems, the more they created an ever-greater need for themselves in such 
milieus—the double integration effects that are the hallmark of the apparatuses of 
security. 
Culled from the vast seas of entropy: enter the cyborg class 
In her discussion of plutonium and genetically engineered and modified 
organisms Donna Haraway in Modest Witness@Second_Millenium: 
Femaleman©_Meets_Oncomouse™ (1997) speaks to the question of classification 
through technoscientific practices emerging in the Cold War era and beyond: 
What interests me about the proportion that links plutonium with genetically 
engineered organisms and situates them in their historical chronotopes, World 
War II through the Cold War of the 1940s through the 1980s, and the New World 
Order of the early 1980s to the present, is the question of taxonomy, category, and 
the natural status of artificial entities—kinship in short. Kinship is a technology 
for producing the material and semiotic effect of natural relationship, shared kind 
(Haraway, 1997, P.53). 
In the same way that Haraway (1997) argues that kinship is a technology for 
producing the effect of a shared kind, this chapter and work overall argue that lists are 
similarly a technology for producing the teleological effects of establishing 'natural' 
relationships, or shared kinds between living beings, things, and knowledge, a primary 
characteristic of life subsumed in entropic milieus of circulation. Where a discerning 
reader might wonder, where has the list gone in all of this? Is it now subsumed, as a 
disciplinary mechanism of computer technologies, merely serving the administration, 
organization, and development of knowledge, like computer code and its reams of listed 
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operations? The answer is no, the list has not disappeared, nor is it merely redeployed in 
the mechanisms of statistics and computer technologies in such mundane capacities; its 
role has just, to this point in the event of the emergence of the modern computer, 
remained rather limited, for the early computer's use immediately following WWII 
hinges almost exclusively on the administration, management, and organization of only 
two listed players: the free world and communist forces. 
Of all the technologies built to fight the Cold Ward, digital computers have 
become its most ubiquitous, and perhaps its most important, legacy. Yet few have 
realized the degree to which computers created the technological possibility of 
Cold War and shaped its political atmosphere, and virtually no one has recognized 
how profoundly the Cold War shaped computer technology. Its politics became 
embedded in the machines—even, at times, in their technical design—while the 
machines helped make possible its politics, we can make sense of the history of 
computers as tools only when we simultaneously grasp their history as metaphors 
in Cold War science, politics, and culture (Edwards, p.ix). 
In a world where classifications of 'us' vs. 'them' are heightened, cybernetic, 
game, and systems theory provided then, and today, a means to delimiting and policing 
the movement of threats of all kinds; the automated classification of living beings and 
things into factors of net-worth and risk, inputted as registered data, and outputted as lists 
of threats. In other words, under Nazi governmentality, through the Cold War era, and 
beyond, the more computers have been engaged to comb ever-expanding sets of social 
data, the more they have produced the teleological effect of establishing seemingly 
'natural' relationships between people, things, and knowledge or what Haraway (1997) 
calls kinships. And the more computers, and statistics have been engaged to establish 
kinships and define lists, the more they have self-elaborated their own taken-for-granted 
role in producing these powerful closed-world regimes of truth. In this way, conjunctions 
of computers, statistics, and lists during the Cold War installed milieus of circulation 
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where the 'risks' of threatening communist elements were always being weighed, and at 
the same time, they served to authorize, reinforce and further embed these underlying 
values, myths and divisive practices, these politics, right back into the design and 
development of the next generation of machines. 
Turning to Haraway's earlier work, in Simians, Cyborgs and Women (1991) she 
says: 
Communication technologies and biotechnologies are the crucial tools recrafting 
our bodies. These tools embody and enforce new social relations for women 
world-wide. Technologies and scientific discourses can be partially understood as 
formalizations, i.e., as frozen moments, of the fluid social interactions constituting 
them, but they should also be viewed as instruments for enforcing meanings. The 
boundary is permeable between tool and myth, instrument and concept, historical 
systems of social relations and historical anatomies of possible bodies, including 
objects of knowledge. Indeed, myth and tool mutually constitute each other 
(p. 164). 
Following on Haraway's argumentation, there is no separating the computer, or 
contemporary installations of apparatuses of security from their historical links to myths 
surrounding the techniques and technologies they help authorize, reinforce, and install. 
And particularly, in the case of the computer, from the discourse of game theory, and the 
'us vs. them' myths it specifically helped reinforce in the delimitation and policing of the 
movement of the Communist threat. From McCarthy's blacklists, to today's no-fly lists 
(explored in the next chapter), post World War II, the world had been, and continues to 
be increasingly translated into what Haraway calls a 'problem in coding,' (Haraway 
1991) where everything reduces to quantities, rates, directions, distribution, probabilities 
and flows of elements in and between populations; and where information makes no 
distinction, and asserts no boundaries between people, objects, and knowledge. Indeed, 
with the emergence and widespread application of 'systems theory' to a litany of fields 
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and domains of knowledge, the human species is further 'naturally' subdivided, 
classified, and listed as cyborg. 
The term cyborg was coined by Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline (1960) to refer 
to the enhanced man who could survive in extraterrestrial environments. They 
imagined the cyborgian man-machine hybrid would be needed in the next great 
technohumanist challenge—space flight.. .One of their first cyborgs was a 
standard white laboratory rat implemented with an osmotic pump designed to 
inject chemicals continuously. Consequently, my people are akin to field mice 
who have entered the anomaly in evolutionary space—a wormhole—called the 
laboratory. Like the science-fictional wormhole in an episode of the television 
show Deep Space Nine, the laboratory continues to suck us into uncharted regions 
of technical, cultural, and political space. Passing through the wormhole of 
technoscience, the field mice emerge as the finely tailored laboratory rodents— 
model systems, animate tools, research material, self-acting organic-technical 
hybrids—through whose eyes I write this essay. Those mutated murine eyes give 
me my ethnographic point of view. Cyborg anthropology attempts to refigure 
provocatively the border relations among specific humans, other organisms and 
machines. The interface between specifically located people, other organisms, and 
machines turns out to be an excellent field site for ethnographic inquiry into what 
counts as self-acting and as collective empowerment. I call that field site the 
culture and practice of technoscience (Haraway 1997, p.51-52). 
By constituting the intermingling of living beings and technological devices as 
information machines and systems susceptible to technoscientific probing for regularities 
and patterns, the kind of governmentality that emerged post World War II also 
significantly helped to integrate and acclimatize people into thinking of themselves and 
society as complex techno-social automated systems, subject to pervasive and ubiquitous 
segmenting, research and testing. Indeed, Haraway's (1985; 1991; 1997) argument for 
cyborgs leaves little doubt that in today's technoscientific order our lives have been 
increasingly consumed and contained by the isolated techno-social systems Wiener's 
folklore of the future cautioned against. 
The term cyborg has come to be understood as the intermingling of living beings 
and machines, ".. .a fusion of the organic and the technical forged in particular, historical, 
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cultural practices" (Haraway, 1996, p.51). Indeed, the emergence of cyborg discourse 
provided the incunabula for new identities, subjectivities, and mythic imaginings fitting 
of the coming information age. Throughout the Cold War, and into today, cyborgs can be 
understood as yielding new possibilities for identity and political action, but always from 
the vantage point of containment within closed isolated systems, whether in the 
individual human body, or up to the Internet, globe, and universe. Cyborg discourse 
which emerged during this time period would inevitably encourage much more than a 
new set of subject positions for people, but ultimately would enter them into profound 
reciprocal relationships with computers themselves. As Sherry Turkle (1984; 1995) has 
shown us, 'life on the screen' would come to encompass 'second selves' for people; and 
as she has demonstrated, when computers and minds are equated, notions of the self are 
significantly altered in processes involving decentering, fragmenting, and ultimately, 
reunifying the self as an information-processing device, constituted by the transmission 
of information between modular, windows-like, mental programs. Indeed, for Edwards 
(1996): 
The experience of the computer as a second self is the experience of the closed-
world of a rule based game. The second self computer users find within the 
machine is, in general, a 'hard,' quasi-scientific, male self, an experience of 
reality in the terms of closed-world discourse (p. 172). 
In this way, post World War II, the second self of the cyborg, despite existing in a 
vast and complex world, never escapes the disciplinary enclosure of conjunctions of 
security technologies, as individuals increasingly are reduced to numerical values of 
worth and risk, they are also and equally, subjected to increasing research and 
experimentation. And like all populations, cyborgs are delimited, policed and listed, seen 
as digital elements that are subject to 'disassembly, engineering, and reconstruction.' In 
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this way, where closed-world discourse serves to systematically reduce social and 
political issues to disciplinary 'problems in coding,' this form of modern and 
contemporary governmentality installs milieus of human/machine integration, which self-
elaborates imagining one's life and society as closed systems, susceptible to endless 
probing for regularities and patterns, and infinite possibilities for delimitation, re-
assembly, and policing. Furthermore, where closed-world discourse and the apparatuses 
of security authorize and reinforce a disciplinary technoscientific politics and practice 
pivoting on global control systems; modern and contemporary governmentality installs 
global milieus of circulation, which further 'naturalizes' imagining oneself as automaton; 
as an isolated cybernetic organism, circulating in a closed mechanical system, contained 
in a global milieu where the boundaries between living beings, things, and knowledge, 
and equally humans and machines, have been totally eviscerated. 
Global classification infrastructures serve: governmentality 
In order to understand how Bowker and Star's (1999) 'global classification 
infrastructures' are deployed as milieus of circulation installed by the apparatuses of 
security under governmentality, one development in communication research, which 
despite pre-dating World War II, and the widespread automation of life through computer 
technologies, need be examined here: Walter Lippmann and Harold LasswelFs notions of 
'persuasive communication' which emerged in the 1920s and evolved onwards 
(Lippmann 1922; Lippmann 1937; Lippmann 1943; Lippmann 1947; Lippmann 1955; 
Lippmann 1961; Lippmann 1965; Lippmann 1970; Lippmann and Godkin Lectures at 
Harvard University. 1934) (Lasswell 1948; Lasswell 1950; Lasswell 1960; Lasswell 
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1972; Lasswell, Lerner, and Speier 1979; Lasswell and Rogow 1969; Smith, Lasswell, 
and Casey 1946). 
Indeed, these early pioneers in the field of communications research, whose work 
taken together ultimately spawned the domain of 'public relations' research (Simpson 
1994), took as their maxim 'persuasive communication,' wherein mass communication 
technologies, conceived of as necessary tools for managing elites to craft and shape 
'public opinion' were understood as instruments for the administration, organization, and 
management of populations through the manipulation of the distribution of elements that 
could be deciphered through the constitution of public opinions. Beginning in an era, the 
1920s, when the delimitation and management of 'threats' was critically ensured through 
physical assemblages of policing (men, guns, batons), the idea of'persuasive 
communication' seemed far more humane and enlightened than the violence of physical 
policing. Critical to this functionalist view aimed at policing populations through mass 
communication means, technology is seen as an ".. .instrument for imposing one's will 
on others, and preferably on masses of others" (Simpson 1996, p. 18). Indeed, the 
communications legacy of Lippmann and Lasswell would profoundly weigh on the 
emergence of how the apparatuses of security (computers, statistics, and lists) would 
install contemporary global classification infrastructures as a worldwide milieu of 
circulation. 
The list serves: Who, Says What, In Which Channel, To Whom, With What Effect? 
Who? 
Says What? 
In Which Channel? 
To Whom? 
With What Effect? (Lasswell 1948, p.37) 
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So begins Lasswell's (1948) The Structure and Function of Communication in 
Society, a short address, in an obscure edited anthology published by the Institute for 
Religious and Social Studies, that takes as its point of departure this list of questions. As 
we have already seen, each answer to a question on a list will surely and inevitably 
generate infinitely more lists of questions. And so, we must investigate further. Indeed, 
this seemingly glib list of 'dictum' summarizing his earlier works with Bruce L. Smith 
and Ralph D. Casey (1946) on Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion, was 
intended to be anything but superficial. For Lasswell (1948) did not only see this list of 
questions as succinctly enclosing communications research as a scientific field and 
domain of knowledge, but it also formed the building blocks for his techniques for the 
materialization of elements circulating in milieus of public opinion that could be acted 
upon. For in fact this list of questions would come to constitute a 'natural' and 'truthful' 
way of seeing and doing communications as an empirical discipline. Indeed, this basic 
list is a 'dictum that is practically inscribed in stone over portals of those US colleges 
offering communication as a field of study' (Simpson 1994, p. 19). For when Lasswell's 
who says what in which channel to whom with what effect dictum is correlated with 
Lippmann's (1922) techniques for delimiting Public Opinion, 'persuasive 
communication' begins to take on the form and characteristics of a technology of security 
in its own right. 
The pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the pictures of themselves, 
of others, of their needs, purposes, and relationship, are their public opinions. 
Those pictures which are acted upon by groups of people, or by individuals acting 




In this way, it is argued here that the dominant legacy that 'persuasive 
communications' left behind for communication studies was precisely the correlation of 
the techniques of Lippmann and Lasswell, and how together, they exhibit the hallmark 
'double integration' of security technologies. The joint functions of statistically 
delimiting populations through techniques like Lippmann's early Public Opinion surveys, 
coupled with the operations of materializing lists of elements from Lasswell's techniques 
involving dissecting who says what in which channel to whom with what effect are 
characteristic of the 'double integration' effect which serves both the delimitation and 
reconstitution of elements in a self-elaborating process of knowledge development. In 
this way the conjunction of Lippmann's Public Opinions and Lasswell's dissection 
techniques, like all security technologies, act on the very populations and elements they 
delimit. 
Indeed, for Lasswell (1948), like in the study of biology, applying a disciplinary 
scientific method to the study of communication, involved taking complex unmeasurable 
phenomena, analyzing and breaking them down into discrete parts, and then building up a 
purportedly objective understanding of the phenomenon as a whole from the 
reconstitution of these parts, and their subsequent steering into harmonious action. It is 
interesting to also note here that the concept of 'persuasive communications' that came to 
be associated with Lippmann and Lasswell was not lost on the Nazis, who in fact were 
great innovators in the instrumental use of public opinion surveys and computerized 
technologies to establish who says what in which channel to whom with what effect inside 
Hitler's Germany (Simpson 1994). 
We gain perspective on human societies when we note the degree to which 
communication is a feature of life at every level. A vital entity, whether relatively 
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isolated or in association, has specialized ways of receiving stimuli from the 
environment. The single-celled organism or the many-membered group tends to 
maintain an internal equilibrium and to respond to changes in the environment in 
a way that maintains this equilibrium. The responding process calls for 
specialized ways of bringing the parts of the whole into harmonious action 
(Lasswelll948,p.38). 
In this way, we can see Lasswell arguing for a form of biopolitics inherent in 
persuasive communication, wherein the entropic milieu of circulation of messages and 
information are tamed by the same mechanical means as those that tame nature itself, in 
organisms, and equally in the populations and societies in which they move about freely. 
With the proliferation of positivist practices and techniques of delimiting, classifying and 
dividing communication into the discrete individual parts of who says what in which 
channel to whom with what effect, elements circulating in populations factored as public 
opinions, could be acted upon, and reconstituted, or re-distributed, through the 
installation of new technological conjunctions, the very same techniques that mark the 
biological, economic and physical sciences, and their fields, domains and objects of 
knowledge. Indeed, this positivist, or disciplinary scientific communications legacy that 
seeks to analyze, break down, calculate, predict, and build up 'natural' and 'truthful' 
connections between 'information' elements circulating in public opinions would come to 
install a massive, modern and contemporary milieu of circulation that would pivotally 
serve contemporary governmentality.' a global classification infrastructure of epic 
proportions that would ultimately evolve into the Internet and other massive assemblages 
of living beings, things, and objects knowledge. 
Indeed, so says Foucault: 
The public which is a crucial notion in the eighteenth century, is the population 
seen under the aspects of its opinions, ways of doing things, forms of behavior, 
customs, fears prejudices, and requirements; it is what gets a hold on through 
150 
151 
education, campaigns, and convictions. The population is therefore everything 
that extends from biological rootedness through the species up to the surface that 
gives one a hold provided by the public. From the species, to the public; we have 
here a whole field of new realities in the sense that they are pertinent elements for 
mechanisms of power, the pertinent space within which and regarding which one 
must act (Foucault 2007f, p.75). 
In this way, it is argued here that the legacy of who says what in which channel to 
whom with what effect listed by Lasswell in his 1948 address is profound, and equally, 
Lippmann's Public Opinions, which continue, to have significant effects on the 
delimitation and policing of populations, providing a critical way of seeing and doing 
'security.' Indeed, I recently attended a presentation at the New Network Theory 2007 
conference in Amsterdam, Netherlands, which epitomized this legacy. Speaking to 
Network Adoption Amongst Groups, a US-based private military contractor described 
how his company explicitly engages Lasswell's who said what to whom model in the 
material mapping of terrorist networks. Engaging a simple strategy of probing reams of 
print-based news data, asking who said what to whom, descending two levels, and 
materializing the results as network images that display kinships and connections 
between people, the contractor described how the form of pictures of networks carried 
with them great power, establishing strong ties between people visually. 
'People like pictures,' he declared, 'and even if we don't understand exactly what 
these connections between people mean, they clearly indicate that they know each 
other.' 
Describing how this network mapping method and tool was engaged to establish 
the terrorist network that constituted the 9/11 attacks; the contractor boasted that the CIA 
turns to his company's network visualizations when publicly articulating the Al-Qaeda 
networks, as the CIA's own maps and visualizations are classified matters of national 
security. Indeed, despite a series of acknowledged 'misidentifications' contained in his 
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visualizations of the 9/11 terrorist networks, he described how his network map of the 
9/11 terrorists has spread itself far and wide across the Internet; making life very difficult 
for some innocent, yet unwittingly listed people. 
Given the power of pictures he described with respect to establishing who says 
what in which channel to whom with what effect, it would appear that the use of such 
visualizations to fracture threats of us vs. them would be approached with great caution 
and trepidation. However, in a world where the probing of entropic milieus of circulation 
for factors of 'worth' and 'risk' is firmly installed, techniques and technologies 
surrounding the visualization of networks of who said what to whom and with what effect 
are merely taken-for-granted, as well as the presence of such network maps in the public 
domain of the Internet. As we shall see in the next chapter on no-fly lists, 
'misidentification' is merely the cost of the installation of such contemporary apparatuses 
of security. Indeed, this thesis argues that such network mapping practices, such 
contemporary forms of lists, will continue to pervasively and ubiquitously serve the 
interests of power, further self-elaborating closed-world apparatuses of security, so long 
as the inherent power to correlate such monumental classification conjunctions afford, 
remains subsumed in our techno-social woodwork, unloosened and unchallenged. 
In the past 100 years, people in all lines of work have jointly constructed an 
incredible, interlocking set of categories, standards, and means for interoperating 
infrastructural technologies. We hardly know what we have built. No one is in 
control of the infrastructure; no one has the power to centrally change it. To the 
extent that we live in, on and around this new infrastructure, it helps form the 
shape of our moral, scientific, and esthetic choices. Infrastructure is now the great 
inner space (Bowker and Star 1999, p.319). 
In Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences, Bowker and Star 
(1999) argue that it is possible to understand 'the networks that shape much of daily life 
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in cyborg fashion' (p.301), by examining and interrogating the 'ubiquitous classification 
systems and standards' that increasingly come to make up distinctions and kinships 
between living beings, objects, and knowledge. Drawing directly on the work of Haraway 
(1991), Bowker and Star (1999) argue that cyborgs understood as the intermingling of 
information technologies, representations, politics, and people are characterized by the 
utter evisceration of the boundaries between living beings, objects, and knowledge. For 
Bowker and Star, the creeping pervasiveness and ubiquity of a 'global classification 
society' involves the ongoing and pervasive transformation of local classification 
schemes into international standardized schemes, which are in turn streamed up, and 
aligned with standardized global-scale information systems. 
In this process, it is becoming easier for the individual to act and perceive him or 
her self as a completely naturalized part of the 'classification society' since the 
thicket of classification is both operative (defining the possibilities for action) and 
descriptive. As we are socialized to become that which can be measured by our 
increasingly sophisticated measurement tools, the classifications increasingly 
naturalize across wider scope (Bowker and Star, 1999, P.326). 
In this way, this thesis picks up on Bowker and Star's (1999) warnings for critical 
engagement with, and a fundamental rethinking of information systems. 
We need recognize that all information systems are necessarily suffused with 
ethical and political values, modulated by local administrative procedures. These 
systems are active creators of categories in the world as well as simulators of 
existing categories. Remembering this, we keep open and can explore spaces for 
change and flexibility that are otherwise lost forever (Bowker and Star 1999, 
p.321). 
Indeed, this work argues that it is politically and ethically crucial to recognize the 
pervasive, ubiquitous, taken-for-granted and vital role of our classification infrastructures 
in our increasingly 'built moral environment' (p.326). What might appear to be banal and 
purely technical issues involving the naming of things and categories, or the articulation 
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of lists, in fact constitutes much of our everyday interactions. In this respect, it is crucial 
to raise awareness of the organizational and political dimensions of engaging 
classifications and lists of people, culled from the vast entropy of our global information 
milieu of circulation, and at the same time, ensure that such classifications and lists retain 
traces of their builders and construction. 
The list serves: an example of entropy and contemporary governmentality 
Postcard received in October 2007 from Rt. Hon. Stephen Harper for Jewish New 
Year 
It is with great concern that I begin to temporally shift my study of how lists 
serve, from modern governmentality, to a contemporary analysis. Indeed, I recently 
received a postcard in the mail that I am now compelled to describe. It was from the 
Right Honorable Stephen Harper, Canada's Prime Minister, and his family, wishing a 
former roommate, and his family 'good wishes' for a Jewish New Year '.. .filled with 
happiness, health, prosperity and peace.' After all that I have analyzed here, it seems both 
ironic, and fitting to ask this very current question: How exactly did the Right Honorable 
Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper get this list of Jews? What computerized and 
mathematical operations were involved in probing our entropic global classification 
infrastructures—these milieus of circulation—for regularities and patterns that would see 
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a former (and very Liberal) roommates' name factor on a Conservative Party's list of 
Jews, a population delimited for 'good' wishes and seasons tidings? When exactly did my 
old roommate register himself and his family as Jews with the Conservative Party of 
Canada, or anyone for that matter, including Statistics Canada, whose data we are told is 
sacrosanct to the Canadian nation? Given that my former roommate never registered 
himself at my address with the Conservative Party, nor anywhere as such, how did he and 
his family come to be classified as Jews, listed at my address, and solicited through the 
post by the Right Honorable Stephen Harper? 
Given the historical trajectory and unloosening of 'governmental reason' 
presented here, the answers to such questions might prove to be very disturbing and 
shocking to ordinary Canadians, should we ever care enough to interrogate them in the 
public domain. Indeed, the apparatuses of security that correlate computers, statistics, and 
lists in the delimitation, administration, organization, and development of populations 
and their elements are so deeply subsumed in our social woodwork, that when the 
fundamental biopolitical caesuras that characterize them materialize so clearly in an 
expression of 'good wishes' for a 'prosperous' new year from a prime minister to a 
Jewish family, this would all go completely unnoticed, merely taken as a natural 
phenomenon, all part and parcel of entropy and contemporary governmentality. 
In the best of all possible worlds, at any given moment, the past could be 
reordered to better reflect multiple constituencies now and then. Only then we 
will be able to fully learn the lessons of the past. In this same optimal world, we 
could tune our classifications to reflect new institutional arrangements or personal 
trajectories—reconfigure the world on the fly. The only good classification is a 
living classification (Bowker and Star 1996, p.326). 
In this same spirit, and drawing on their argumentation for critical engagement 
with classifications, this thesis argues that the only good list of people is a living list of 
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people, one which explicitly states the criteria by which it was formed, and the builders 
and building processes—the techno-human couplings—responsible for its creation. Just 
as Bowker and Star (1999) suggest that 'classifications should be reclassified,' this thesis 
argues that lists should be re-listed, as pivotal and contested sites of contemporary 
governmentality. 
Conclusion 
A constant interplay between techniques of power and their object gradually 
carves out in reality, population and its specific phenomena. A whole series of 
objects were made visible for possible forms of knowledge on the basis of the 
constitution of the population as a correlate of techniques of power. In turn, 
because these forms of knowledge constantly carve out new objects, the 
population could be formed, continue, and remain as the privileged correlate of 
modern mechanisms of power (Foucault 2007f, p.79). 
Being a child of the 1970s, I am capable of remembering a time when people like 
my grandparents were extremely wary of, and approached any form of involvement in 
scientific research and testing, whether medical or social, with a highly skeptical eye, 
mostly avoiding being the subjects of experimentation their whole lives. Indeed, my 
grandparents were not only skeptical of scientific research and experimentation, but also, 
having felt the chilling effects of their families being registered, listed, experimented 
upon, and exterminated as Jews by the Nazis, were also highly skeptical of government 
operations involving registering individuals and populations through disciplinary census 
mechanisms. How quickly times change. For today, it would be near impossible to 
imagine how one might heed my grandparents repeated warnings against involvement in 
scientific research, let alone how to avoid registering oneself through census and other 
contemporary identification and tracking operations, when the basis of all everyday 
software and technology end-user license agreements take as their foundation the 
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immediate release of the rights of the 'cyborg' to the data they generate, all in the interest 
o f future' research and development of products, 'security' technologies, and 
correlations of governmental power. 
In the same way that Haraway (1997) argues that kinship is a technology for 
producing the effect of a shared kind, my work argues that computers, statistics, and lists 
are similarly technologies of security which produce the teleological effects of 
establishing 'natural' relationships between people, or shared kinds of things and 
populations. In this way, post World War II, throughout the Cold War, into the 1980s, 
and beyond, increasingly pervasive closed-world game theory discourses, operating 
through policing assemblages of computers, statistics, and lists, can be understood as 
reinforcing divisive 'us vs. them' classification practices, particularly concerning the 
risks posed by possible communist threats in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, and eventually 
coming to exert great force in how we delimit and police 'terrorist' movements today. 
In a world where questions of us vs. them are heightened, and epic battles 
between black and white classifications of opposing forces are seen as ongoing and 
never-ending, the powerful operations of practices involving delimiting and policing 
'threats' through lists is receding further and further into our techno-social woodwork. 
Indeed, securing 'freedom' through the automated, divisive, and dehumanizing 
classification of living beings as measures of worth/risk in global information 
infrastructures, policed through list technologies, is clearly on the rise. The more 
computers and statistics are engaged to comb ever-expanding sets of social data for 
regularities and patterns of 'threatening' people and things, the more these self-
elaborating processes produce the teleological effect of establishing 'natural' good versus 
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bad global relationships, the more lists are used to delimit and police the movement of 
threats. Moreover, the more we take this self-elaborating form of governmentality for 
granted. 
In this chapter we have seen how open-human and closed-world discourses 
operated in conjunction with computer, statistical, and list technologies as an economy of 
discourses, correlated by the apparatuses of security which installed a global milieu of 
circulation in which we would come to see ourselves, and our societies as 
technoscientific cultural constructions of cyborg elements and populations, circulating in 
entropic information environments where the boundaries between people, objects, and 
knowledge are eviscerated. In this way, the emergence of modern computers while 
ushering in awe-inspiring developments in massive assemblages of living beings and 
machines, also served to increasingly isolate cyborgs in global classification 
infrastructures, subjecting them to evermore pervasive and ubiquitous delimitation, 
policing and nullification. Building on Bowker and Star's (1999) assertions, this thesis 
argues that like classifications, lists are powerful ubiquitous technologies that are so 
deeply embedded in our working infrastructures that they have become relatively 
invisible, despite never losing any of their power in the self-elaborating processes of 
sublimation. Just as categories and classifications are culled into working infrastructures, 
becoming increasingly taken-for-granted ways of seeing and doing everyday life, lists too 
coalesce into working infrastructures, that are integrated into, and aligned with local, 
national, and global information systems. 
Indeed, the next chapter on "Fear and No-Fly Listing in Canada' demonstrates 
how in the entropic global milieus of circulation that were installed with the birth of 
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modern computers, the assemblage of policing (computers, statistic, and lists) deployed 
to patrol and regulate these uncertain and ever-expanding power/knowledge 
environments continues to play a pivotal role in contemporary governmentality. 
Increasingly factoring elements circulating as risks, and delimiting and policing their 
movement in more and more everyday environments, this research explores what I call 
contemporary no-blank list culture in chapter 4. Indeed, no-fly lists, and broader no-blank 
list culture, which has emerged in Canada, the United States, and worldwide post 9/11, 
both culls, and calls the modern 'terrorist' into reality. From out of the vast disorder of 
uncertain entropy, into increasingly streamlined global classification infrastructures, 
contemporary 'us' nations, like Canada, continue to attempt to identify, predict, and 
police 'them' terrorists, through the installation of assemblages of policing, underpinned 
by the critical 'security' technology of the list. 
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Chapter 3 - Fear and no-fly listing in Canada (Mar. 2006-Nov. 2007) 
Introduction 
A no-fly list is collective punishment for a population that has done no wrong, it 
violates the rule of law and it will not stop terrorists from murdering innocent 
people. The no-fly list should be grounded1. 
On June 18 2007, amidst much controversy and contestation , massive failure 
with the same endeavor in the United States, and warnings from Canada's Privacy 
Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart about the 'chilling position' of being mistakenly 
identified on the list and the 'nightmare' of subsequent redress to the 'so-called' Office of 
Reconsideration3, Transport Canada Minister Lawrence Cannon put into effect a no-fly 
list, promised to consist of the names of no more than 1000 Canadian citizens deemed to 
be threats to domestic and international aviation security. Known formally as The 
Specified Persons List, Canada's no-fly list was introduced as a part of Canada's 
Passenger Protect Program, first announced on October 27th, 20064 which required in 
January 2007 that all outgoing Canadian air travelers provide a government issued 
identification in order to board commercial flights; and then as of June 18th, 2007 
1
 The Vancouver Sun Editorial Staff. 2007. No-fly list won't thwart any terrorists. January 17. In The 
Vancouver Sun. http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/editorial/story.html?id=633061 dl -cc09-42dc-
a797-578c055aa704 
2
 CBC News Services. 2007. Critics alarmed by Canada's no-fly list. June 18. Online Edition: 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/ottawa/story/2007/06/18/no-fly-list.html 
also Galloway, Gloria. 2007. No-fly list grounds up to 2,000people. In The Globe and Mail. June 19. 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20070619.NOFLY19/PPVStory?URL_Article_ID=L 
AC.20070619.NOFLY19&DENIED=1. Toronto, ON. 
also CTV.ca News Staff. 2007. As many as 2,000 names on no-fly list. June 19. In CTV.ca online edition: 
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070619/cdn_no_fly_list_070619/20070619?hub 
=Canada, 
also New Democratic Party of Canada Press Release. 2007. NDP rejects Harper's no-fly list. June 19. 
Ottawa, ON. http://www.ndp.ca/page/5460 
3
 Mayeda, Andrew. 2007. Gov't may use biometric data to back up no-fly list, in Can West News Service. 
June 18. Online Edition: http://www.canada.com/regmaleaderpost/news/story.html7idH39e9a4ec-ebd7-
469a-9fl6-0d28f6a91152. Ottawa, ON. 
4
 Transport Canada. 2006. Canada's New Government Announces Details of Passenger Protect Program, 
October 27, News Release available at http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2006/06-gc014e.htm 
160 
161 
required that all airline carriers departing from within Canadian soil screen all 
passengers, whether domestic or international, through Transport Canada's Specified 
Persons List, with the intention of securing Canada's skies and aviation industry from the 
threats of domestic and global terrorism. When the plan was publicly unveiled on Friday 
October 27 l , 2006, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reported Public Safety 
Minister Stockwell Day saying the following: 
Recent events such as the alleged terror plot in the United Kingdom highlight the 
importance of a program like Passenger Protect. We must remember that Canada 
is not immune to the threat of terrorism and we must remain vigilant5. 
As of June 18th, 2007 remaining vigilant 'to the threat of terrorism'—to alleged 
terror plots—means that individuals 'calculated' to be 'terrorist' or 'predicted' to commit 
a 'life-threatening crime' involving airline security in Canada will be placed on the 
Specified Persons List, as decided on a case by case basis by an Advisory Group headed 
up by Transport Canada, and including members of The Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) and The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). On October 27th, 2006 
Transport Canada announced the criteria for the inclusion of individuals on the Specified 
Persons List : 
• An individual who is or has been involved in a terrorist group, and who, it can 
reasonably be suspected, will endanger the security of any aircraft or aerodrome 
or the safety of the public, passengers or crew members; 
• An individual who has been convicted of one or more serious and life-threatening 
crimes against aviation security; 
• An individual who has been convicted or one or more serious and life-threatening 
offences and who may attack or harm an air carrier, passengers or crew members . 
5
 CBC News, 2006. Ottawa plans no-fly list by 2007, Friday, October 27. Toronto, ON, 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/10/27/flying-rules.html 
6
 Transport Canada. 2007. Passenger Protect: Questions and Answers, Accessed September 15, 2007: 
http://www.tc.gc.ca/vigilance/sep/passenger_protect/Q&A.htm#4 
161 
Inspired by its American counterpart which had been re-invigorated in the wake 
of the 9/11 attacks through the enacting of the US Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act on November 19th 2001, which formally established the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) as the administer of the US no-fly list, subsequently moved and 
housed in the US Department of Homeland Security in March of 2003; Canada's no-fly 
list program resulted from the Public Safety Act of 2002, which bequeaths the federal 
Transport Minister with the legal right to take measures to identify individuals who pose 
risks to aviation security, as well as the legal right to administer and maintain a list of 
such individuals . Unlike the US government, who will not divulge the criteria by which 
people's names are included on the list, the Canadian government has provided the vague 
criteria, outlined above, for the inclusion of cases on the list. 
Where in the US the number of people on the list fluctuates, is kept secret, and is 
acknowledged by the US Department of Homeland Security to contain the names of tens 
o 
of thousands of people (where more independent estimates actually place the number in 
the hundreds of thousands9), in Canada the number of names on the list also fluctuates, 
but was promised to contain the names of no more than 1000 people when the program 
was first announced1 . Ironically, on the first day of its formal incorporation into 
Canadian aviation culture on June 18th, 2007, this promise was already broken, when 
7
 Alphonso, Caroline. 2007. First day of'no-fly' list trouble free. In The Globe and Mail. June 19th. 
Toronto, Ontario. 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20070619.DAYONE 19/PPVStory/?DENIED= 1 
see also Canada's BILL C-17: THE PUBLIC SAFETY ACT, 2002, Amended March 2003. 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/bills_ls.asp?Parl=37&Ses=2&ls=cl7 
8
 Alphonso, Caroline. 2007. First day of'no-fly' list trouble free. 
9
 BBC News Services. 2007. US 'to halve'no-fly watch list. January 18. 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/americas/6274221 .stm 
10
 Transport Canada. 2006. Canada's New Government Announces Details of Passenger Protect Program, 
October 27, News Release available at http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2006/06-gc014e.htm 
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Transport Minister Lawrence Cannon acknowledged that the list had already 
mushroomed to some 2,000 names; doubling in size in under a day1 . 
In terms of appeals processes for getting names removed from the no-fly lists, the 
US Congress legislated in 2004 that the TSA create a system that allows people to correct 
inaccurate information that misidentifies them on their no-fly list, also directing the 
Department of Homeland Security to create an oversight board to ensure that anti-
terrorism measures do not infringe upon individual privacy, human rights, and civil 
liberties . In Canada, any person who has been misidentified on the list has the right to 
appeal to Transport Canada's 'Office of Reconsideration.' Canadian citizens also have 
the right to take the case of misidentifications on The Specified Persons List to Federal 
Court13 
The emergence of Canada's Specified Person List will be examined in this chapter 
as a case for list technologies understood as operating in apparatuses of security and 
assemblages of police, that correlate the techniques of computers and statistics and install 
a global milieu of circulation and classification. Indeed, in this correlation of power, or 
governmentality, practices surrounding the delimitation and policing of the movement of 
threatening elements through statistical worth/risk assessment techniques, technologies, 
and practices, are yet again redeployed, now serving and enforcing divisive fractures 
through a security assemblage critically supported by the list. Building on the theoretical 
11
 CTV.caNews Staff. 2007. As many as 2,000 names on no-fly list. June 19. In CTV.ca online edition: 
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070619/cdn_no_fly_list_070619/20070619?hub 
=Canada 
12Alphonso, Caroline. 2007. First day of'no-fly' list trouble free. In The Globe and Mail. June 19th. 
Toronto, Ontario. 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20070619.DAYONE 19/PPVStory/?DENIED= 1 
13
 Transport Canada. 2007. Passenger Protect: Questions and Answers, Accessed September 15, 2007: 
http://www.tc. gc.ca/vigilance/sep/passenger_protect/Q&A.htm#4 
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analysis and discursive threads constructed in the previous chapters, this chapter 
interrogates global news and popular culture media sources, spanning a time period that 
begins just over one year (March 2006) before the implementation of Canada's Specified 
Persons List on June 18th, 2007, up until November of 2007, probing for discursive 
regularities and patterns surrounding the no-fly list apparatuses of security. 
The method involved in gathering global popular culture news sources in the next 
two chapters is innovative in terms of the use of an automated computerized probing 
technology to gather a large corpus of 'news' stories from the ever-expanding entropic 
milieu of circulation of the Internet. In the winter of 2006,1 set up a Google News Alert 
containing the search term 'no-fly list.' The Google News Alert consists of an automated 
tracker that allows one to 'search and browse 4,500 news sources updated 
continuously'14, sending an email alert every time a popular global news source contains 
the specified search term. 
In the time period studied here (March 2006 to October 2007) at least one or two 
emails appeared daily, peaking at times to 15, such as in the 24 hour period after Canada 
unveiled the 'take-off of its no-fly list on October 27th, 2006. While Google's automated 
news aggregator is open to criticism stemming from the subjective criteria and selection 
processes by which 'news' sources are established and included, as well as the corporate 
favoritism that could clearly impinge on result rankings, this automated aggregation 
technique yielded a corpus of news sources (audio, video, print) on no-fly lists that were 
unranked and sorted exclusively by date; including all of Canada's English-language 
major news sources, such as CanWest Global and all of their local, national, and 
14
 Google Alerts website: http://www.google.com/alerts?hl=en&t:=l 
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international news outlets, channels and websites, CTVNews Services, as well as the 
entire Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) network, from radio, to television, to 
Internet coverage. The news aggregator also included popular and established news 
sources from around the world including The New York Times, The Chicago Sun-Times, 
National Public Radio, The U.S. News and World Report, The Washington Post, Fox 
News, USA Today, The International Herald Tribune, The Jerusalem Post, and The 
Chennai Times (India). This work aims to make the argument for no-fly lists as a part of, 
and partially constituted in and through national and global popular culture news sources 
and information channels, and therefore the existence of human biases and agendas 
embodied in the Google News Alert technology are a tangential and taken-for-granted 
assumption of this research, albeit ones that certainly merit future research consideration. 
The research presented here into the emergence of Canada's no-fly list epitomizes 
how the correlations of power that lists pivot, unloosened in the preceding chapters, can 
be exhumed from our historical woodwork, and propelled into an analysis of 
contemporary operations of power that pivot on computers, risk assessment techniques, 
and global classification infrastructures, underpinned by the critical practice of delimiting 
and policing lists of human beings as a means and ends to seeing and doing local, 
national and global security. The practices associated with probing our ever-expanding 
and ever-disordered entropic global classification infrastructures for regularities and 
patterns that constitute threatening cases—people reduced to worth/risk assessment 
scores—comes to the fore of this interrogation of contemporary popular news 
surrounding Canadian and international no-fly list security technologies, particularly 
around cases of misidentification. 
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Anyone who has flown into or out of America, or any large Western society's 
airport in the post-9/11 era, and has been pulled over by an over-zealous customs agent 
has certainly felt the chilling effects of the apparatuses of security, particularly when the 
'freedom of movement' that Foucault's (2007a) governmentality ensures is suspended. 
We could also equally say, from Agamben's (1998) biopolitical perspective, that the 
suspension of rights that detention in such enclosures imply, is further evidence of 'bare 
life' as the fundamental essence and unit of contemporary political life; sovereign spaces 
where the layers of the onion that both shield and constitute our political identities are at 
once revealed, and at the same time, stripped away. For the moment, despite which 
biopolitical analysis we engage, suffice it to say, 'what happens when you book an airline 
ticket' (Bennett 2005) is increasingly what happens when you make a phone call, send an 
email, engage in a debit/credit card-based commercial transaction, or drive a GPS (Global 
Positioning System) enabled vehicle—your actions and your person are registered and 
classified, transformed into delimited, tracked, and policed objects; bits of information in 
global classification infrastructures, that efface the boundaries between people, objects, 
and knowledge, all listed as populations for patrol. 
Legal, technoscientific, and popular conceptions of no-fly lists 
What pre-existing ideas underpin no-fly lists, and what real-world entities do they 
represent? An everyday commonsense answer to such a line of questioning would 
suggest that no-fly lists are underpinned by national and international laws and security 
agendas, and contain and represent the names of known and alleged terrorists, who would 
seek to board airplanes and wreak havoc in the sky. But such an answer would be facile, 
for as the work of Paula Treichler (1988) into AIDS, Homophobia and Biomedical 
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Discourse has clearly demonstrated, where our commonsense view of language is that it 
transmits pre-existing ideas and represents real-world entities, when it is put to the test, it 
really does neither. Just as Treichler (1988) demonstrated through her interrogation of 
popular news sources that AIDS is less a clear-cut disease entity, and more an invented 
label, classification, and technoscientific cultural construction given birth to in scientific 
naming practices, and discourses in popular news sources, which carry with them 
stigmatizations of imagined threatening bodies; this chapter is intended to demonstrate 
that no-fly lists are equally an invented label; in this case not for a clear-cut disease 
entity, but nonetheless a threatening disease in metaphor—the contemporary epidemic 
spread and need for policing of viral 'terrorist' bodies. 
In the same way that Treichler (1988) argues that the nature of AIDS is 
constructed through the language and discourses of medicine and science, this work 
argues that no-fly lists, and equally the 'nature' of terrorists, are constructed through the 
technoscientific language of computers, statistics, risk assessment, and global 
classification infrastructures, which retain the legacy of closed-world security discourses 
and their underpinning 'us' versus 'them', 'good' versus 'evil' dichotomies. Indeed, this 
work argues that our construction of no-fly lists, and their constituent 'terrorists' are only 
'true' or 'real' insofar as they help successfully guide local, national, and international 
security agendas, intended to further separate (or shield) 'us' from 'them' through the 
streamlining and converging of global classification infrastructures, in a series of self-
elaborating processes. 
In this way, this work argues that the term 'no-fly list' constructs the 'terrorist' 
anew, shifting the epistemological locus from physical, corporeal bodies and the potential 
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risks they pose, to identify-based representations of people, cases and elements 
circulating in global classification infrastructures which efface the boundaries between 
living beings, things, and knowledge, and at the same time make intelligible the greatest 
pervasive and ubiquitous 'epidemic' of our time—the terrorist threat. Indeed, the more 
'terrorists' are reified on lists, the more we see how lists serve the construction of 
imagined 'threatening' bodies in a self-elaborating discursive process that clearly exhibits 
the hallmark of the technologies of security: double integration. The delimitation of 
populations of worth/risk assessed objects, further authorizes, reinforces, and validates 
the ongoing and pervasive reduction of people to worth/risk assessment scores, and listed 
elements for policing. It is argued here that this self-referential and self-elaborating 
'double integration effect' of the technologies of security (Foucault 2007f), serves to at 
once further efface the boundaries between living beings, objects, and knowledge, and at 
the same time, to redeploy the technologies themselves, further correlating and 
streamlining the global security policies, practices, and classification infrastructures they 
themselves embody. 
There is no doubt that terrorists do represent real dangers, threatening and killing 
real human beings. Because of this it is tempting—and in some instances imperative—to 
view risk assessment techniques and global classification infrastructures as providing a 
technoscientific discourse about terrorist threats closer to the 'truth' or 'reality' of what 
constitutes a 'terrorist' than what we are capable of making intelligible ourselves in our 
everyday lives. After all, most of us have never knowingly come into contact with a 
'terrorist,' and therefore have little but popular conceptions to build our ideas upon. The 
use of computers to probe entropic global classification infrastructures, using statistical 
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techniques to calculate and predict patterns of terrorist movements, and in turn delimiting 
threatening cases, listed on no-fly rosters for policing, is a cultural construction that 
would seemingly offer reassurance in a highly insecure, but increasingly ubiquitously 
connected global milieu of circulation, where we are told invisible threats lurk 
everywhere. 
In this way, what constitutes a 'terrorist,' who poses threats, and the policies, 
practices and discourses surrounding how names are delimited on no-fly lists—an 
increasingly pervasive how-to strategy for containing the overall 'epidemic' spread of 
threats post 9/11—are at once questions of local, national and global law and governance, 
and disciplinary technoscientific systems, and at the same time what Treichler (1988) has 
called an 'epidemic of meanings or significations.' Like Treichler, "the use of the term 
epidemic [here] refers to the exponential compounding of meanings as opposed to the 
simpler spread of a term through a population" (p.32). Indeed, epidemics of meanings 
and significations surrounding 'the war on terror' are crucial to explore, for try as we 
might to understand and treat 'terrorist' threats as what Haraway (1997) has called 
'problems in code' that can be delimited and policed through conjunctions of juridical-
disciplinary mechanisms of security, like no-fly lists, no such contemporary listing 
apparatus has ever succeeded in stopping a known terror threat. Yet despite such ironies, 
meanings of what constitutes 'terrorists,' and the installation of security conjunctures like 
no-fly lists to both call 'them' into reality, and police them, continue to multiply and 
spread wildly at an extraordinary rate, broadening into what this work calls no-blank list 
culture in the next chapter. 
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Following on Treichler (1988), who derives 'signification' from the linguistic 
work of Ferdinand de Saussure, the term is used here to call attention to the way in which 
'no-fly list' operations are increasingly organizing our conceptions of, and language 
surrounding 'terrorists' and how to control threats to other social contexts and 
institutions—how we are increasingly doing and seeing security and surveillance in 
general, through watch-lists. As such, no-fly lists can be understood as key signifiers of 
contemporary terrorist realities. In this way, we are also able to begin to see how despite 
a no-fly list policy and program that has been highly contested in the US since its 
increased use and exponential growth post 9/11, the operations and language of 'watch-
lists' are proliferating like wildfire in the US and worldwide in many areas of everyday 
life15. 
This 'epidemic of meanings' is readily apparent in the complex, contradictory and 
chaotic assemblage of understandings of'no-fly lists,' 'terrorists,' and further, 'watch-
lists' that have emerged in the time frame studied here. The enumeration of some of the 
ways no-fly lists have been characterized in the global press suggest their enormous 
power to generate meanings pertaining to terrorist threats and local, national and global 
security realities: 
1. As crucial key tools in 'the war on terrorism'16 
2. As utterly useless in the war on terrorism17 
15
 Singel, Ryan. 2007. A Watch List Is Born. In Wired News. April 4. 
http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/04/watchlist3 
16
 Epitomized by US Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff s assertions of a global 
surveillance society in Geist, Michael.2007. Privacy threats no longer 'TerraIncognita' In The Ottawa 
Citizen. October. 2. Ottawa, Ontario. Pg. D.l 
17
 United Press International (UPI). 2006. No-fly list said growing into uselessness, June 11. In the 
Washington Times, Washington, DC, http://washingtontimes.com/upi/2006061 l-023518-2050r.htm 
also in Kutty, Faisal. 2007. Too Guilty to Fly, Too Innocent to Charge. March 18. Media Monitors 
Network. CA,USA. <http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/41774> 
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3. As protecting innocent citizens in their rights to mobility and free movement, 
'only bad guys are on these lists'18 
4. As abetting terrorism in their own right, providing a vetting system for would-be 
terrorist candidates. Those who make it through the lines being the best 
candidates19 
5. As rendering privacy law irrelevant20 
6. As presenting a real danger for people misidentified on them21. As misidentifying 
and mislabeling innocents, removing their fundamental rights and liberties, 
subjecting them to mistreatment22 
7. As perfectible technological solutions in iterative development 
8. As highly fallible techno-social systems that limit civil rights and liberties24 
9. As tools for individual, local, national and global security25 
10. As tools that can be misused for carrying out political agendas26 and revenge 
(most notably the case Senator Edward Kennedy of the US' name appearing on 
the no-fly list)27 
11. As a political tools that could wind up in the wrong hands28 
18 Hall, Mimi. 2006. Fliers headed to USA face scrutiny. July 12. In USA TODAY. 
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2006-07-11 -flier-checks_x.htm 
19 Schneier, Bruce. 2007. They're Watching. In Forbes Magazine. January 8. NY, USA. 
http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2007/0108/032.html 
20
 Butler, Don. 2007. Privacy commissioner wary of no-fly list. In The Ottawa Citizen. Wednesday, May 
16. Ottawa, Ontario. http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=eecd8149-295c-43b0-b095-
5e7963e6bl82 
2
 CBC News. 2006. US no-fly lists still grounding Canadians, says civil rights group. July 9. Alberta, 
Canada, <http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2006/07/07/no-fly.html> 
22
 Canadian Press. 2007. Back Off on Arar: Ambassador tells Stockwell Day to lay off trying to get 
Canadian off U.S. security list. January 24. In The Toronto Star: 
http ://www.thestar.com/defaultNews/article/174407 
23
 Canville, Carolyn. 2007. Flying Blind? No-fly list way off the mark. Aired February 27. FoxNews 26, 
Houston, Texas. 
http://www.myfoxhouston.com/myfox/pages/Home/DetailJsessionid=43EEBB1857CA566904B7CC3642 
E17CD9?contentId=2512844&version=6&locale=EN-US&layoutCode=VSTY&pageId= 1.1.1 &sflg= 1 
24
 Gugliotta, Guy. 2006. Data Mining Still Needs a Clue to Be Effective, In The Washington Post, June 19. 
Page A08, http://www.washingtonpost.eom/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/l 8/AR2006061800524.html 
25
 Associated Press. 2006. US no-fly list reroutes plane. August 8. In The Edmonton Sun. Alberta, 
Canada. <http://www.edmontonsun.com/News/World/2006/08/08/1724189-sun.html> 
26
 Dobbin, Murray. 2007. Deep integration: The plan to disappear Canada. June 11. In Rabble.ca: News 
For the Rest of Us. http://www.rabble.ca/columnists_full.shtml?x=59973 
27
 Kroft, Steve. 2006. Unlikely Terrorists On No Fly List: List Includes President Of Bolivia, Dead 9/11 
Hijackers. Originally aired on CBS Broadcasting Corporation's 60 Minutes October 8th, Producer Ira 
Rosen, Transcript: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/05/60minutes/printable2066624.shtml 
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12. As broadening beyond securing terrorist, threats, to a plethora of elements that 
pose risks to all populations, including health threats, gang threats, etc 
Such contradictory conceptualizations of no-fly lists are also coupled with 
fragmentary interpretations of the specific elements of the legal policies and procedures 
surrounding them and how classifications of 'terrorists' and their 'organizations' are 
factored and correlated in the first place. Confusion over whom and what constitutes a 
terrorist threat and terrorist organization respectively have made the misidentification and 
mislabeling of innocents on terrorist watch lists, like no-fly lists, a common and routine 
news story30. While many still believe that only 'bad guys' are on 'watch-lists,' 
increasingly Canadians like elementary school teacher Allison Barker are learning that 
no-fly list culture means the misidentification and mislabeling of innocents as threats is 
becoming a more common experience of everyday life31. Indeed, according to global 
news sources studied here the misidentification of innocents on no-fly lists is quite 
28
 Globe and Mail News Staff. 2007. Government admits that no-fly list could be misused. June 6. In the 
Globe and Mail. Toronto, Ontario. 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20070606.NATS06-4/TPStory/National 
also in Brennan, Richard. Inquiry told of no-fly list danger. June 5. In The Toronto Star. Toronto, Ontario. 
<http://www.thestar.com/News/article/221760> 
and Canadian Press Services. 2007. No-fly list will end up in foreign hands. June 6. In The Edmonton Sun. 
Edmonton, Alberta. <http://www.edmontonsun.com/News/Canada/2007/06/06/4238186-sun.html> 
and Bronskill, Jim. 2007. Ottawa's no-fly list won't end use of US roster in Canada. May 22. In The Globe 
and Mail. Ottawa, Ontario. 
http://www.theglobeandmaiI.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070522.wnoflylist0522/BNStory/National/home 
29
 Singel, Ryan. 2007. A Watch List Is Born. In Wired News. April 4. 
http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/04/watchlist3 
30
 Dickson, Louise. 2007. No-fly list snags 78-year-old Saanich 'Mr. Nice Guy.' In Victoria Times-




 Can West News Services. 2006. No-fly for you, woman told. In The Province. March 6. Ottawa, ON. 
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clearly a much bigger story than their role in protecting innocents from terrorist threats, 
as no 'no-fly list' has ever succeeded in 'nabbing' a single terrorist threat . 
In the United States, more than 100,000 people have been "accidentally" harassed 
by the no-fly list, and it has caught a grand total of zero terrorists or criminals. 
Although it has caught dozens of police, military officers, small children and 
practically everyone with the name Mohammed, I've yet to see anyone claim that 
it's doing a good job33. 
In this way, no-fly lists can be read as instilling more of a fear for one's own self 
being misidentified, or in Agamben's terms, for the exposure of one's own 'bare life,' 
over and above any reassurance they would seemingly offer in an uncertain and 
dangerous world inhabited by circulating terrorists. After all, as the Americans have seen, 
if Senator Edward Kennedy can be on the US no-fly list, why wouldn't the names of 
other innocent Americans be there too?34 
In other words, I am arguing here that we cannot effectively understand the 
implications of the emergence of Canada's Specified Persons List, if we approach it 
exclusively from the lens of legal and constitutional rights and liberties, or 
technoscientific practices alone. Popular conceptions and myths surrounding no-fly lists 
and what constitutes a 'terrorist' in general need to be understood as well. Indeed, the 
emergence of Canada's Specified Persons List represents not only a new legal imperative 
and conception for airlines and air travel, but also an emerging way of seeing and doing 
Canville, Carolyn. 2007. Flying Blind? No-fly list way off the mark. Aired February 27. FoxNews 26, 
Houston, Texas. 
http://www.myfoxhouston.com/myfox/pages/Home/Detail;jsessionid=43EEBB1857CA566904B7CC3642 
E17CD9?contentId=2512844&version=6&locale=EN-US&layoutCode=VSTY&pageId= 1.1.1 &sflg= 1 
33
 Cotton, Nicholas. 2006. No-fly in the ointment. October 30. In The Globe and Mail. 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20061030.LETTERS30-10/PPVStory/?DENIED=l 
34
 A case mentioned ad infinitum in news reports, but most notably as a focus in CBS News Television's 60 
Minutes piece. Kroft, Steve. 2006. Unlikely Terrorists On No Fly List: List Includes President Of Bolivia, 
Dead 9/11 Hijackers. Originally aired on CBS Broadcasting Corporation's 60 Minutes October 8th, 
Producer Ira Rosen, Transcript: 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/05/60minutes/printable2066624.shtml 
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broader governmentality; as pivoting on the delimitation and policing of the movement of 
people and things that pose risks as taken-for-granted to be on watch-lists. 
No matter how much we way desire thinking about Canada's Specified Persons 
List as an exclusively juridical-legal disciplinary mechanism designed to protect citizens, 
and analyze it as such, it is also, and equally, a global social metaphor, representing the 
semantic and linguistic work of Canadians, and populations of the world, making sense 
of a 'war on terrorism,' conducted on a global stage, in an era of pervasive and ubiquitous 
worth/risk assessment scores, classification infrastructures, and milieus of circulation. I 
am arguing, then, not that the legal dimensions of Canada's Specified Persons List are to 
be ignored, but rather that the technoscientific, social, and metaphorical dimensions are 
far more central than we might think and therefore merit privileging and intensive 
scrutiny in their own right. In order to effectively analyze Canada's Specified Persons 
List, and develop future policies and procedures surrounding its existence, we must not 
only take its legal dimensions into account, but also how it operates as a discourse, and 
what it means for how Canadians see ourselves, and how we do 'security' in the world in 
which we live. 
Moreover, our cultural construction of no-fly lists as tools in a war on terrorism 
are based not on a legal, objective, and technoscientifically determined 'reality' of 
terrorist threats to aviation and other areas of global society, but rather upon what we are 
told about this reality, about this ongoing war on terror, and how we choose to talk about 
it. Therefore, there are no distinctions, but a continuum between popular, technoscientific 
and legal discourses surrounding no-fly lists; which are in many ways the same as "a 
continuum between controversies in daily life and those occurring in the laboratory" 
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(Latour and Woolgar 1986, p.281); that play out and are revealed in language and 
metaphor. In this indeterminate space, where everyday life is increasingly consumed in 
global classification infrastructure, and experimented upon in 'laboratories,' research 
centers on worth/risk strategies, with no guarantees as to efficiency, or effectiveness, only 
probabilities and populations to guide and assign the way. Consider the thoughts of 
security 'expert' Bruce Schneier on this state of affairs, specifically pertaining to 'risk 
assessment' and 'no-fly lists' in a Forbes Magazine, January 8th, 2007 article entitled 
'They're Watching'35 
[The Automated Targeting System] assigns a "risk assessment" score to people 
entering or leaving the country, or engaging in import or export activity. This 
score, and the information used to derive it, can be shared with federal, state, local 
and even foreign governments. It can be used if you apply for a government job, 
grant, license, contract or other benefit. It can be shared with nongovernmental 
organizations and individuals in the course of an investigation. In some 
circumstances private contractors can get it, even those outside the country. And it 
will be saved for 40 years. Little is known about this program. Its bare outlines 
were disclosed in the Federal Register in October. We do know that the score is 
partially based on details of your flight record—where you're from, how you 
bought your ticket, where you're sitting, any special meal requests—or on motor 
vehicle records, as well as on information from crime, watch-list and other 
databases.. .any system like this will generate so many false alarms as to be 
completely unusable. In 2005 Customs & Border Protection processed 431 
million people. Assuming an unrealistic model that identifies terrorists (and 
innocents) with 99.9% accuracy, that's still 431,000 false alarms annually. The 
number of false alarms will be much higher than that. The no-fly list is filled with 
inaccuracies; we've all read about innocent people named David Nelson who can't 
fly without hours-long harassment. Airline data, too, are riddled with errors. The 
odds of this program's being implemented securely, with adequate privacy 
protections, are not good. Last year I participated in a government working group 
to assess the security and privacy of a similar program developed by the 
Transportation Security Administration, called Secure Flight. After five years and 
$100 million spent, the program still can't achieve the simple task of matching 
airline passengers against terrorist watch lists36. 
Schneier, Bruce. 2007. They're Watching. In Forbes Magazine. January 8. NY, USA. 
http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2007/0108/032.html 
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Based on such an assessment from a security 'expert,' are you comfortable with 
legal policies being enacted that take as their basis technoscientific procedures involving 
the automated probing of 'datamart' environments, and reductive risk assessment scores 
to identify and list human beings? Indeed, hearkening to Cold War players and the 
origins of the no-fly list apparatuses closed-world discursive legacy, Schneier concludes 
with sharp criticism: 
There is something un-American about a government program that uses secret 
criteria to collect dossiers on innocent people and shares that information with 
various agencies, all without any oversight. It's the sort of thing you'd expect from 
the former Soviet Union or East Germany or China. And it doesn't make us any 
safer from terrorism37. 
But the point here is not whether this security 'expert' is 'right' or 'wrong,' but 
rather that ambiguity and uncertainty are features of technoscientific practices 
surrounding the risk assessment of 'terrorists,' and as such are uncertainties—like those 
unearthed in the laboratory—that must be socially and linguistically managed. Almost a 
year to the day before Canada implemented its no-fly list, Guy Gugliotta writing in The 
Washington Post (June 19, 2006) in an article entitled "Data Mining Still Needs a Clue to 
Be Effective" writes: 
Computers can jump to conclusions just like humans... To make the correct 
inference requires deep, intellectual thinking; these systems are significantly less 
reliable than lie detector tests. Still, even the best technicians are going to find 
themselves searching multiple blind allies in navigating a mega-database such as 
telephone logs, the experts said, so much so that the time needed to clear false 
positives may outweigh the odds of finding a terrorist38. 
What we are told is at stake here are innocent peoples' lives, threatened at every 
turn by terrorists, who lurk in every corner of an increasingly globalizing, yet highly 
Gugliotta, Guy. 2006. Data Mining Still Needs a Clue to Be Effective, In The Washington Post, June 19. 
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connected and (in this way contradictory way) shrinking world. What we tend to take for 
granted in this conception is that the delimitation and policing of 'terrorist' movements 
takes as its basis legal and technoscientific amalgamations of network technologies, 
automated statistical risk assessment techniques, and global information infrastructures, 
whose outputs for policing are watch-lists. 
It is important to note that no-fly rosters, in addition to listing threatening human 
subdivisions, also contain everyday household objects. Headlines like "Feds add juice, 
sprays to no-fly list " from The Ottawa Sun in August of 2006 have become 
commonplace. It is now taken-for-granted that both living beings and things have unique 
'security identities' and associated scores, and all populations as such, animate and 
inanimate, must be screened before flight, whether by government officials, or the 
subjects of such disciplinary mechanisms themselves. 
The disciplinary mechanism also constantly codifies in terms of the permitted and 
forbidden, or rather the obligatory, and the forbidden, which means that the point 
on which the disciplinary mechanism focuses is not so much the things one must 
not do, as the things that must be done (Foucault 2007e, p.46). 
In this way, contemporary governmentality of the milieu of global aero-
circulation can be characterized as redeploying a disciplinary space, that through the 
positing of prohibitive norms (such as the increasingly complex no-fly list of carry-on 
items), offers prescriptive remedies for 'secure' circulation by placing the responsibility 
for 'the things that must be done' onto the passengers themselves, who are increasingly 
trained to 'screen' their own bags and selves, ensuring they do not contain prohibited no-
fly list items. Indeed, the taken-for-granted nature of the effacing of boundaries between 
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people and inanimate objects, as well as technoscience's pivotal role in such processes is 
exemplified in a September 2006 Forbes Magazine article entitled "Will it Fly?" 
'Since the initial total ban [on liquids] experts from around the government and 
our national labs have conducted extensive explosives testing to get a better 
understanding of this specific threat,' said Hawley [Kip Hawley, assistant 
secretary of Homeland Security for the TSA], speaking yesterday at the Ronald 
Reagan National Airport in Washington, D.C. 'While this novel type of liquid 
explosive is now an ongoing part of the terrorist playbook and must be dealt with, 
we now know enough to say that a total ban is no longer needed from a security 
point of view.' So what's now off the no-fly list? Vindicated toiletries include lip 
gloss, saline solution, shampoo, toothpaste, shaving cream, gel deodorant and 
liquid antibacterial soap—all of which were banned last week but are now allowed 
in 3-ounce packages. Lipstick and solid deodorant were never subject to the ban 
and are therefore still allowed on commercial flights. And, there are some oddities 
in what's permitted and not in the cabin—yes on knitting needles, no on pool cues, 
for example40. 
Herein we see no-fly list security discourses figuring the laboratory as central to 
the fabrication of factual, or truthful, knowledge about 'threatening' elements and 
populations. Indeed, contemporary apparatuses of security make no distinction 
whatsoever between the detection of human and inanimate threats to aviation, and all the 
while self-elaborate 'the laboratory' as the pervasive and ubiquitous site of security 
solutions. Indeed, the laboratory is also the penultimate 'vindicator,' whether of 
'toiletries,' or innocent people, from 'terrorist' labels, classifications, and lists-—from 
being constituted in, and as, such objects of knowledge. Building on Foucault (2007a), it 
is argued here, that the challenge for governmentality in the global milieus of circulation 
installed by the apparatuses of security is to 'train' people and things alike to be self-
screeners, to not be misidentified as 'threats,' and in the event they are, with how to cope 
and manage these 'inconveniences' until such time as the technoscientific laboratory 
Banay, Sophia. 2006. Will It Fly?. In Forbes Magazine. Travel Feature. September 26th. 
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susses out the situation, ultimately providing a perfect solution; all the while further 
naturalizing 'terrorist' classifications and knowledge in everyday life, and the lab as the 
penultimate fabricator of such facts. 
In the face of such colossal uncertainty surrounding our existence and who and 
what constitutes a 'threat,' it seems only reasonable that our conceptions of 'terrorist' 
would differ wildly, and often derive from stereotypical notions, and in turn racial 
profiles, since the majority of'us' have never engaged with 'them'—known terrorists. 
Indeed, as Treichler (1988) argues, 'what is distasteful in peoples conceptions' (p.36) 
must nonetheless be considered, and in this way there are few differences between the 
AIDS and 'terrorist' epidemics in terms of the oft-discriminatory operations of 
significations, meanings and misconceptions. 
To label them misconceptions implies what? Wrongful birth? That only facts can 
give birth to proper conceptions and only science can give birth to facts? 
(Treichler 1988, p.36) 
Indeed, despite our best efforts, there appears to be no exact science on the 
horizon to wage war on this terrorist epidemic, one that could accurately and precisely 
define, predict, and give unequivocal fact to a naturalized 'terrorist' class. And so we are 
left on the one-hand with vague, if not 'black-box' government criteria, policies and 
procedures by which terrorists and their organizations are constituted, and on the other, 
and more pervasively, with our widespread popular conceptions of what a terrorist is, 
which sadly, post-9/11 tends to center on racial profiles built on Muslim stereotypes. In 
this way, the argument here is that there is no clear boundary between the facticity of 
legal, technoscientific, and popular conceptions of no-fly lists wherein 'us' versus 'them,' 
stereotyped, ambiguous, cloudy and confusing definitions of 'terrorists' circulate in 
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osmotic discursive fashion. Indeed, it is my argument that this is but the operations of an 
economy of discourses; and more profoundly, represents the ethical and moral 
implications of reducing human lives to scores, subdividing 'threatening' populations, 
and labeling 'dangerous' cases in an uncertain, but increasingly automated and classified 
world; and as such these issues must be deeply and critically considered in future policy. 
Writing about the 'privacy world' gathering in Montreal for The International 
Data Protection and Privacy Commissioner's Conference in September of 2007, Michael 
Geist in The Ottawa Citizen articulates the moral and ethical conundrum inherent in 
blurred techno-legal boundaries, describing how the conference emphasized 
...the growing 'toolkit' of responses, including privacy audits of public and 
private sector organizations, privacy impact assessments that are used to gauge 
the effect of new regulations and corporate initiatives, trust seals that include 
corporate compliance programs, and emphasis on global co-operation in a world 
where personal data slips effortlessly across borders. While the effectiveness of 
these measures has improved in recent years, there remained a pervasive sense 
that these responses are inadequate. Part of the unease arises from the growing 
realization that the legal foundation of privacy law is being rendered increasingly 
irrelevant . 
Canadian privacy law at its core relies on two fundamental principles—those of 
'notice' and 'consent'—and these 'twin pillars' are designed to ensure that Canadian 
consumers are notified of, and consent to, the collection, use and disclosure of their 
personal 'identifiable' information. As Geist notes "Critics argue that both notice and 
consent today are little more than legal fictions, as consumers ignore overly complex 
notices and shrinking technology makes it virtually impossible to obtain informed 
consumer consent" 42. Furthermore, Canadian privacy law also makes distinctions 
41
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between 'personally identifiable' (legally protected) and 'non-identifiable' (not legally 
protected) information, which global classification technologies, practices and 
infrastructures are also rendering irrelevant. 
Technology threatens the ability to easily distinguish between the two as powerful 
computers and ever-expanding databases make it easier to identify individuals 
from what was once thought to be non- identifiable information. In a room full of 
privacy advocates, [Michael] Chertoff [US Secretary of Homeland Security] came 
not with a peace offering, but rather a confrontational challenge. He 
unapologetically made the case for greater surveillance, in which governments 
collect an ever-increasing amount of data about their citizens in the name of 
security. In the process, his vision of a broad surveillance society ~ supported by 
massive databases of biometric data collected from hundreds of millions of people 
~ presented a chilling future43. 
Chertoff s assertion of a broad security and surveillance society epitomizes not 
only the legal and technoscientific transformations to how we now materially identify and 
constitute 'terrorists,' but also a new inscribed meaning for their bodies; as listed objects. 
Indeed, what changed for Canadians with the implementation of the Specified Persons 
List were not so much terrorist and threatening bodies as material entities in their own 
right, but the way we would now construct them linguistically and understand them 
metaphorically, as objects on lists—the fundamental pivot of Chertoff s 'broad 
surveillance society'. With each such announcement and articulation of the fundamental 
use of risk assessment techniques and global classification infrastructures in the war on 
terror, not only do these apparatuses of security further sublimate themselves into 
Canadian social woodwork, but also a new dominant meaning for 'terrorists' is invoked, 
reinforced and validated: that 'threatening' people and things are listed; that such lists are 
subject to sharing and manipulation between and by corporations, governments and 
nations; and that such lists are rife with misidentified, innocent people. 
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In this way, no-fly lists are to be understood not only as 'double integration' 
technologies of security, but also as a linguistic and material reality; "a duality inherent in 
all linguistic entities" (Treichler, p.40), wherein the 'terrorist' label associated with 'no-
fly list' discourse can carry with it highly dehumanizing and possibly life-threatening 
consequences for those listed as such. Indeed, without such an understanding and vision, 
we cannot begin to read the story of no-fly lists accurately, nor formulate intelligent 
interventions surrounding them in the future. No case better exemplifies this than that of 
Canadian Maher Arar, who, as a result of having his name appear on the US no-fly list, 
was extradited to Syria where he endured over one year of imprisonment and torture, and 
subsequently, despite having been declared innocent of any terrorist actions or affiliations 
by the Canadian Government, has yet to receive an apology from the US Government, 
nor has he had his name removed from their no-fly list44. 
Intelligent interventions into no-fly listing 
All of the above is not to say that intelligent interventions have not helped shape 
the discourse surrounding the Specified Persons List; quite the contrary really. Although 
over the timeline studied here the Canadian Government remained 'tightlipped' about its 
'terrorist criteria' and whether, how, and when it would share its no-fly list data with the 
United States and other foreign governments45, Canada's Privacy Commissioner, Jennifer 
Stoddart, certainly did not, warning repeatedly about the infringement on individual 
Canadians' rights to privacy, and the destructions of the 'twin pillars' of privacy law— 
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notice and consent—that the sharing of the Specified Persons List with the United states 
would imply46. 
On June 8th, 2007 CanWest News Service's Don Butler wrote in The Ottawa 
Citizen that: "Stoddart said the list represents a 'serious incursion' into the privacy and 
mobility rights of Canadians"47. Under the program, which took effect for all domestic 
and international flights in Canada on June 18th, 2007, anyone deemed a threat would 
now be prevented from boarding. And further on, he noted even more critical warnings 
from Stoddart, who on June 17 warned Canadian citizens that 
.. .the increasingly intrusive use of your identity in order to make decisions about 
you as an individual are pretty drastic. This could turn into quite a nightmare for 
some ordinary citizens. Every time we go to the airport, do we expect to be 
challenged? That may be the new world. Increasingly one wonders how effective 
is this going to be. Is this simply going to widen into another net through which to 
filter civil categories of people?48 
Yet despite Stoddart's warnings and verbal interventions into this divisive 
caesuric social practice—the filtering of civil categories of people—that was been 
initiated by the Canadian Government, for the most part Canadians stood back idly and 
watched as the no-fly list began to sublimate itself further into our woodwork, with no 
substantial arguments raised against it in the 75 day period of public rebuke that came 
into effect as of its announcement on October 27 , 2006. The lack of interest in the topic 
by Canadians over the course of the research, and the lack of serious public debate 
around the Passenger Protect Program and its Specified Persons List were epitomized by 
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the headline from the Canadian Press Service on January 27 , 2007: 'Canada quietly 
working on own no-fly list'49. 
While at times the Canadian press did approach the question of the 
implementation of the Passenger Protect Program with a critical eye during the period 
studied here, mostly when Jennifer Stoddart spoke, and Michael Geist, Don Butler, and 
major Canadian news department editorial staffs wrote on the topic, for the most part, the 
majority of the mainstream press stood by and watched as 'Canada's no-fly list sped 
towards liftoff50. Indeed, despite Stoddart's highly publicized statements on October 
27th, 2006, the day of the announcement, Meagan Fitzpatrick of The National Post opted 
to omit Stoddart's criticism in her article the next day, merely waving a hand at questions 
of privacy and civil liberties by suggesting that "Alexi Wood of the Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association is not sure if the no-fly list is necessary"51. 
Throughout the research period, not only were the 'Feds mum on the no-fly list' 
and how it would work (but for Transport Canada's initial public announcement of the 
vague criteria for inclusion on The Specified Persons List, and how the advisory board 
would be constituted) but the Canadian government also adamantly refused to divulge 
whether or not they planned to share the list with the US and other allies. Indeed, Butler 
(2007) writes that 
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... security experts say there's little doubt Canada will share no-fly information 
with its allies, including the U.S., when the list is activated.. .One thing is beyond 
dispute: every airline that flies into and out of Canada will have access to the no-
fly list53. 
With such 'corporate' sharing already an assumption of the Passenger Protect 
Program, there is little doubt that as of this writing the United States and other foreign 
nations are in full possession of Canada's no-fly list. There is also clearly something 
unsettling about a Canadian air travel culture that prior to the initiation of the Passenger 
Protect Program and its Specified Persons List, had already been turning a blind eye to 
the constitutionally questionable practice engaged by Air Canada of screening its 
passenger names through the US no-fly list prior to departure54. 
Transport Canada is putting the finishing touches on its no-fly list, called 
Passenger Protect, that all airlines will be required to use to screen passengers. 
The goal is to identify individuals who pose an "immediate threat to security." But 
Air Canada already applies a no-fly list using intelligence data from Canadian and 
U.S. authorities. "As part of our security measures, we do screen for names," said 
a spokesman. He wouldn't elaborate. "I don't think you'd expect a bank to talk 
about the steps it takes to keep its money safe," he said55. 
Moreover, no provisions have ever been stipulated in Transport Canada's 
Passenger Protect Program that bar such practice, before or after the implementation of 
the Specified Persons List, practices which had then, and continue today, to expose 
Canadian air travelers, at least on Air Canada flights, to the massive American no-fly list. 
Indeed, the dangers of practices that frame individuals in legally contradictory guilty-
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Just how Eire the rights and liberties of Canadians protected when they travel by air and 
have their names screened through lists derived from what amount to anonymous 
builders, working with unspecified construction materials—data-bases and data-pools— 
culled from the entropy of global classification milieus? 
Not surprisingly, racial profiling and stereotyping play into the discursive mix as 
well, as on the day of the initiation of the Specified Persons List, the Canadian Council on 
American-Islamic Relations were already calling for its 'scrapping,' voicing concerns 
with how ".. .the measure could lead to racial and religious profiling and the blacklisting 
en 
of innocent people" a CTV.ca story noted . So it is ironic that just as Canada was 
considering how to adopt its own no-fly list in June of 2006, a Baltimore Sun headline 
stated that "No-fly list said growing into uselessness" in the United States, citing the 
TSA's admission that the no-fly list was getting so large and cumbersome that it was 
C O 
increasingly becoming obsolete . "The federal government [of the United States] has 
inflated the 'No Fly List' to 200,000 names. But the list has nabbed more members of 
Congress than it has terrorists," wrote James Bovard in The Boston Globe on July 24 , 
200659. 
Indeed, with the number of people on the Canada's Specified Persons List 
doubling in a mere day , how long will it be before it approaches the six digit figures 
associated with its American counterpart? And how many people on the list will be 
57




 United Press International (UPI). 2006. No-fly list said growing into uselessness, June 11. In the 
Washington Times, Washington, DC, http://washingtontimes.com/upi/2006061 l-023518-2050r.htm 
59







delimited there merely because of their race? In a culture that has already become 
comfortable with profiling and listing in powerful contexts that reduce people to 
delimited and policed digital worth/risk elements, increasingly subdivided in populations 
housed in massive global information infrastructures; what impact do the Canadian 
Privacy Commissioner and The Canadian Council of American-Islamic Relations 
interventions really have? Moreover, can the 'stringent' criteria for inclusion on the 
Specified Persons List set forth by Transport Canada have any real impact on securing 
innocent people, like Maher Arar, from the 'misidentifications' that rule the day when 
computers, statistics, and lists are correlated in assemblages of police that patrol the 
global milieus of circulation installed by the apparatuses of security? 
As the year progressed there was surprisingly no interrogation in the Canadian 
Press of the definition of the term 'terrorist' itself, which indicates its deep sublimation as 
a taken-for-granted but highly vague, provisional, and ambiguous classification in 
Canadian society. But despite a murky definition of 'terrorist', questions pertaining to the 
clearing of false 'terrorist positives' began to bubble to the surface of concerns voiced in 
the Canadian press61, while paying little mind to the term itself. Indeed, the criteria 
associated with a person being placed on the no-fly list in Canada is so vague, and the 
practices engaged by the Canadian Specified Persons List Advisory Board for 
delimitation on the list so closed, that despite the fact that individuals can petition to be 
removed from the no-fly list to the 'so-called' Office of Reconsideration (a review and 
advisory board consisting of independent, unnamed advisors and former judges), the 
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reasons for which they were placed on the list in the first place, and who was responsible 
for the decision will never be disclosed to the listed . In this respect, and following on 
Bowker and Star's (1999) conclusions regarding classification systems as living entities 
that need explicitly contain traces of their builders and construction, we see a troubling 
trend in this research, wherein the construction and builders of The Specified Persons List 
in Canada remain obscured behind black-box policies, practices and criteria for probing 
entropic milieus of circulation for regularities and patterns that constitute terrorists and 
their organizations—classified matters of the highest national security. 
Indeed, Canadian Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart's four main concerns 
regarding the no-fly list also reflect this 'questionable' state of affairs. As Don Butler in 
The Ottawa Citizen chronicled on May 16, 2007 in an article entitled 'Privacy 
Commissioner Wary of No-Fly List' . Stoddart's first concern centers on whether or not, 
and how the no-fly list will be shared with foreign governments. "Though most security 
experts say there's little doubt they will be shared, the government has refused to say, 
citing security considerations"64. Her second concern is the risk of misidentification of 
innocent Canadian citizens through the establishment of 'false positives' on the list. 
Indeed, Stoddart's spokesperson Florence Nguyen ".. .noted the no-fly list in the United 
States has been plagued by false positives. Children have been listed as suspected 
terrorists, she said, and Senator Ted Kennedy was once denied boarding because his 
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name was on the list"65. Her third concern is how Canadian airline travelers will be 
informed of the presence of their name on the no-fly list. '"Will that information be 
communicated privately?' Ms Nguyen said. 'In front of everyone, it could be 
embarrassing'"66. And perhaps most poignantly to the research presented here, Stoddart's 
fourth concern is more broadly reflective of an ongoing trend towards 
.. .identity-based versus physical-based screening systems... What makes a person 
an immediate threat is more about what they are physically doing than who they 
are or who they have associated with67. 
Indeed, Butler concludes by noting "Ms. Stoddart has asked Transport Canada for 
studies or other evidence that no-fly lists improve airline security, Ms. Nguyen said no 
such studies or evidence had ever been provided" . So where reports of Stoddart's and 
other critical interventions emerged throughout the year in the assembled news corpus, 
the only thing they would seem to make clear for Canadians is that challenging 
increasingly streamlined and converged classification infrastructures, risk assessment 
scores, and apparatuses of security in general—whose meanings are deeply entrenched in 
the social and historical codes outlined in earlier chapters—requires considerable 










The case of Christopher Soghoian 




Challenging no-fly lists and the security 
agendas they associate means engaging the cultural 
and material resources available to those 
intervening, and in the case of no-fly lists, such interventions begin with a key 
technological support of the apparatuses of security; networked computer infrastructures. 
Indeed, while computer technologies and global classification infrastructures are 
subsumed so deeply in our social woodwork, rendering them near-invisible for the most 
part in how no-fly list conjunctures are represented, it was precisely when the computer's 
taken-for-granted status as an underlying technology of US airline security was 
compromised in the timeframe studied here, that its crucial operations in the apparatuses 
of security were only revealed. 
On October 28th, 2006, a headline in The Chicago Sun Times read 'Student shoots 
down no-fly list'70, which went on to chronicle how Christopher Soghoian, a Ph.D. 
student in the School of Informatics at Indiana University, was distracted and bored 
during a lecture on cryptography, and quickly designed and developed a website that 
would generate Northwest Airlines boarding passes. Any visitor to the site could type in 
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any name and any flight number, and Soghoian's application would then prepare a 
facsimile for printing of a Northwest Airlines boarding pass containing the desired 
information. 
Despite not being able to be used to actually board a plane, the boarding pass 
facsimile allowed anyone to pass through airport security checkpoints, completely 
subverting the no-fly list screening procedures engaged by Northwest Airlines prior to 
clearance into secure pre-boarding facilities. Indeed, this case was used to justify the need 
to remove pre-boarding security screening responsibilities from airlines themselves, 
placing no-fly list measures in the hands of the US Transport Safety Administration 
directly, streamlined into their broader classification infrastructures and the watch-lists of 
71 
the Department of Homeland Security . 
A Northwest Airlines passenger is put through a no-fly list screening process72. 
Randall Stross in The New York Times on December 17th, 2006 described how 
Soghoian had stated on his (quickly dismantled) website that the project was simply 
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intended "to demonstrate that the TSA. Boarding Pass/ID check is useless," but clearly 
from a political perspective, it represented far more than that. Indeed, without 
compromising any computer airline system, without cracking any code, and without 
visiting any airport, Soghoian used simple computer web-based techniques, technologies, 
and global classification infrastructures—namely the internet—to completely 
compromise the United States' no-fly list program, and in turn, aviation security 
procedures across that nation, at the very least, as they were intended to secure boarding 
facilities at airports that accommodated Northwest Airlines flights. And although 
Soghoian had presented Homeland Security with evidence for, and an opportunity to 
make strong arguments to further streamline and unify security watch lists and 
procedures across the nation, and internationally, 
To thank Mr. Soghoian for helping the government identify security weaknesses, 
the T.S.A. sent him a letter warning of possible felony criminal charges and fines, 
and ordered him to cease operations, which he promptly did. It was too late, 
however, to spare his apartment from an F.B.I, raid7 . 
While Soghoian was subsequently cleared of any charges against him75, one has 
to wonder what kinds of watch-lists his name can now be found on? "The message it 
sends to the community is that if you do security research, someday the FBI will come 
knock on your door," said Soghoian76. Indeed, Soghoian's manipulations of 
technoscientific infrastructures, and his intervention into the practices that partially 
constitute no-fly list apparatuses of security in the United States, through the 











computer and digital photo manipulation software could have easily accomplished, had 
the effect of labeling him a 'bad guy.' And not surprisingly, 'expert' analysis of the case 
inevitably framed questions of conducting security research as involving ethical and 
moral dilemmas revolving around the categorization of 'good' and 'bad guys;' 
conundrums that place researchers working in security contexts in difficult and 
compromising situations. Matthew Blaze, an associate professor of computer science at 
the University of Pennsylvania, investigating domestic and international security 
computerized systems, framed the dilemma for security researchers working in a 'black' 
and 'white' world of global security, wherein their research can be interpreted as abetting 
the 'bad guys' agendas, as such: 
'Why should we help the bad guys?' The answer, he said, is that the bad guys 
aren't helped — because they almost certainly already know a system's weak 
points — and that disclosing the weaknesses brings pressure on government 
agencies and their suppliers to improve security for the good guys... 'If a grad 
student can figure it out,' he said, 'we can assume agents of Al Qaeda can do the 
77 
same' . 
Indeed, Blaze and his graduate students had discovered a series of techniques for 
subverting and thwarting government wiretapping systems the previous year, but they 
•jo 
hesitated when it came time to publish their findings . Blaze described how they adhered 
to the assumption that if they had discovered the techniques, 'terrorists' and 'criminals' 
had undoubtedly discovered them too, and therefore, in the interest of scientific 
advancement, and in order to push the research, corporate and military-industrial 
complex to address the security weaknesses their work revealed, they needed to publish 
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their findings. But despite these rational principles, Blaze and his students still contacted 
the FBI before publishing their results, explaining their assumptions, elaborating on their 
findings, and providing the Department with a schedule for pending publications. The 
contradictions of their rational assumptions coupled with their cooperation with the FBI 
leads one to wonder if their 'openness' derived from a patriotic impulse, or whether it 
was more emblematic of their fear for their own identities being factored as risks? 
Possibly delimited as security threats in their own right—possibly classified as 'bad guys' 
for tampering with security systems—with little to no redress for re-listing. 
'To their credit,' Professor Blaze said, 'they [FBI] understood and did nothing to 
try to stop it . 
What Soghoian's intervention and Blaze and his students' conundrum reveal is 
that despite the computer being deeply sublimated in the apparatuses of security, and the 
operations of global classification infrastructures, and further governmentality, when it is 
used, or revealed as a tool of resistance, for 'good' or 'bad,' the risk factor for those 
involved in exhuming this power from our social woodwork can be elevated and 
delimited for policing; a historical legacy traceable to both Nazi governmentality, and 
also the embodiment of Cold War politics in computer, statistics, and list conjunctions 
outlined in the previous chapters. It is far from a stretch to suggest that the raids on 
Soghoian's house, his identity factored as a risk, his name on 'security' watch-lists, is 
precisely what Blaze and his students feared, and exactly what Soghoian experienced. 
Soghoian, who flies often and fears being put on the no-fly list, said he will 
probably cease working on airport security research, despite having had other 
ideas he wanted to test. "I travel and I see the risks and I want them to be fixed, 
but I'm not going to get to try them, and if Al Qaeda is the first one to test it then 
we failed. Al Qaeda should never be the first one to test the system," Soghoian 
194 
said. As for the lessons he's learned? "You don't do anything two weeks before an 
election," Soghoian said. Also he suggests that his experience fits with those of 
security researchers pursued by the feds for their exposure of faults with Cisco 
and Adobe products. "The message it sends to the community is that if you do 
security research, someday the FBI will come knock on your door" . 
The case of Christopher Soghoian's challenge of, or more precisely intervention 
into US aviation security and its no-fly list program, not only demonstrates the extent of 
tenacity and courage required to challenge no-fly lists, global classification 
infrastructures, and their associations in the apparatuses of security, but at the same time, 
requires us to acknowledge and examine the multiple ways in which our social 
constructions pivot on discursive dichotomies—how doing 'no-fly lists' guides our vision 
of the material reality 'terrorists' in extraordinarily 'black' and 'white' terms. 
Reconstructing no-fly lists 
As Christine Brooke-Rose demonstrates, one must pay close attention to the way 
in which these apparently fundamental and natural semantic oppositions are put to 
work. What is self and what is not-self? Who wears the white and who wears the 
black hat? (Or in her discussion, perhaps, who wears the pants and who the skirt?) 
(Treichlerl988,p.64)81. 
There is now not only broad consensus amongst privacy policy analysts and 
activists that no-fly lists represent significant incursions into, and outright violations of 
HO 
privacy law, civil right and liberties , but there is also contradictory consensus amongst 
worldwide governments, particularly those of the US and Canada, that security 
Singel, Ryan. 2006. Boarding Pass Hacker Not Prosecuted. In Wired News. November 28. Wired News, 
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2006/ll/boarding_pass_h.html 
81
 Treichler (1988) paraphrasing Brooke-Rose, Christine. 1986. "Woman as a Semiotic Object," in The 
Female Body in Western Culture: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Susan Rubin Suleiman, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. Pp.305-316. 
82
 MacCharles, Ronda. 2007. Canada to launch no-fly list in June. May 12. In The Toronto Star. Ottawa, 
Ontario. http://www.thestar.eom/News/article/213185 
and also 
Butler, Don. 2007. No-fly list puts rights at risk: critics. January 14. In The Ottawa Citizen. 
Ottawa, Ontario. 
195 
assemblages such as no-fly lists, are the way to go in a never-ending and ever-expanding 
war on terrorism. Indeed, the latter is highly emblematic of an emerging and pervasive 
tendency towards engaging technoscientific closed-world conjunctions involving the 
probing of global classification infrastructures, through risk assessment techniques and 
technologies, wherein outputted watch-lists pivot the delimitation and policing of 
'terrorist' movements as a means and ends of practicing a global surveillance society. 
Clearly, the multiplicity of meanings, significations, and stories no-fly lists 
represent are neither simple nor under any specific discursive control. No-fly lists exist at 
a point where many entrenched narratives intersect, each with its own problematic 
context in which the 'terrorists' they represent acquire meaning. Therefore it is no 
wonder that most of us cannot resist the temptations and reassurance of pervasive and 
ubiquitous good/bad and black/white discourses surrounding no-fly lists and terrorists, 
and herein we inherit what Treichler (1988) calls ".. .a series of discursive dichotomies; 
the discourse of [no-fly lists] attaches itself to other systems of difference and plays itself 
out there" (p.63): 
• us and them 
• good guys and bad guys 
• Islam and the 'free world' 
• religion and secularity 
• capitalism and communism 
• certainty and uncertainty 
• humans and machines 
• physical bodies and identities 
• freedom and repression 
• innocents and perpetrators 
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• self and other 
There is little doubt that for many people the emergence of no-fly lists lends force 
to their fear of terrorists—to their fear of others—and at the same time provides 
reassurance in an increasingly uncertain world. And there is little doubt that for some, in 
a post 9/11 era, no-fly lists would seem to provide a legitimate forum and mechanism for 
enabling racial profiling, which in this era, sees Muslims as those primarily listed83. 
Indeed, the complications associated with racial profiling, and delimiting and policing 
'terrorist' movements are exemplified by a story that emerged in late summer of 2006. 
On August 30 a Reuters worldwide headline declared: 'Pakistani-American teen, father 
barred from US,' a story that subsequently generated over 30 news articles in the 
assembled corpus in the surrounding weeks, all of which chronicled how two relatives 
(Mohammed and Jaber Ismail) of a father and son, recently convicted of terrorism 
charges in the US (Umer and Hamid Hayat), had been placed on the no-fly list while in 
Pakistan, and had been barred from American soil, unless they agreed to be interviewed 
by the FBI in Islamabad. Despite no direct evidence of Mohammed (45 years old) and his 
son Jaber (18 years old) Ismail's involvement in a terrorist network, their bloodlines to 
those recently convicted (and intensely interviewed) terrorists made them 'guilty enough' 
to be placed on the US no-fly list. The New York Times reported on August 29th, 2006 
that 




 Reuters News Service. 2006. Pakistani-American teen, father barred from US. August 30. USA. 
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Hamid Hayat mentioned Jaber Ismail in a marathon F.B.I, interrogation before he 
was charged, according to transcripts. He said his cousin had attended a camp in 
the past couple of years, but he was not sure if it was the same one he had 
attended85. 
Indeed, what the Ismail's were doing in Pakistan at the time of being placed on 
the US no-fly list—the son participating in a vaguely defined 'religious' camp coupled 
with the father's refusal to cooperate with the FBI interviewers—certainly sounds 
suspicious, especially to anyone who might have been tuning into to FOX Television's 24 
weekly series at the time of this news. But as one of the Ismail's lawyer's was quick to 
note, suspicion is not law, and "If the government had evidence instead of 
innuendo.. .then they would be charged with a crime instead of being held hostage in a 
foreign land"86. 
What the Ismail's case demonstrates is that to talk of racial profiling as though it 
were a simple, or easily detectable and recognizable phenomenon in popular global news 
culture is impossible. When we review the various conceptions of 'terrorist' produced by 
the term 'no-fly list' in how we construct meaning surrounding lists of risky circulating 
elements, we find very limited and narrow discourses of 'black' and 'white' dichotomies 
—of good guys and bad guys; us versus them; good versus evil; terrorist versus the free 
world; self versus other, etcetera. 
Ironically, at first, many Americans and Canadians undoubtedly believed that the 
names of innocent citizens would never be contained on no-fly lists—that they 
themselves would never be mislabeled 'bad guys'—but such myths are quickly shattered, 
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as the misidentification of innocent citizens on no-fly lists continues to be the focus of 
mainstream news on no-fly lists87, most notably epitomized by CBS Television's 
newsmagazine 60 Minutes segment on no-fly lists entitled 'Unlikely Terrorists on No-Fly 
Lists'88. Indeed, the original airing of the episode of 60 Minutes on October 8th, 2006 
became news in its own right, yielding Associated Press international headlines including 
one in The Jerusalem Post on October 6th, 2006: 'Report: US no-fly list includes foreign 
officials.' This short Associated Press news brief read: 
A no-fly list meant to keep terrorists off airplanes contains the names of Bolivia's 
President Evo Morales and Nabih Berri, Lebanon's parliamentary speaker, 
according to a report by a television news show. The story by CBS' "60 Minutes" 
builds on previous reports that detailed how young children and well-known 
Americans like Sen. Edward M. Kennedy have been stopped at airports because 
their names match those on lists. Critics say the government does not provide 
enough information about the people on the lists, so innocent passengers can be 
caught up in the security sweep. The number of names on watch lists increased 
into the tens of thousands since the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the 
United States89. 
The news of 60 Minutes' revelations about the 'misidentification' of world 
leaders on the US no-fly list were quickly rebuked by the Associated Press on October 
10th, 2006 saying that "Richard Kopel, acting director for the Terrorist Screening Center 
of the Justice Department, said Bolivia's Evo Morales and Nabih Berri, the Lebanese 
parliamentarian, are not on the list, but he did not say whether they ever have been," in a 
report entitled 'U.S. breaks silence on no-fly list published in The International Herald 
Dickson, Louise. 2007. No-fly list snags 78-year-old Saanich 'Mr. Nice Guy.' In Victoria Times-
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Tribune90. Whether they were, or weren't on the list, what this 60 Minutes segment 
revealed is a taken-for-granted 'truth' of no-fly list apparatuses of security: That anyone 
and everyone is equally susceptible to this powerful web, as Senator Edward Kennedy, 
who has also been on the US no-fly list is well aware91. 
One of the other key revelations contained in the 60 Minutes segment also pointed 
to just how contradictory and ambiguous practices associated with risk assessment and 
the automated probing of global classification infrastructures can be, involving how 14 of 
the 19 names of the 9/11 hijackers are still identified on the no-fly list. When asked about 
the presence of the names of the dead hijackers on the no-fly list, Donna Bucella, who 
spearheads the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center which has been responsible for 
evaluating information and intelligence from various agencies post 9/11 and ultimately 
for compiling the US no-fly list, replied: "Well, just because a person has died doesn't 
necessarily mean that their identity has died. People sometime carry the identities of 
people who have died," she said92. 
Indeed, repeated warnings that terrorists are everywhere among us, even in death, 
suggest that technoscientific, legal, and popular discourses surrounding no-fly lists all 
take as their underlying assumption that fears borne of everything and everyone are 
legitimate in an unending array of social contexts in the age of global terrorism, wherein 
'terrorists' are seen to lurk in every corner of an ever-threatening global milieu of 
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circulation of good guys and bad guys that no-fly lists serve, validate, reinforce, and self-
elaborate. In this way, the 'terrorist' constructed around the term 'no-fly list' in Canadian 
and global news sources—the multiplicity of meanings it invokes—is driven in large part 
by a historical need and tendency to create evermore oppositions between people, to 
constantly distinguish between 'us' and 'them.' Indeed, the dichotomous meanings 
enabled through no-fly lists continue to be layered into existing discourses, evidenced in 
the slippery slope between listing cases that pose 'terrorist risks' and those that pose 
'health risks' . In other words, no-fly lists and their constituent 'terrorists' are signifiers 
that in many ways, have been, and can be embraced forever, in an unending array of 
social contexts, as the next chapter on no-blank list culture demonstrates. 
Indeed, how to disrupt, intervene, and renegotiate the powerful cultural narratives 
and discourses surrounding no-fly lists as they operate in the apparatuses of security are 
complex questions, ones that require significant tenacity and courage to approach, as 
Canada's Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart's efforts attest, and the case of 
Christopher Soghoian clearly demonstrates. Fear of the 'other' is inscribed within no-fly 
list discourse at such a deep level that it is very difficult to dislodge. When our Public 
Security Minister tells us that 'Canada is not immune to terrorism' and that 'we must 
remain vigilant to the threat' he is merely validating, reinforcing, and redeploying a 
message that has been conveyed time immemorial, and one that has been used 
historically to justify increasingly invasive security and surveillance measures and 
divisive caesuric practices: 'they' lurk out there in every corner, posing mortal threat to 
'us.' In this way, the only 'truth' that no-fly lists reveal is that any separation of 'others' 
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(terrorists) from 'us' (general global population) is now quite literally impossible, yet 
such hegemonic discursive dichotomies and attempts at governmentality continue to rule 
the day. 
Conclusion 
The discursive mechanisms that no-fly lists pivot I have described here are 
systems of difference—of significations and meanings of'us' and 'them'—that lists have 
reinforced at least since the dawn of Nazi governmentality. But what we have also seen is 
that no-fly lists further shift the focus from the physical, corporeal assessment of risks, to 
identity-based screening, involving deploying assemblages of policing in entropic global 
classification infrastructures and milieus of circulation. While there continues to be 
debate about how no-fly lists render the twin pillars of Canadian privacy law—notice and 
consent—irrelevant, as the government increasingly leverages indistinguishable 
'identifiable' and 'non-identifiable' information to assess terrorist movements, the 
Canadian and American governments have quite clearly opted to disregard these 
conundrums—the perils of precarious guilty-before-proven-innocent legal positions— 
privileging a technoscientific vision, and equally, unproven approach, to the management 
of terrorist threats locally, nationally and globally. In a never-ending war on terror, the 
misidentification of'innocents' is seen merely as a 'problem in code,' perfectible through 
the engagement of increasingly sophisticated computer, statistical, and list techniques and 
technologies deployed to probe massive classification infrastructures in global milieus of 
circulation. 
Moreover, underpinning this technoscientific correlation of power is a discourse 
of 'national security' wherein the criteria by which risks are factored on no-fly lists are 
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considered sacrosanct strategic intelligence, the highest 'classified' matters of national 
and global security. For even those who have been misidentified cannot know why, how, 
or when their identities came to be listed amongst terrorist populations, as surely this 
would impact the 'freedom of movement' that juridical-disciplinary mechanisms like no-
flight lists are expressly deployed by the apparatuses of security to ensure. We have also 
seen how the terrorist, as a listed object, is not merely a threat to local, and Canadian 
national security, but presents a global danger, that makes the criteria by which this 
critical object of contemporary knowledge is constituted and called into reality even more 
precious and protected, and equally, all the more important to unloosen as a key site of 
struggle. 
My own view is unequivocal: technoscientific discourse cannot be privileged in 
this way. For it represents a slap in the face to both legal rights and any form of open-
human discourse. Historically, we have seen how privileging technoscientific 
conjunctions to articulate differences between people are dangerous practices, and 
represent a very slippery slope for organizing society: one that teeters on, if not outright 
becomes, fascist. It is my view that the 'terrorist' is at once a socially constructed object, 
but also a historical subject, and equally a very real source of threat in contemporary life, 
albeit one that remains for the most part invisible and highly provisional. 
Even Osama Bin Laden never refers to himself as a 'terrorist.' 
In this way, intervening into no-fly list assemblages of policing and security will 
require us to relinquish some of the most pervasive and ubiquitous myths of the ages; our 
epic tales of good and evil—of us and them—and equally the fallacies and dangers of 
approaching such questions from an exclusively technoscientific lens. We need to use 
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what technoscience has given us in ways that are open, critical, self-conscious, legal, just, 
and pragmatic. We need to understand that 'no-fly lists' and their 'terrorist' constituents 
are historical, provisional and deeply problematic signifiers. Above all, we need to resist 
thinking pervasively and ubiquitously about risks and threats all around us—how we can 
shield 'us' from 'them' through no-blank list apparatuses of security—and get in touch 
with real people, in real time, placing the weight of our beliefs in each other, in Norbert 




Chapter 4 - No-blank list culture, or how technoscience 'truthfully' constructs the 
'terrorist' 
Introduction 
Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language 
(Williams 1976, p.87). 
As the 'war on terror' becomes a more and more taken-for-granted reality in a 
post-9/11 world, the no-blank list's significance as a legal, technoscientific, and popularly 
conceived solution to our local, national, and global security 'crises' is increasingly 
becoming clear. What the emergence of the Specified Persons List and the overall 
Passenger Protect Program has shown us is that as the Canadian government has tried to 
'get ahead of the game' with their new 'border' technologies and 'changing practices of 
government' (Aas 2005), the probing, or 'data-sniffing' of entropic global classification 
milieus of circulation for regularities and patterns that constitute risks, or reasonable 
suspicion of involvement in terrorist organizations, continues to expand. In this way, true 
to their 'double integration' form (Foucault 2007f), technologies of security, like no-
blank lists, serve as justification for the redeployment of their own praxis in these self-
elaborating processes involving the constitution of fields, domains, and objects of 
knowledge. Indeed, the legal, popular, and technoscientific conception that terrorist 
threats lurk everywhere amongst us in a highly uncertain, yet ubiquitously connected 
world, and the seemingly incumbent need to delimit and police the 'unknown' 
movements of elements circulating in populations and global milieus as such, is 
epitomized in Canadian Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart's 'welcome message' 
to The International Data Protection and Privacy Commissioner's Conference held in 
Montreal in September 2007, cryptically called 'Terra Incognita.'' 
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Our theme, Privacy Horizons: Terra Incognita points to the challenge for us as 
privacy guardians entering into uncharted territory, to anticipate and plan our 
readiness to tackle the "unknowns" in our field. Technology and terrorism are 
transforming the world. Information outsourcing and the exponential growth of 
transborder data flows as well as illicit data trafficking have become 
commonplace. Terra Incognita is our chance to assess this shifting privacy 
landscape and to map out our responsiveness and capacity to address emerging 
issues that trouble us as privacy professionals. 
By bringing together some of the world's foremost data protection experts to 
boldly chart the challenges ahead, we can explore ways of protecting and 
enhancing the privacy rights of all people. Thought-provoking workshops and 
interactive roundtables will plumb the depths of difficult issues such as data 
mining, authentication and identity management in our volatile, globalized and 
interconnected world. The emphasis will be on offering practical advice so you 
can develop your own solutions. Experts will bring forward the latest on new and 
alarming technologies such as brain scans and smart dust1. 
In this way, the field of Terra Incognita, and the domain of 'data protection 
experts,' can be classified as a 'closed-world' disciplinary technoscientific way of seeing 
and doing 'terrorism' through the delimitation and policing of the movement of 
circulating 'threats.' Indeed, through this disciplinary conjunction, which takes shape in 
research and experimentation conducted in the technoscientific laboratory, the 'terrorist' 
is 'made real;' at once 'fabricated,' and at the same time materialized as 'fact,' through 
correlations of computers, statistical data mining, risk assessment techniques, and no-
blank lists. Indeed, all of these technoscientific forces were clearly in evidence in Jennifer 
Stoddart's 'welcome message;' in her emphasis on 'new and alarming technologies,' and 
the critical role of 'identity management' in a 'shifting privacy landscape,' deployed to 
'anticipate and plan our readiness to tackle unknowns in our field.' Indeed, in Terra 
Incognita, the calculation, prediction, classification, and listing of 'threats' are practices 
1
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that are pervasively expanding, in this vast and ubiquitously connected, but highly 
insecure, milieu of circulation installed by the apparatuses of security that serve 
contemporary governmentality. 
In this way, this research argues that 'technologies of security' (like computers, 
statistics, and lists) and' terrorism' are not merely 'transforming the world' in which we 
live, as Stoddart argues, but are also transforming how we conceive of, talk about, 
symbolically represent, and materialize 'terrorists' in their own right: as naturalized, 
truthful, and classified listed objects. In a post 9/11 world, no-blank lists have seemingly 
become a taken-for-granted way of both seeing and doing local and global security; 
through the visualization, materialization, and policing of 'terrorist,' or 'threatening' 
elements delimited on lists. Moreover, increasingly pervasive technoscientific practices 
surrounding the collection, analysis, and disclosure of 'personal' information in global 
classification milieus of circulation are permeating the way we think through, and talk 
about terrorism and terrorists in general; as a taken-for-granted 'listed' reality in a highly 
insecure and irruptive world, where dubious elements are understood as probed for, 
listed, and policed for the safety of the 'general population;' ensuring their 'free' and 
'secure' circulation. 
This year's conference theme was 'Terra Incognita,' a reference to the unknown 
lands that typify the fear of the unknown in a world of rapidly changing 
technologies that challenge the core principals of privacy protection. Yet despite a 
dizzying array of panels on new technologies such as ubiquitous computing, 
radio-frequency identification (RFID) and nanotechnology, it was a reference by 
U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff to a simple fingerprint that 
struck the strongest chord.. .In support of his security agenda, he noted that U.S. 
forces in Iraq once gathered a single fingerprint from a steering wheel of a vehicle 
that was used in a bombing attack and matched it to one obtained years earlier at a 
U.S. border crossing. He added that there was a similar instance in England, 
where one fingerprint in a London home linked to a bombing was matched to a 
fingerprint gathered at a U.S. airport (the identified person was actually innocent 
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of any wrongdoing).. .Rather than terra incognita Chertoff seemed to be saying 
that there is a known reality about our future course and there is little that the 
privacy community can do about it2. 
With the Montreal conference placing the spotlight on the 'growing toolkit of 
responses' available to security specialists to address the uncertainties of Terra Incognita, 
where personal data slips effortlessly across borders, a future course did seem to be 
taking hold in Montreal: one in which individuals are increasingly understood as listed 
objects, mathematically and statistically derived worth/risk assessment scores, delimited 
and listed as threats circulating in global classification milieus that further efface the 
boundaries between people, things, and knowledge; all legally validated, reinforced, and 
naturalized as truth, in government programs like no-fly lists. 
No-blank list culture emerges 
Source: The Washington Post3 
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In addition to constituting our contemporary 'surveillance society' as a 
conjunction of computer technologies, surveillance techniques and privacy discourses, 
that hinge on cyborg reductions of humans and machines to information, David Lyon 
(1994; 2002; 2005) has also argued that 'the border is everywhere' (2005). Indeed, 
identities are increasingly being managed through biometric and surveillance techniques 
and technologies (Muller 2005), like 'new' micro data-sniffing devices; while at the same 
time local security classifications, like those parodied in the political cartoon above, are 
increasingly being streamlined and unified into 'global surveillance and policing' 
standards, technologies, infrastructures and discourses (Zureik and Salter 2005). Indeed, 
the research presented here argues that this movement towards a global surveillance 
society revolves around the articulation and dissemination of 'watch-lists'; with who 
builds them, and what they factor as statistical risks. The interrogation of the emergence 
of the Specified Persons List in Canada in the preceding chapter demonstrates how no-fly 
lists are powerful discursive entities that are becoming deeply embedded in our working 
infrastructures, and in this way, risk losing visibility, despite never losing any of their 
power in their self-elaboration and further sublimation. Indeed, no-fly lists are but the tip 
of the iceberg of no-blank list culture. 
Throughout this period of research, numerous worldwide news sources reported 
the emergence of a variety of other watch-lists that are also increasingly being used to 
manage 'threats' to other areas of local, national and global security. On April 16 , 2006 
Ryan Singel writing for Wired News described how over and above the US no-fly and 
selectee lists (people who can fly but are designated for extensive screening and 
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interrogation before boarding), new watch-lists are being born every day in the United 
States. Singel provided a 'field guide' to US watch-lists post-9/11, including: 
1. The Unified Watch List—a master watch US list said to contain more than 
200,000 names of suspected foreign or domestic terrorists ranging from Al-Qaeda 
operatives to radical environmental activists. 
2. The Violent Gang and Terrorist Organizations File—a list including citizens and 
residents suspected of being associated with gangs or terrorists. 
3. The Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment—a massive global database and 
repository of intelligence data from US and global intelligence services that 
(hearkening back to Lasswell's 'who said what to whom' mantra) Singel 
describes as 'likely to have the name of anyone who ever called anyone who ever 
called Al Qaeda.' 
4. The Interagency Border Inspection System which can be seen as completely 
effacing the boundaries between people, things, institutions, organizations, and 
knowledge, containing over a billion records on individuals, businesses, cars, 
trucks and planes; all 'tagged' with worth/risk scores by the, 
5. Automated Targeting System that rates the suspicion level of every single person 
and vehicle and their cargo traveling in and out of the United States. 
6. The Consular Lookout and Support System—a global database that leverages 
American and other governments' terrorist watch lists to assess visa requests and 
allocations. 
7. The Interpol Terrorism Watch List—a unified list shared between intelligence, 
border and law enforcement agencies worldwide. 
8. The Warrant Information Network—a list maintained by the US Marshals Service 
that keeps a watch on everyone in the United States with an existing federal 
warrant4. 
As the emergence of this avalanche of watch-lists attests, no-blank list culture 
begins with the reduction of people and things to digital elements with associated 
4




worth/risk scores through the techniques of correlating computers and statistical 
technologies, like in the operations of The Automated Targeting System. Indeed, no-blank 
list culture continues with the streamlining of these worth/risk assessed objects into 
entropic global classification infrastructures, like The Terrorist Identities Datamart 
Environment, and The Interagency Border Inspection System, and The Consular Lookout 
and Support System, in which objects are further data-mined and probed for factors that 
constitute risks. Finally, no-blank list culture fulfills itself with the fracturing practices of 
delimiting and policing 'terrorists,' like through the operations of The Unified Watch List, 
and The Interpol Terrorism Watch List, which attempt to nullify the movement of 
'threats' through their patrol by even finer-grain list technologies of security, like no-fly 
lists, no-buy lists, no-work lists, etcetera. Indeed, it is argued here that these provisional 
and self-elaborating techniques and correlations continue to serve, reinforce, and validate 
the form of governmentality that the apparatuses of security install: milieus where 
'freedom of movement' is of preeminent concern, and where risky populations and 
elements are calculated, predicted, and outputted on watch-lists for policing. Indeed, in 
these struggles over this most critical production of knowledge—of who and what is 
classified a terrorist—power very much rests in the associations and representations of 
no-blank lists, with who builds them, and what they factor for risk. 
This calculation of risk shows straightaway that risks are not the same for all 
individuals, all ages, or in every condition, place, or milieu. There are therefore 
differential risks that reveal, as it were, zones of higher risk and, on the other 
hand, zones of less or lower risk. This means that one can thus identify what is 
dangerous (Foucault 2007f, p.61). 
Post 9/11, the identification of 'what is dangerous' through no-blank lists emerged 
in milieus or circulation that we have long taken-for-granted to be 'zones of higher risk,' 
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like airports, but they are now equally being installed in milieus we assume to be 'zones 
of lower risk,' like hotels. On February 16th, 2007, Misty Harris writing in The Ottawa 
Citizen reported that a no-stay database and list have been increasingly employed in 
Australia to track hotel guests who might pose a threat to the security of a then registered 
100 hotels and chains in that country5. Indeed, no-stay lists in the hotel industry did not 
end in Australia, as it was equally being debated in the United States in this research time 
frame, including in an article by Kitty Bean Yancey in USA Today on September, 15, 
2006, which explored questions of whether or not US hotels should have a 'blacklist' for 
guests6. 
No-blank lists as technoscientiflc cultural constructions 
To call no-blank lists 'cultural' may mean simply acknowledging that legal, 
technoscientiflc, and popularly conceived discursive amalgamations like no-fly lists, and 
their constituent 'threatening' cases have significantly affected social life, symbolic 
expression, talk, and material reality. But as we have seen through the research of Paula 
Treichler (Treichler 1988) into AIDS and biomedical discourse in the preceding chapter, 
no-fly lists are less clear cut entities, and more invented labels, cultural constructions 
given birth to in the closed-world laboratory through its scientific naming practices. In 
this way, the research presented here argues that to call no-blank lists 'cultural 
constructions' means acknowledging how they serve the visual, conceptual, and material 
establishment of truth, invoking debate about the nature of knowledge, and equally, the 
5
 Harris, Misty. 2007. Australian 'no-stay' database tracks hotel guests behaving badly. In The Ottawa 
Citizen. February 16. Ottawa, ON. http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=8635fd6d-
025d-4bl8-a81b-d3859836fe61 
6
 Yancey, Kitty Bean. 2006. When irate guests pounce: Should hotels have a blacklist? In USA Today. 
September 15. http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2006-09-14-bad-guests_x.htm 
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nature of living beings and things, as they exist, and are classified in the everyday world. 
Indeed, as Foucault argues, these are the critical sites of power that must be unloosened: 
struggles over the production of 'truthful' knowledge related to living beings (Foucault 
2001:1970; Foucault, Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991; Foucault, Senellart, and 
Davidson 2007). 
What we have seen thus far is that no-blank list culture pivots on the reduction of 
people and things to worth/risk assessment scores, classified in global technological 
infrastructures that at once efface the boundaries between living beings, objects, and 
knowledge, and at the same time invoke new meanings for the term 'terrorist;' 
understood as a listed object. Given the complex correlations of the apparatuses of 
security installing global milieus of circulation, and the delimiting and policing of the 
movement of 'threats' lists serve outlined throughout this research, I would like to now 
assert that no-blank lists are, in all these ways, thoroughly 'cultural constructions.' 
In a later work entitled AIDS, HIV, and the Cultural Construction of Reality, 
Treichler (1992) traces the legacy of the term 'cultural construction:' from Karl 
Manheim's groundbreaking Ideology and Utopia (1936/1985) which concerns itself with 
how knowledge is bound up with being—how ".. .any object of knowledge becomes 
clearer with the systematic and cumulative analysis of different ways of seeing it" 
(Treichler 1992, p.70)— to Kuhn's (1962; 1996) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
which argues that radical 'scientific' ideas coalesce and produce moments of rupture in 
knowledge development; to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman's (1967) influential work 
on The Social Construction of Reality which explores how we experience the world in the 
form of multiple realities continuously in our everyday lives; and onto the work of Karin 
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D. Knorr-Cetina (1999; 1981) who explores how science is a discourse like all others, 
where 'fact' is understood as a 'fabrication' of the laboratory, which serves the central 
purpose of 'making things real' and 'making things work.' What Treichler concludes 
from this analysis is that, as per Foucault, culture is about the discursive construction of 
knowledge, hinging on the etymological connection between 'fact' and 'fabrication.' In 
this way, culture, like that of technoscience, is a 'made phenomenon' of the laboratory' 
(Treichler 1992, p.73). 
Indeed, a constant regularity in no-blank list culture is that when things go awry 
in its operations, questions are put right back on the disciplinary technoscientific 
mechanisms themselves to prescribe solutions. In this way, the laboratory of 
technoscience calls on itself to resolve problems when things do not work with no-blank 
lists, and in this way, the laboratory is equally a double integration technology of security 
in its own right. 
Written communication crystallizes the laboratory's entire argument and stakes its 
claim. Science, as a discursive field of interaction, is directed at and sustained by 
the arguments of others; writing is, therefore, at the heart of its social and 
symbolic foundation (Treichler 1992, p.73). 
Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar's (1986) Laboratory Life is similarly inspired, 
arguing that fact simultaneously constructs what is fabricated, as well as, what is not 
fabricated. In a similar way to how lists operate as 'intellectual technologies', Latour and 
Woolgar argue that scientific accounts are inherently uncertain and provisional; that facts 
are constructed through "slow, practical craftwork by which inscriptions are 
superimposed and accounts are backed up or dismissed. It is through practical operations, 
that a statement can be transformed into an object or a fact into an artifact" (p.236). In 
this way, Latour and Woolgar (1986) argue that there is no inherent dichotomy between 
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the material (the lab's technological apparatuses) and the nonmaterial dimensions of its 
cultural constructions (scientific ideology). Technoscientific accounts of phenomena are 
understood as transforming into reified objects, ultimately emerging as a reality that self-
elaborates its own praxis. In turn, Latour and Woolgar characterize the social, or cultural 
study of scientific phenomena as "the construction of fictions about fiction construction" 
(p.284). 
What does this mean in terms of this research into no-blank list culture? It means 
that a terrorist, and equally the no-blank lists that delimit and call them into reality, are 
both cultural constructions, fictional representations, whose legitimacy is established, 
validated and reinforced through a series of interacting and self-elaborating technologies, 
scientific practices, and ideologies that take shape in the laboratory. Indeed, how the 
terrorist is produced—the classification of this most critical of contemporary 
knowledge—must be taken seriously and unpacked, rather than passively accepted as 
hegemonic reality. This is the challenge that this research into no-blank list culture brings 
to the table: that the issue is not the cultural construction of the terrorist, but rather, the 
technoscientific construction of terrorism, or terrorist culture. 
In this way, it is my view that no-blank list culture must be understood as a legal, 
scientific, and popular imagining, that most often privileges disciplinary 'closed-world' 
technoscientific constructions, whose classifications are increasingly experienced by 
people as natural, as what is. Indeed, the more data about individual identities that is 
collected, sniffed, worth/risk assessed, and classified in global information 
infrastructures—the more people are reduced to scores on no-blank lists—the more the 
technoscientific laboratory's account and construction of terrorist realities, classifications, 
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and the 'truth' about the ongoing war on terror becomes a taken-for-granted reality self-
elaborated through no-blank list culture. And in this highly uncertain, but pervasively 
connected global culture, it is precisely these underlying technoscientific discourses and 
their embodied technologies that appear to become precisely what need not be examined. 
In this way, the taken-for-granted stage on which the realities of terrorist dramas unfold, 
the milieus of circulation installed, are validated and reinforced almost invisibly, by the 
apparatuses of security that serve contemporary governmentality. 
If there is another constant in the history of no-blank list culture presented here, 
besides that of the technoscientific construction of 'terrorists,' it is the further sublimation 
of the computer's crucial and taken-for-granted role in combating 'good' and 'evil' in 
this global struggle over the production of 'terrorist' knowledge—its role as a pivotal 
'closed-world' technology of security governing operations that probe entropic milieus 
for patterns and regularities that factor threat. Taken-for-granted couplings of humans and 
machines, cyborgs, data-sniffed at every moment, worth/risk assessed, and distributed in 
populations circulating in increasingly ubiquitous and pervasive classification milieus 
that completely efface the boundaries between people, things and knowledge, have in 
many ways become a hegemonic reality of contemporary governmentality. The unfolding 
global popular news items on 'watch-lists' reads like a case-study on this point, 
documenting on the one hand, the utter instability and uncertainty involved in practices of 
identifying terrorists through risk assessment techniques and global classification 
infrastructures, and on the other, the efficient and effective ways in which technoscience 
can repair this instability and uncertainty—that it is a just a matter or time until the 
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perfect mathematical algorithms and technoscientific system is developed to combat this 
contemporary plague of terrorism. 
Indeed, the contestation surrounding the sharing of Canada's no-fly list with other 
nations, and specifically the US, explored in the last chapter, is not merely a question of 
privacy law, civil rights and liberties but also clearly demonstrates how we are coming to 
increasingly understand, see and accept our 'selves' as technoscientific objects of 
knowledge; distributed in populations that are continuously experimented upon, risk 
assessed, coded, classified and streamlined into international information standards and 
systems. Global adherence to such standardized systems, beginning with the underlying 
technological infrastructures enabling the Internet, global telephony and cellphone 
networks in general, are standards which for the most part have been developed by the 
United States (Bowker and Star 1999), that not only form the infrastructure of global 
telecommunication, but are also the de-facto pivot in post 9/11 cooperative efforts to 
manage terrorist threats worldwide. In these ever-creeping ways too, no-blank list culture 
expands, going hand in hand with staunch technoscientific governmental efforts which, in 
the case of the emergence of the Canada's no-fly list, saw increased pressure being 
placed on the Canadian government to share their lists and databases and adhere to 
increasingly stringent US standards, policies and procedures that seek to delimit and 
police the movement of 'threats' in more and more milieus of circulation. 
The appearance of terrorists as taken-for-granted to be listed objects are quite 
clearly the remnant of Cold War 'closed-world' discourse, validated and reinforced 
through mainstream global news sources, with each and every utterance of good guys and 
bad guys, us and them, etcetera. At the same time we have seen oppositional discourse 
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appear in mainstream news, centered generally on privacy law, and the protection of 
basic civil rights and liberties associated with 'free movement.' Such discourse, 
characterized by open-human conceptions, has certainly also helped shape no-blank list 
culture. Indeed, we have seen that resistance and opposition to no-blank list culture is not 
futile, specifically in the case of no-fly lists, but does become evermore difficult the 
deeper powerful technoscientific 'security' agendas, enabling global surveillance milieus, 
sublimate themselves into our social woodwork. At times, it is even difficult to 
distinguish between dominant and oppositional views of no-blank lists, as 'friends and 
foes' often agree that there is 'no better solution' to security than this technoscientific 
one; the installation of no-blank lists . 
On May 24th, 2007, Kathy Kiely reported in USA Today that an immigration bill 
had been proposed and was being debated in the US Senate that would make provisions 
requiring that every person who applies for a job in the United States need demonstrate 
that they are legally eligible to work . Like the no-fly list, a no-work list was being 
developed by the United States' Department of Homeland Security that would ultimately 
allow all US employers to verify the legal-status of their employees through comparative 
screening processes like those of the no-fly list program. Indeed, such technoscientific 
practices involving 'verifying the eligibility' of identities by screening them against no-
work lists are increasingly being "seen [by the US government] as key to immigration 
7
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control"9. But such a technoscientific vision for immigration control, despite the powerful 
governmental forces behind it, is far from taken-for-granted, as competing and 
contradictory meanings surrounding no-work lists also abound in mainstream reporting. 
Civil liberties advocates worry that an extensive database linking Social Security 
data with immigration information would invade Americans' privacy and could 
lead to warrantless government data mining, be a ripe target for identity thieves 
and foster a "no work" list akin to the federal government's "no fly" list. Other 
experts fear that a multibillion-dollar, mandatory system « which would be 
almost 1,500 times the size of a pilot program that already has encountered 
logistical problems ~ would be rife with errors and delays. But friends and foes of 
immigration alike say there's no better solution10. 
Indeed, according to this report, the competing legal discourses of civil liberties 
visions of no-work lists, set against the efficiency and effectiveness of technoscientific 
approaches to controlling immigration, both take as their basis an agreed upon, yet highly 
provisional foundation: that there is 'no better solution' than that derived from the 
laboratory and its no-blank list technoscientific conjunctions for such assemblages of 
policing. In a world where 'threats' lurk everywhere and need be managed and controlled 
through watch-lists, the obliteration of privacy law becomes a taken-for-granted reality 
too. A passive agreement between all that human existence in a world plagued by 
pervasive and ubiquitous threats to local, national and global security—from terrorist 
threats, to threats to immigration, and employment—can be secured trough 
technoscientific 'sniffing' and 'screening' practices, legally enforced through no-blank 
list correlations. 
"Everybody who wants there to be meaningful (immigration) enforcement 
recognizes that the centerpiece has got to be workplace enforcement, and 
9
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employment verification is a central component of that," said Steve Camarota, 
research director at the Center for Immigration Studies in Washington, D.C., a 
think tank that favors reducing both legal and illegal immigration. The American 
Civil Liberties Union has long opposed such a plan, which it considers a step 
toward a national identity card that the government could use to track the 
movements of Americans without their consent. "This will create privacy 
consequences that are profound," said Tim Sparapani, the ACLU legislative 
counsel for privacy rights. "We'll be gathering enormous amounts of sensitive 
information in an unsecured format...These databases will inevitably be used by 
the government for purposes other than employment verification. The government 
has an insatiable appetite, post 9/11, for information. And it will take and 
aggregate and sift and data mine any source of information about the populace 
that it can get its hands on"11. 
As fabricators of fact, no-blank lists have become technoscientific industries in 
their own right, ways of doing and seeing that are extremely costly, both economically, 
and in terms of their degradations of human beings to information bits, highly susceptible 
to misidentification and the 'inconveniences' of being placed in guilty-before-proven 
innocent contexts. Furthermore, despite having thus far provided no 'return-on-
investment', no-blank lists are increasingly being seen as so critical to ensuring 'freedom 
of movement' and 'security' in a highly uncertain world, that it appears, they will not be 
given up on lightly. Indeed, we have clearly seen that their use is expanding evermore 
pervasively across an 'unknown,' but ubiquitously connected milieu of circulation— 
Terra Incognita—both fabricating, and giving 'truthful' fact to terrorist realities. 
Double integration, or Good Guys 0, Bad Guys 1 
What is involved in this analysis of mechanisms of power is the politics of truth, 
and not sociology, history or economics (Foucault 2007d, p.3). 
The case of the emergence of the Specified Persons List in Canada, explored in 
the last chapter, epitomizes the creeping pervasiveness and ubiquity of a global 





Canada's no-fly list) are transformed into international standardized schemes (i.e. US no-
fly list practices and policies), which are in turn aligned with standardized global-scale 
information systems (i.e. unification and alignment of many governments no-fly lists in 
global surveillance and policing networks). Furthermore, with the case of no-fly lists, we 
have seen how international forces, particularly those exerted by the United States, are 
acting to cement a common global classification infrastructure that at its core completely 
effaces the boundaries between people, things, and knowledge. Indeed, both the Canadian 
and American no-fly list programs derive from the same technoscientific assumption: that 
a terrorist is functionally equivalent to an information bit, identifiable and controllable as 
it bounces between states, countries, security checkpoints and computer nodes. 
Indeed, no-blank lists derived from the tabulation, sorting, analysis, and coding of 
human beings are becoming evermore pervasive and ubiquitous in our global 
classification society, receding further and further into the fabric of an everyday culture 
that is increasingly turning to lists to manage threats to local, national and global security. 
In this way, the historical legacy of Nazi governmentality's practices of reducing 
individuals to statistical objects with associated values cannot be denied in contemporary 
no-blank list culture. The more the Nazis devised quantitative means and mechanisms for 
differentiating between 'biopoliticaP lives in the Greater Reich, the more social policies 
and programs revolving around empirically reductive and caesuric differentiation 
flourished and became an increasingly taken-for-granted way of seeing and doing 
security and surveillance. Beyond the biopolitics, the historical imperative is clear, 
particularly when propelled into a contemporary analysis: the more comfortable people 
become with the liberty, rights and mobility of their selves being reduced and tracked as 
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worth/risk assessed digital bits, ultimately regulated and policed through lists; the more 
social policies and procedures are accepted and implemented that rely on such reductions 
of people to bits. These are the self-elaborating discursive processes, the double 
integration effects of technoscientifically constructed no-blank list culture. 
But where we can see similar patterns and regularities in today's no-blank list 
culture with Nazi governmentality, there are differences, which at once involve the kinds, 
and scope of information gathered and warehoused in global classifications 
infrastructures—the direct effects of which are the rendering irrelevant of distinctions 
between what Canadian privacy law calls 'identifiable' and 'non-identifiable' personal 
data, and also the twin pillars of 'notice' and 'consent'—and at the same time, how 
automated statistical techniques involving work/risk assessment have come to take center 
stage. Indeed, with increased emphasis on encoding life as worth/risk objects, and 
approaching it as a 'problem in coding,' come self-elaborating policies, procedures and 
practices of mathematically reducing people to scores, and assessing and classifying them 
as risks. According to James Gilden's headline in The Los Angeles Times on November 
19, 2006, such 'Pi in the Sky Math could help protect against terrorism'12. Chronicling 
how 'operations research' follows the numbers in assessing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of current no-fly list screening systems, Gilden writes that".. .there is the 
problem that there is no clear picture of what a terrorist looks like" .' 
'Whenever you divide people into two categories — more suspicious and less 
suspicious — you invite the bad guys to figure out how to get into the 'search-me-
less line'.. .There's this myth that somehow there is a profile of the bad guys, and 
it's not true,' Schneier said. 'There's an enormous danger and enormous insecurity 
12
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in relying on a profile,' Schneier said. 'Pre-identification doesn't really help 
much, so why are we bothering?' 
Despite the assumed reassurance of such screening practices, the terrorist 
continues to remain invisible in technoscientifically constructed no-blank list culture, and 
thus, is faithfully and eternally profiled, stereotyped and constructed as a 'bad guy' in 
need of further policing. Moreover, while such practices have proven to be inefficient, 
no-blank lists can also be thought of as instruments at the disposal of would-be threats, in 
terms of how they can be used oppositionally, as vetting systems for 'terrorist 
candidates.' And in this game, both the digital score and classification are the same: 
Good Guys 0, Bad Guys 1. 
Critics of Secure Flight note that it would be simple for terrorists to probe the 
system, sending their members on flights just to see who would be selected for 
secondary screening. Those who were not selected by the government would 
become the lead candidates for any planned terrorist act15. 
However, despite such problematic conceptions of no-fly lists, and further no-
blank lists, as 'dangerous' technoscientific cultural constructions, in the over 500 news 
articles that appeared in the corpus, only three articles (and one a Fox News television 
report) actually probed deeper into the specific mathematical algorithms and risk 
assessment techniques of watch lists. Quite shockingly, these three reports revealed that 
the 
U.S. federal government is using the Soundex concept to match traveler names 
against the No Fly List. Soundex, developed in 1918 for census analysis, removes 







result is hundreds of "false positive" matches and unnecessary inconvenience for 
tens of thousands of airline passengers16. 
Over and above the disturbing revelation that the US no-fly list program at its 
core engages an inefficient mathematical risk assessment algorithm first developed in 
1 7 
1918, that has never succeeded in 'nabbing a single terrorist,' is the source of this 
information; a Public Relations Newswire for S3 Matching Technologies of Houston18. It 
is even more distressing that the second source of this technoscientific revelation was a 
report filed by Carolyn Canville for FOX News's Houston outlet on February 27th, 2007 
where she too, shockingly revealed the underlying 1918 mathematical algorithm on 
which America's Secure Flight No-Fly List was based1 . Not surprisingly, Canville's 
segment concludes with what is little more than a commercial plug for local Houston-
based S3 Technologies. 
The final report which addressed this story came from the United Kingdom's The 
Register, which ran the following headline on March 14th 2007: "George Bush fingered 
as terrorist by US feds" . This short article ends with a conclusion epitomizing the 
situation: 
16
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Either the terrorist conspiracy has gone deeper than anyone could have thought, or 
the American feds have gone loco, or perhaps the S3 guys are over-egging the 
pudding just a tad. Maybe all of the above. 
But, where such 'news' reports focus on the misidentifications inherent in the use 
of no-blank lists to patrol threats, at no point do they define what a terrorist is, call such 
'truthful' classifications into question, nor raise any criticism of the policies and 
procedures that strip people of fundamental rights and liberties to 'movement' and 
'circulation' on little more than a computationally-derived risk assessment score. Of 
course, the laboratory is taken-for-granted as providing the solution here, and yet again; 
the invisible body of the terrorist is reduced to the eternal catchall-phrase 'bad guy.' 
False matches on a list of 20 names included: Bugs Bunny, Daffy Duck, and 
Mickey Mouse—he matches up with a suspected terrorist named Max Massou. 
And while they're [TSA] busy targeting these false matches, the bad guy could be 
getting away...We could all wind up on the no-fly list! Along with thousands of 
other innocent travelers21. 
But as Canville is quick to reassure us, fortunately 'there is a solution on the 
horizon' and it comes from none other than the laboratory of 'Houston's own S3 
Technologies.' Indeed, the reduction of the identities of individuals to mathematical 
objects, and their subsequent algorithmic worth/risk assessment, and reconstitution on 
security watch-lists—the ethical and moral dimensions of people divested of basic 
liberties and rights in precarious guilty-before-proven innocent contexts on nothing more 
than a score—have little to do with the failings of the US no-fly list program, which 
according to these reports, are merely attributable to approaching security and 
surveillance as a mathematical problem in coding. In these self-elaborating discursive 




the laboratory. Indeed, one such lab, may have already solved the no-fly list 
misidentification conundrum: S3, and their TeraMatch® software technology that 
leverages innovative and patented mathematical algorithms. 
'It's no wonder the No Fly List has never nabbed a terrorist,' said Andrea 
Gillentine, S3's Healthcare Solutions Leader. 'Soundex had 97 false positives 
compared to only 3 turned up by our TeraMatch® technology. It should be pretty 
obvious to everyone why so many people are upset about the No Fly List.22. 
So, quite clearly we have seen, that people are upset with the underlying 
technologies and mathematical algorithms, and the need for their improvement and 
refinement in this technoscientific construction of no-blank lists, paying little to no mind 
to the divesting of their privacy and civil rights and liberties to 'free movement.' 
Terrorists are scary, and only the technoscientific lab can save us! Either that, or the 
'American feds have gone loco'23. Whatever the case, what is taken-for-granted is that 
terrorist threats, and all living beings and things in general, are reducible to worth/risk 
bits, delimited through statistical mechanisms and policed through the operations of no-
blank lists. Indeed, the extent to which these invisible threats lurk all around us, even 
potentially in ourselves—this technoscientifically constructed reality and fear central to 
the technoscientific construction of terrorism—comes right to the fore in Bruce 
Schneier's Forbes Magazine article from January 8th, 2007 entitled 'They're Watching'24. 
"If you read this piece we'll have to kill you," he begins, 
If you've traveled abroad recently, you've been investigated. You've been assigned 
a score indicating what kind of terrorist threat you pose. That score is used by the 
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government to determine the treatment you receive when you return to the U.S. 
and for other purposes as well. Curious about your score? You can't see it. 
Interested in what information was used? You can't know that. Want to clear your 
name if you've been wrongly categorized? You can't challenge it. 
This research argues that the contemporary construction and naturalized 
classification of 'terrorists'—reduced to numbers, assessed as risks, and placed on no-
blank lists—this commitment to categories, scores, and listing—is at once an artifact of 
the ways in which people have been classified on lists as threats since modern Nazi 
governmentality, and at the same time, is a highly provisional and emerging 
phenomenon; wherein never-before imagined global classification infrastructures and risk 
assessment techniques and technologies are leveraged in attempts at pervasive and 
ubiquitous global security and surveillance on a radically re-spatialized globe, where 
populations, milieus of circulation, and predictions of movement rule the day. In this 
way, despite its invisible risk factors and criteria, no-blank list culture requires an 
ongoing commitment to 'black' and 'white' classifications based on profiled factors of 
'risk.' In this way, no-blank lists as technoscientific cultural constructions can be seen in 
all their contradiction: 
• As providing reassurance in a highly insecure but pervasively and ubiquitously 
connected world through the 'truthful' and 'natural' materialization of 'terrorists'; 
• As rendering the terrorist body even more invisible in this milieu of circulation, 
un-localizable in our global classification woodwork; 
• As reinforcing perpetual fears, that threats to 'us' from 'them' are always lurking 
out there, somewhere, on a radically re-spatialized globe, where the solution to 
finding such threats will inevitably come from the technoscientific laboratory. 
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No-blank lists serve: the naturalization of 'terrorist' knowledge 
Officials disclosed that they intended to search for unknown terrorists by buying 
access to commercial repositories of personal data collected about consumers to 
look for any possible link between a passenger and a known terrorist like a 
common address or phone number25. 
Indeed, under a form of contemporary governmentality that swallows information 
up, like phone books, in one big gulp, into the bowels of global classification 
infrastructures, the mislabeling of 'terrorists' and threatening populations—this slippage 
in the production of some of our most critical 'truthful' knowledge—is virtually ensured. 
Furthermore, 'innocents' who are miscategorized, and who suffer at the long arm of such 
assemblages of police, are meant to appease their suffering, through their unwavering 
belief in technoscience; that it is only a matter of time until the laboratory unearths the 
'right' strategy for 'securing' the milieu of circulation. "All of us are anxious to get it 
started as soon as possible," Kip Hawley [US Transport Security Administrator] said of 
the problems of scope the revamped no-fly list program in the US was intended to 
address, with the aim of cutting the overwhelming amount of misidentifications on the 
list down by at least half. "But we are going to get it right before we set an artificial date 
"J ft 
and try to rush to it" . 
Indeed, a timeline for 'getting it right,' the imposition of an 'artificial date,' would 
seemingly be anathema to a never-ending war on terror, in which technoscientific 
discourse further reinforces, validates and self-elaborates itself and its laboratories as 
pivotal in perfecting systems that will inevitably and 'truthfully' classify, calculate, and 
25
 Lipton, Eric. 2007. U.S. Official Admits to Big Delay in Revamping No-Fly Program. February 21. In 
The New York Times: 
http ://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21 /washington/21 secure.html?_r= 1 &refHis&oref=slogin 
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 Lipton, Eric. 2007. 
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predict 'terrorist threats' and their movements. In this way, when it comes to no-blank 
lists as cultural constructions, technoscientific discourse would seem to not only trump 
civil rights and liberties, but also economic practices, as surely we have seen, that despite 
the massive expenditures associated with them, no-blank list programs, like no-fly lists, 
rarely, if ever, yield a return-on-investment. Indeed, if we are to understand no-blank lists 
as cultural constructions of a symbolic model of reality, then it has become apparent 
through this analysis that approaching them from a strictly technoscientific standpoint 
raises several important questions: 
• What kind of correspondence do we presume to exist between the technoscientific 
representation of terrorists on no-blank lists, or in global classification 
infrastructures, and their material corporeal reality? 
• Are the realities of terrorist corporeal threats really reducible to risk assessment 
scores, factored in populations, and classified in global information 
infrastructures, or are they far more provisional in nature, and in this way, 
invisible? 
• What other features of culture determine no-blank list reality? 
• What is the role of language in articulating and popularizing no-blank list culture? 
• Do different representations of no-blank lists and their threatening constituents 
make a difference in no-blank list cultural constructions? 
Three general takes on such questions can be observed in mainstream news 
reporting on watch-lists. Firstly, terrorist threats, whether animate or inanimate, are seen 
as reducible to risk assessment scores; and in this way, a high degree of correspondence 
is assumed between terrorist realities and technoscientific discourse. Secondly, that once 
reduced to risk assessment scores, threatening elements, and in turn terrorist corporeal 
bodies, can be efficiently and effectively controlled (delimited and policed) through their 
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listing in global classification infrastructures. Moreover, the misidentification of 
innocents on watch-lists in such practice is seen as a taken-for-granted reality of 
involvement in a local, national and global 'war on terror'. A problem inevitably 
mediated through the language of technoscientific discourse, wherein the solution to 
misidentification—the perfection of the no-blank list screening of terrorists—is self-
elaborated as exclusively realizable in technoscience's closed-world lab. Thirdly, that our 
experience and knowledge of terrorists is inevitably mediated through our symbolic 
construction of them, as listed objects, housed in global classification infrastructures, and 
circulating in vast milieus of uncertainty. 
Currently, there are pressing and critical reasons for clarifying the concept of no-
blank lists as cultural constructions in this way. In the face of an ever-broadening and 
seemingly never-ending war on terror, the ethical, moral and technical limitations of 
these facile symbolic constructions of'black' and 'white' 'terrorists' that no-blank lists 
reinforce and validate, should by now be emerging as not only obvious, but dangerous. In 
this way, the current terrorist crisis—with its long-term influence over the direction of 
policy, research, legislation and everyday life—makes it all the more imperative to take 
seriously the conceptual clashes between different symbolic conceptions of 'no-blank 
lists' and 'terrorists' (like those presented here) and how these terms can be clearly read 
as technoscientific cultural constructions. 
Displayed in themselves, emptied of all resemblance, cleansed even of their 
colours, visual representations will now at last be able to provide natural history 
with what constitutes its proper object, with precisely what it will convey in the 
well-made language it intends to construct. This object is the extension of which 
all natural beings are constituted—an extension that may be affected by four 
variables. And by four variable only: the form of the elements, the quantity of 
those elements, the manner in which they are distributed in space in relation to 
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each other, and the relative magnitude of each element (Foucault 2001:1970, 
p. 146). 
It is my hope that by highlighting its ancient and historic instrumental role in the 
'naturalization' of 'threatening' classes of people and things, through its techniques for 
visualization and materialization, the list has been revealed as a key site of struggle in the 
production of knowledge: providing the contemporary 'terrorist' with form, establishing 
its quantities, serving the distribution of its elements in relation to each other, and helping 
to delimit, predict and modify magnitudes of knowledge about it. Who (or what) are 'us,' 
and what (or who) are 'them,' and where will 'they' strike next? How are these politics 
that serve to delimit, predict, police and nullify the movement of terrorists established? 
Although the answers to such questions remain fluid and elusive with respect to who 
builds no-blank lists, and how risk is factored, one thing we can be sure of, is that 'us' 
and 'them' can equally be living beings, things, or combinations thereof. 
In this way, of all the stories that could be read from it, the emergence of no-blank 
lists are multiple stories about and object that in many ways does not exist: that of the 
'terrorist'. As Raymond Williams (1976) has shown us, culture encompasses both 
material and non-material meanings; both the concrete objects produced by a cultural 
community (i.e. airports, airplanes, x-ray machines, no-fly lists, terrorists), as well as the 
complex intersection of practices, attitudes, beliefs, ideas, stories and myths that make up 
a culture's way of life (i.e. terrorists are everywhere and we need to exercise extreme 
vigilance in delimiting and policing the movement of these 'unknown' threats). Williams 
also notes that the dichotomous nature of culture does not end there, that it also serves to 
distinguish the material from the spiritual, and further to distinguish human from 
material development—people from objects. 
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In a contradictory era of ubiquitous global connectedness, coupled with high 
uncertainty, and extreme religious and spiritual fundamentalism, the 'truthful' and 
'natural' classification of the terrorist is one that we seem to so want and need to 
materialize and differentiate, that we, in many ways, and particularly through no-blank 
lists, have constructed it ourselves. No-blank lists are pivots of contemporary visions of 
global surveillance and security societies and as such represent a nexus of technologies, 
practices, meanings, stories, and legal, technoscientific and popular discourses that 
reinforce, subvert, intersect and overlap each other. Yet clearly within this miasma of 
densely interwoven meanings and significations, one pivot remains constant, that of the 
ephemeral 'terrorist'—the elusive and oft invisible threat to the Volk—the Jew, or the 
Communist—figuring centrally in the drive towards the streamlining of global 
classification techniques and infrastructures. 
Moreover, the ambiguities inherent in the label 'terrorist'—in how we construct 
'it' as an object of knowledge—can be read as retaining clear traces of Nazi 
governmentality, involving the practice of valuing human life and assessing risks through 
the probing of data-pools as a means and ends to the identification and control of 
threatening elements. Such practices are now deeply sublimated in our classification 
milieus of circulation, but remain clearly palpable in legal security measures such as the 
Canadian Public Safety Act of 2002, which bequeaths the federal Transport Minister with 
the right to take measures to identify individuals who pose risks to aviation security, as 
well as the right to administer and maintain a list of such individuals27. Such fracturing 
social practices involving disaggregating 'threatening' elements from general 
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populations, while highly provisional, are also deeply historical, and so it is not surprising 
that despite ongoing vague definitions of what constitutes a 'terrorist' being presented in 
the national and global press —of this most critical classification and knowledge— 
Canadians implemented a Passenger Protect Program in June 2007 hinging on this 
questionable legacy involving delimiting, policing, and nullifying the movement of 
'threatening' circulating elements—terrorist and other—through lists. 
No-blank lists serve: the reemergence of bare life 
Foucault's (2007) critical theorizing of governmentality has clearly served to 
identify and unloosen key constrictions, blockages, and correlations of power that list 
security technologies pivot in this research. But at the same time, in light of the questions 
of 'human rights violations' which have emerged in this analysis—of the ethical and 
moral quandaries surrounding assemblages of juridical-disciplinary mechanisms for 
policing individual bodies in global entropic milieus of circulation like airports—there 
has also remained a tangible sense of 'bare life' in this state of affairs, which now 
compels us to re-examine the work of Giorgio Agamben (1998). By way of example, one 
of the most covered no-blank list stories worldwide in the time frame studied here was 
about a US citizen who unfortunately contracted a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis 
while honeymooning in Rome and was placed on the US no-fly list while abroad . 
Unable to return from Europe to the United States, and desperate to get home, Andrew 
Hashmi, Sikander. 2007. Clement Confident Despite TB Carriers No-Fly Voyage. May 31. In The 
National Post. http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=b8de6459-l 5bd-4d44-b4b7-
elf558def726&k=87708 
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Speaker, of Atlanta, Georgia, subverted the no-fly list by boarding a plane in the Czech 
Republic, and flying into Montreal, then crossing the US border via land . 
This story first broke at the end of May 2007, and generated over 50 articles in the 
assembled corpus most of which illuminated Speaker's body—reduced, assessed, and 
classified as a risk and threat to the 'health' of US society—as an urgent beacon, or 
signifier, for the unification and streamlining of US and Canadian security measures and 
infrastructures (as well as those of other nations), all in the interest of ensuring the 'free' 
movement of normal populations in secured global milieus of circulation . But in 
another way, Andrew Speaker's body can be read here per Agamben (1998): as pared 
down to its 'bare life,' stripped of its rights to 'freedom of movement,' through the 
fracture of biopolitical caesuras from legal subjects of right, in disciplinary enclosures 
where bodies are stripped of humanity, and unequivocally and brutally policed at all 
times; like those in the Nazi concentration camps. 
Whoever entered the camp moved in a zone of indistinction between outside and 
inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit, in which the very concepts of subjective 
right and juridical protection no longer made sense. What is more, if the person 
entering the camp was a Jew, he had already been deprived of his rights as a 
citizen by the Nuremberg laws and was subsequently completely denationalized at 
the time of the Final Solution. Insofar as its inhabitants were stripped of every 
political status and wholly reduced to bare life, the camp was also the most 
absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts 
nothing but pure life, without mediation (Agamben 1998, p. 170-1). 
For Agamben, the enclosure of the concentration camp as the most absolute 
biopolitical space ever to have been realized extends itself well beyond Nazi Germany. 
Hashmi, Sikander. 2007. Tuberculosis case shows system works, Ottawa says. June 01. Can West News 
Services. In The Montreal Gazette. http://www.canada.com/topics/bodyandhealth/story.html?id=96929015-
7a90-4980-a3ca-2229c840dO2 
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 CNN News Services. 2007. Border Security Scrutinized After TB Patient Slips In. June 1. 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/conditions/05/31/tb.flight/index.html 
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Just as practices surrounding the identification and control of bare life were at the center 
of this modern political formation, inscribed on the bodies of all citizens of the Reich in 
birth, the concentration camp as disciplinary space for the cloistering of bare life can be 
seen as transcending its historical realm too, jumping the barbed-wire fence, propelled 
into contemporary global milieus of circulation. 
The camp as dislocating localization is the hidden matrix of the politics in which 
we are still living, and it is this structure of the camp that we must learn to 
recognize in all its metamorphoses into the zones d'attentes of our airports and 
certain outskirts of our cities.. .The camp, which is now securely lodged within 
the city's interior, is the new biopolitical nomos of the planet (Agamben 1998, 
p.175-6). 
Andrew Speaker's body reduced to an element circulating in an entropic global 
milieu31, in this way, is not only emblematic of Foucault's governmentality, but also is 
evidence of Agamben's contemporary biopolitical caesuras. The layers of the onion that 
shield bare life, stripped away in contemporary zones d'attentes like airports, where 
fractured threatening bodies are policed, quarantined, and their rights as homo sapiens are 
rescinded; all in the interest of protecting the sanctity of the global Volk's 'free' 
movement. Indeed, under a contemporary form of governmentality, which envisions the 
state as an organic membrane with permeable, leaky borders, nested in a global body; 
what need be policed and patrolled at these osmotic outskirts are the bodies of individual 
citizens, circulating in chaotic fashion, but inscribed with the fundamental political unit 
of 'bare life' in birth, and thus, critical sites of contemporary policing. 
Indeed, Agamben argues that the emergence of bare life at the center of modern 
and contemporary biopolitical policing can be traced back to the United States' 
31
 Associated Press. 2007. Andrew Speaker Case Fuels Calls for Tougher Laws on Movement of Patients. 
June 10. Washington DC. Reported on FoxNews.com: 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,279912,00.html 
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Declaration of Rights and Freedoms enacted in 1789, which unequivocally affirms 'that 
'men [sic] are born and remain free and equal in their rights'; and that 'every man [sic] is 
born with inalienable and indefeasible rights.' For Agamben, the emergence of 
'individual human rights' as such, represent a radical shift in the site of sovereignty; from 
divinely authorized royal sovereign, to a dispersed national sovereignty, situated in the 
individual bodies of everyday citizens. "The fact that in this process the 'subject' is 
transformed into a citizen means that birth—which is to say natural bare life as such—for 
the first time becomes the immediate bearer of sovereignty" (Agamben 1998, p. 128). 
Indeed, for Agamben charters of rights and freedoms go hand-in-hand with the practice 
of sovereignty, with each right inscribed on the body forming another layer of protection 
to shield our absolute biopolitical nature; our bare lives, inscribed on us in birth. 
Biopolitical caesuras are essentially mobile, and in each case they isolate a further 
zone in the biological continuum, a zone which corresponds to a process of 
increasing degradation. Thus the non-Aryan passes into the Jew, the Jew into the 
deportee.. .the deportee into the prisoner.. .until biopolitical caesuras reach their 
final limit in the camp.. .Here the wavering link between people and population is 
definitively broken, and we witness the emergence of something like an absolute 
biopolitical substance that cannot be assigned a particular bearer or subject, or be 
divided by another caesura (Agamben 2000, P.84-5). 
In this way, for Agamben 'bare life,' or "the absolute capacity of the subjects' 
bodies to be killed forms the new political body of the West" (Agamben 1998, pi 25). 
With each biopolitical caesura that further divides, layers of rights are shed from bodies, 
until all that remains is bare life. For Agamben, bare life, as such, is the fundamental 
political unit of modern and contemporary existence, an absolute biopolitical substance 
that cannot be further divided, and around which power is fundamentally practiced. 
Whether life is subsumed in Nazi totalitarianism or existence takes shape in western 
liberal democracy, each fracture of people from populations, delimited, listed, and 
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policed as threats, further divests bodies of layers of humanity; ultimately carrying the 
potential to pare them down to this final and absolute indivisible biopolitical substance— 
bare life—their capacity to be killed without conscience. In this way, Agamben's bare 
life propels the corporeal bodies that Foucault subsumed in populations under 
governmentality, back into the spotlight, and into a pivotal role. 
Behind the long, strife-ridden process that leads to the recognition of rights and 
formal liberties stands once again the body of the sacred man with his double 
sovereign, his life that cannot be sacrificed yet may, nevertheless, be killed. 
Today politics knows no value (and, consequently, no non-value) other than life, 
and until the contradictions that this fact implies are dissolved, Nazism and 
fascism—which transformed the decision on bare life into the supreme political 
principal—will remain stubbornly with us. According to the testimony of Robert 
Antelme, in fact, what the camps taught those who lived there was precisely that 
'calling into question the quality of man provokes an almost biological assertion 
of belonging to the human race' (Agamben 1998, p. 10). 
Following on Foucault's governmentality, we could say that Andrew Speaker's 
entire life was reduced to the contamination probability that he posed to the US Volk, and 
other global biopolitical populations, materialized on a no-fly list, and in this way, was 
nothing more than a factor of risk, assigned to an element, circulating in a global milieu 
of circulation, which seeks to subdivide the human species into such categories in the 
interest of ensuring the normal distribution and circulation of populations. But Agamben 
also forces us to acknowledge that there is something else going on here that need be 
unloosened relating to the dehumanizing effects of stripping layers of freedom from 
circulating bodies, classifying, concentrating, and quarantining subdivisions of the human 
species as risks and threats. In other words, through this analysis of how lists serve power 
formations, we are able to see how Foucault's populations and milieus of circulation 
installed through governmentality are in fact, reconcilable with Agamben's 'bare life' as 
the fundamental political unit of contemporary political life. 
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Indeed, since Foucault (2007) understands juridical-disciplinary mechanisms (i.e. 
human rights and freedoms charters) as redeployed in the apparatuses of security, serving 
the free milieus of circulation installed under governmentality, what Agamben (1998) 
brings to this analysis of how lists serve governmentality is an elaboration and 
description of the dehumanizing effects implicit in redeployments of such juridical-legal 
mechanisms. As we have seen with the case of Andrew Speaker, and all the cases of 
misidentification outlined here (or even applied to those interned in Guantanamo Bay 
today), it is precisely because these bodies are divested of humanity, stripped of rights 
customarily attributed to human beings, and yet still remaining biologically alive (and as 
such are extreme signifiers of risk), that bare life can be understood as a part of 
correlations of power that constitute this most critical of classifications of the human 
species: the terrorist, or what Agamben calls homines sacres (homo sacer). 
Those who are sentenced to death and those who dwelt in camps are thus in some 
way unconsciously assimilated to homines sacres, to a life that may be killed 
without the commission of homicide. Like the fence of a camp, the interval 
between death sentence and execution delimits an extratemporal and 
extraterritorial threshold in which the human body is separated from its normal 
political status and abandoned, in a state of exception, to the most extreme 
misfortunes. In such a space of exception, subjection to experimentation can, like 
an expiation rite, either return the human body to life (pardon and the remission of 
a penalty are, it is worth remembering, manifestations of the sovereign power 
over life and death) or definitively consign it to death to which it already belongs 
(Agamben 1998, p. 159). 
In this way, through the case of Andrew Speaker, we can see how homo sacer, or 
sacred man—one who is lacking the rights bestowed on other human beings—resides in 
each and every one of us, and the potential for the exposure of this bare life lies at every 
turn of existence in global milieus of circulation; a double integration, or double 
sovereignty each and every one of us assumes in birth and possesses in life. On the one 
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hand, our sovereignty is sanctified in our bodies at birth and is the foundation of our 
nation-state's legitimacy, which cares for and protects the lives of its citizens through its 
charters of rights and freedoms. On the other hand, our sacred and bare lives can always 
be exposed—that which is illuminated when one violates the sanctity of the biopolitics of 
the nation or globe—when one is divided, classified, and listed as 'dangerous', 'them,' 
'terrorist,' or 'other.' 
Indeed, when individual human rights, freedoms, and liberties to movement are 
removed through the operations of no-blank lists, and when the layers of the onion 
covering sacred life are stripped away; the pivotal contemporary operations of both 
Foucault's governmentality, and Agamben's bare life are further exposed. Like the 
double integration effect characteristic of Foucault's technologies of security, bare life is 
a double sovereignty that is written into our legal constitutions, and is the foundation of 
political life—biopolitical life—inscribed on us at birth: the proud subjects of individual 
human rights; and at the same time, equally subject to their nullification. 
Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who 
its 'sacred men' will be. It is even possible that this limit, on which the 
politicization of the exceptio of natural life in the juridical order of the state 
depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has 
now—in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved 
inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a 
particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of 
every living being (Agamben 1998, p. 140). 
What the case of Andrew Speaker shows us is that the installation of 'secure' 
global milieus of circulation that take as their chief objective ensuring 'freedom of 
circulation' for normal populations, through the delimiting, policing, and nullification of 
the movement of anything that may stand in the way of this objective is a reality of 
contemporary governmentality. At the same time, we are able to see how the 
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redeployment of juridical-disciplinary mechanisms installed by the apparatuses of 
security also produce the 'double integration,' or 'double sovereignty' effect of calling 
into reality human rights and freedoms, inscribed on the bodies of individuals, and at the 
same, nullifying these rights and freedoms in the interest of serving the modus operandi 
of this self-elaborating form of governmentality; 'freedom of movement.' 
"We only have the ability to put people on watch lists coming into our country," 
[Michael] Chertoff [United States Department of Homeland Security Secretary] 
told CNN. "It would have been good if we had a system that allowed us and the 
Canadians to have a common picture.. .The Canadians could have picked up this 
individual (before) getting into Canada, if the two countries had a fully integrated 
system to share information on passengers who pose a health threat," Chertoff 
said32. 
Indeed, the people on the watch lists US Department of Homeland Security 
Secretary Michael Chertoff s describes are fundamentally nothing more that worth/risk 
elements circulating in populations and milieus that can be probed and subjected to 
automated risk assessment techniques and technologies; and subsequently listed as 
'threatening' objects in global classification infrastructures, stripped of some of the layers 
of the onion that shield bare life. Such digital identities are also stripped of any trace of 
humanity, reduced to scores, which serve as the basis for Chertoff s 'common picture'. 
Throughout the coverage into the case of Andrew Speaker's subversion of the US 
no-fly list, Canada's Health Minister Tony Clement refused to comment on whether or 
not the idea of creating a specific no-fly list for people with contagious diseases and 
sharing it with other nations such as the US was an option that would be considered in the 





future to prevent the recurrence of such an incident . The links between a health derived 
no-blank list, and Nazi governmentality's critical practice of nullifying elements that 
posed a health risk to the V61k, is clearly detectable here too. 
Despite the fact that the risk that Andrew Speaker actually posed to the health of 
US society was admitted by Julie Gerberding of the US Centre for Disease Control to be 
low,'.. .but we can't rule out zero'34, this case nonetheless received an inordinate amount 
of worldwide coverage, that inevitably took as its focus the increased urgency for the 
sharing of no-blank lists and their data between nations, further reinforcing the need for 
delimiting, predicting, and policing the movement of elements distributed in populations 
and milieus that pose other kinds of security threats and risks over and above terrorism; 
like health risks. Indeed, in the self-elaborating processes of no-blank list culture, more 
meanings of what is dangerous are inscribed, and at the same time, the bare lives of even 
more innocent citizens are exposed. 
Given Transport Canada's criteria for people's inclusion on the no-fly list as 
strictly pertaining to an individual's involvement in terrorist organizations, or the 
commission of serious life-threatening crimes, how will government officials deal with 
such health-based risks in the future? Will they correlate another no-blank list, or will 
those victimized by contagious diseases be forced into Canadian no-fly list culture's 
procrustean 'terrorist' bed? Will the boundaries between such circulating risky 'health' 
elements and 'terrorists' be completely effaced as they are calculated, predicted, 
Hashmi, Sikander. 2007. Tuberculosis case shows system works, Ottawa says. June 01. Can West News 
Services. In The Montreal Gazette. http://www.canada.com/topics/bodyandhealth/story.html?id=96929015-
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classified and cross-referenced on lists in global classification infrastructures where 
'misidentification' seems to always rule the day? 
In this way, and speaking to the legacy of how lists brought contradiction to 
questions of who constituted a 'Jew' or an 'undesirable' in Nazi governmentality—how 
such knowledge was 'truthfully' classified—today, they can be seen as bringing 
contradiction to questions of who constitutes a 'terrorist'; and how criteria are established 
to factor 'risks,' and place such elements on watch lists. Like the Nazis traced back 
generations in their classifications of 'who' and 'what' constituted the 'Jewish' 
population, fiercely deliberating how far bloodlines needed to go; today, registration data 
leveraged from telephone, email, web and commercial databases are our probed 
contemporary bloodlines—who said what to whom and with what effect—wherein 
'terrorist' movements are established by probing for regularities and patterns between 
individuals in this time honored fashion. In this epic, necessary and never-ending battle 
between 'us' and the 'them', the cost of delimiting and policing the movement of risks to 
security often means that innocent citizens are misidentified and miscategorized. 
We must remember that Canada is not immune to the threat of terrorism and we 
must remain vigilant . 
The unfortunate exposure of the bare lives of innocent Canadians on no-blank 
lists is clearly one of the costs of remaining vigilant to threats of terrorism in the global 
war on terror. Throughout this research a series of articles emerged depicting the trials 
and tribulations of parents whose children had unwittingly been given 'terrorist' names 
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that were contained on no-fly lists36. 'No-Fly list' names cause baby blues' read a 
headline in The Montreal Gazette in the summer of 2006. "It sounds like a joke, but it's 
not funny to parents who miss flights while scrambling to have babies' passports and 
other documents faxed"37. Other headlines like '4-year-old's name on US no-fly list'38 
which told the story off how "the parents of a 4-year-old California boy say their son gets 
treated like a terrorist because his name is on the US government's no-fly list," were 
peppered throughout the assembled corpus. Indeed, the emergence of infants and toddlers 
on no-blank lists can be read as evidence that the contemporary apparatuses of security 
make no distinctions whatsoever when it comes to ensuring 'secure' circulation, even 
between children and terrorists, equally exposing the bare life of all. Indeed, the 
emergence of infants and toddlers on no-fly lists can also be read as further evidence of 
Agamben's (1998) conclusion that we are born into bare life from the get-go; that homo 
sacer, or sacred man—the threatening class of homo sapiens—ones who are lacking the 
rights bestowed on other human beings—resides in each and every one of us, and the 
potential for the exposure of bare life—of the 'them' in 'us'—lays at every turn of 
existence, even for toddlers; a double sovereignty each and every one of us assumes in 
birth and possesses in life. 
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On the one hand, the sovereignty of this 4-year old from California was sanctified 
in his body at birth and is the foundation of his nation-state's legitimacy, which inscribes, 
cares for, and protects his life through charters of rights and freedoms, and the use of 
security tools like no-fly lists. On the other hand, his bare life can always be exposed— 
the boundaries between his identity and those of a 'known terrorist' completely effaced. 
Cases, like that of the 4-year old, misidentified and classified on the no-fly list as a 
terrorist, demonstrate how bare life can be read in the case of no-blank lists as the 
foundation of political life—biopolitical life—inscribed on us at birth—the proud 
subjects of individual human rights; and at the same time, equally subject to their 
removal in powerful global milieus of circulation like airports, policed through 
apparatuses like no-blank lists. 
No-blank list culture as a critical site of struggle 
An example of a no-blank list that could seemingly be read as a site of struggle is 
Canada's do-not-call list. Initiated with Bill C-37 introduced in November 2005 by the 
Canadian Government, the Amended Telecommunications Act gave the Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) the legal authority to establish 
a disciplinary mechanism called a do-not-call list, intended to protect Canadian citizens 
from intrusive telemarketing campaigns aimed at a large swath of populations. Indeed, 
the bill also included provisions to levy penalties for violations on any and all 
offenders . But despite "moving forward with a do-not-call list [which] generated a sigh 
of relief from millions of Canadians fed up with intrusive, unwanted, and inconvenient 
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unsolicited telemarketing calls," competing visions continue to abound as to the nature 
of this list, its operations, meanings, and ownership; in addition to a variety of other 
questions emerging regarding how such a monolithic technology and practice can be 
efficiently and effectively administered in the name of millions of 'innocent' Canadians. 
In the past few months, the do-not-call list details have begun to emerge, with the 
CRTC addressing questions surrounding who will run the list, who will pay for it, 
and who will investigate consumer complaints. While Canadians might expect 
most of those responsibilities to rest with the CRTC, the commission appears to 
have a far different vision, one that involves a near-complete outsourcing of 
responsibilities to Canada's dominant telecommunications companies41. 
Indeed, the ironies inherent in placing the control of the do-not-call list in the 
hands of the problem creating, and ever-offending telecommunications giants themselves, 
speaks to the enormity of industry required around no-blank list culture; how the design, 
development and administration of such 'screening' practices working in the interest of 
'innocent' people, requires massive human effort, and tremendous technological and 
financial administration and resources to maintain, and the CRTC has clearly indicated 
and acknowledged that they could never meet such demands. Moreover, we see another 
example of the double integration effects of list technologies: wherein the corporations' 
(and their laboratories) responsible for the 'problem' of deploying do-call lists delimited 
from elements circulating in the 'public' domain in the waging of massive telemarketing 
campaigns, are the same players who are invoked as responsible for the solution to the 
problem, which is self-elaborated as engaging the equal and opposite technological effect 
of do-not-call lists to nullify their own opposing force. 
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The CRTC was never particularly supportive of the do-not-call list. Indeed, 
Charles Dalfen, the former CRTC chairman, told the Canadian Press in 2004 that 
a do-not-call list was a good idea, but that the commission 'isn't equipped to 
administer such a list and doesn't have the power to enforce it properly'42. 
So where no-blank list culture as a means of opposition to contemporary 
governmentality is clearly out of the hands of ordinary 'innocent' populations of citizens, 
due to the massive and inefficient monolithic scope of such projects, nonetheless, its 
expansion across society continues to be never-ending. Indeed, Kelly Harmon reported in 
The Fredericksburg Free Lance-Star on July 26, 2006 that identities in the United States 
are also now increasingly being checked when people make major purchases, such as 
cars, boats, houses and insurance, as businesses have begun to consult a Homeland 
Security-derived no-buy list to weed out the names of "people and businesses associated 
with drug trafficking, money laundering or terrorism"43. On March 28, 2007 Richard 
Gonzales filed a radio report on the no-buy list for National Public Radio's 'All Things 
Considered' radio news magazine in which he chronicled how the no-buy list is 
increasingly 'snaring regular citizens in its web,' making large purchases difficult for 
those misidentified44. 
Indeed, in an article entitled "Reliance on watch lists can threaten Americans' 
safety" penned by former US Republican Congress Representative Bob Barr (Georgia) 
with Azizah Al-Hibri, which appeared in The Chicago Sun-Times on May 26th, 2007, the 
story of Tom and Nancy Kubbany, who were denied a mortgage because Tom's middle 
name matched an alias known to be used at times by one of Saddam Hussein's sons was 
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detailed . Strongly opposing no-buy list practices, which clearly place people like the 
Kubbanys in guilty-before-proven-innocent contexts, Barr and Al-Hibri write: 
We must be cautious in our use of watch lists. First and foremost, watch lists 
should not be used as "blacklists" to deny employment or other contracts. The 
Kubbanys' mortgage is far from the only example of a company misusing a watch 
list. Watch lists are appropriate only when a lengthy investigation is not possible 
and the potential consequences are extremely grave, as in the case of the no-fly 
list. Even when watch lists are appropriate, reforms are necessary to promote 
fairness and accuracy. Since most people will not know they are on a watch list 
until they experience some harm, it is crucial to maintain accurate lists in the first 
place. The system requires serious front-end reform, including clear written 
standards detailing what evidence is needed to place someone on a list. Watch 
lists can be useful, but only insofar as they are maintained fairly and used 
appropriately. Liberty and security are mutually reinforcing; we can and must 
demand both from our government46. 
Despite such intelligent critical written opposition, that clearly strikes an open-
human standpoint over the closed-world systems approach generally privileged in this 
technoscientific conjunction, still no-blank list culture expands evermore. Barr and Al-
Hibri explicitly argue that watch lists need retain traces of their construction materials 
and builders, and equally adamantly argue for their use only in exceptionally 'grave' 
contexts in a major US news paper; and yet no-blank lists remain unchecked as such. 
Indeed, in a global milieu of circulation where ' You are either with us, or you 're with the 
terrorists!' no-blank lists efficiently and effectively serve this critical discursive 
dichotomy of our time, and with this, so goes their self-elaboration. Indeed, George 
Bush's post 9/11 mantra is as vague as the risk assessment criteria set forth by Transport 
Canada for inclusion on the Specified Persons List. Who is a terrorist? What is a terrorist 
organization? And who has the authority to deem either so? How are such risks factored? 
Barr, Bob and Azizah Al-Hibri. 2007. Reliance on watch lists can threaten Americans' safety Reform is 




While none of the answers to these questions are clear, what is clear is that the 
fabrication of these facts is the field and domain of the technoscientific laboratory, and 
their 'data pool' expertise. Where Transport Canada has seemingly provided quite 
stringent criteria for an individual's inclusion on the Specified Persons List, in 
unequivocally stipulating that this means 'known or suspected involvement in a terrorist 
organization,' what remains completely obfuscated are the criteria, or statistical strategies 
by which organizations are deemed to be 'terrorist' in the first place; how individuals a 
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o f securing' the Tree' movement and distribution of necessary, sufficient, and 'normal' 
elements in populations circulating in entropic global milieus. In this way, the emergence 
of conjunctions of no-blank lists, pervasive global classification infrastructure 
technologies, statistical risk assessment techniques, and their derived scores and 
populations, also indicates a radical new form of global re-territorialization: one that 
began with the economic mechanisms Foucault (2007) describes to counter famines and 
epidemics installed in the eighteenth century; continued through to targeting military 
airplanes in the sky; and ultimately expanded to include the space race. In these vast and 
uncertain milieus, threats are seen as no longer existing in terms of disciplinary two-
dimensional geographical territories, but rather, are seen to reside in living beings, things, 
populations, and knowledge circulating everywhere. 
This re-territorialization has involved shifting the meaning of 'threats' from 
disciplinary spaces and their clearly delimited geographical territories, to individual cases 
circulating in populations, a way of seeing and doing governmentality which clearly 
gained further traction in the wake of the terror attacks of 9/11. Indeed, prior to 9/11, the 
US no-fly list was said to contain some 11 names48, but as of the time of this writing has 
mushroomed to what independent sources estimate to be between 200,000 and 400,000 
names (the precise number has never been stated by the US government who considers it 
a matter of national security)49. More and more, from WWII to 9/11, and beyond, we 
have come to see the globe as one whole contested territory—one milieu of circulation— 
one whole no-fly zone—wherein 'terrorist' threats and risks are understood to be 
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pervasive and ubiquitous 'realities' existing in all dimensions, in need of constant 
delimiting and policing through technoscientific risk assessment practices and unified 
global classification infrastructures. With this transformation, our talk, specifically 
pertaining to the location of terrorists, has shifted from a language of localizable terrorist 
organizations in national territorial zones, to one of threatening individual cases 
circulating everywhere, patrolled by lists. 
In an article appearing in The International Herald Tribune on October 12th, 2007 
entitled 'Canadian airlines rebuke U.S. call for more passenger data,' Ian Austen 
described how the United States Department of Homeland Security is attempting to now 
require that Canadian airlines turn over all information about passengers flying above the 
United States, whether or not the carrier is landing on US soil en route to their 
destination50. Indeed, the no-blank milieu of circulation is so pervasively understood to 
be everywhere, that the United States now demands a vertical reconstitution of geography 
through its no-fly list program's policies and standards: From the two-dimensional realm 
of maps, into the ^-dimensional realm of clouds and satellites, wherein threats, as they 
have been since the Cold War, are seen to lurk everywhere, in the heavens and on earth, 
contained in the bodies of individuals and objects on land, in the air, at sea, and in space. 
In this pervasive, ubiquitous, and entropic milieu, correlations of power seek to effect 
populations, ensuring 'security' through the delimitation and policing of the movement of 
' terrorists ' circulating in milieus installed by the apparatuses of security that serve the 
'best' interests of contemporary governmentality, in the ongoing struggles over the 
constitution of fields, domains, and objects of knowledge. 
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The concept of cultural construction can be understood as follows. It is a way of 
talking about how knowledge is produced and sustained within specific contexts, 
discourses, and cultural communities; it takes for granted metaphor and other 
forms of linguistic representation; it presupposes that ideas are produced out of 
concrete contexts and have concrete effects; it takes for granted hermeneutic 
activity; it is a complex of ideas and operations sustained over time within a given 
community; hence it is institutionalized. Though often confused with idealism or 
more recently with a view that 'discourse is everywhere,' the notion of cultural 
construction is not a matter of arbitrarily envisioning an unknowable material 
reality, but of engaging in highly rcowarbitrary ways with the material world. 
Although meaning is indeed arbitrary and fluid, this does not mean that it is 
arbitrary and fluid within a given signifying system. The predictability and 
stability provided by a given history, society, culture, and set of disciplinary 
conventions are anything but arbitrary (Treichler 1992, p.89). 
Within our cultural constructions of no-blank lists, terrorists are both materialized 
and given meaning; they are rendered nonarbitrary, predictable, and stable, fabricated as 
fact through technoscientific conjunctions. In an age of global uncertainty where the fear 
of terrorists lurking everywhere among us feels increasingly more real, it is no wonder 
that our governments expend great efforts and monies on such technoscientifically 
derived solutions to combating 'evil' that at once provide a sense of reassurance and 
security, and at the same time, continue to preserve our beliefs in the same 
amalgamations of computer technologies, statistical practices, and no-blank lists that 
makes the material realities of terrorists appear to be more stable and controllable—more 
real and true—on a local, national, global, and even universal level. Indeed, recognizing 
that the realities of no-blank lists and their delimited and policed 'terrorists' are 
culturally constructed makes such 'truthful' beliefs impossible. 
Like the realities in the cultural construction of AIDS outlined by Treichler 
(1992), with no-blank list culture, we see a 'division of linguistic labor,' wherein people 
are becoming increasingly more comfortable with ceding the articulation of 'terrorist' 
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realities—their 'black box' definition and constitution—to 'classified' technoscientific 
'data pool' security expertise, ideologies, and systems. Indeed, we have seen that the 
problems and contradictions inherent in identifying and naming individual terrorist 
threats, the misidentifications, and the infringements to privacy, civil rights and liberties 
laws—the exposure of bare life—are all obfuscated by the denotative and disciplinary 
authority of technoscientific discourse. During a period like the current one, where no-
blank list authority can, and is still being challenged, it is with these divisions of 
linguistic and conceptual labor, involved in 'naturalizing' and 'truthfully' classifying, 
naming, and listing 'terrorists,' that opposition must begin. 
The naming of terrorists and the listing of threatening elements in global milieus 
of circulation cannot be approached through the exclusive lens of technoscience and 
black box security criteria's factoring of risk. In Canadian Privacy Commissioner 
Jennifer Stoddart's interventions, and writings like Michael Geist's on the 2007 security 
conference 'Terra Incognita,' as well as those of former Congressman Bob Barr and 
Azizah Al-Hibri, we can see challenges to the technoscientific construction of no-blank 
lists: People trying to get in touch with people, in speaking and writing about a shifting 
privacy landscape, where identity-based screening, over physical corporeal assessment of 
risks, has come to rule the day. As the solution to a global security crisis named, 
practiced, and interpreted through a 'closed-world' technoscientific security lens, this 
investigation into no-blanks lists has served to demonstrate that "the concepts of culture 
and cultural construction encompass both material and nonmaterial phenomena and that 
analysis must emphasize the ongoing interaction and mutual influence between the two" 
(Treichler 1992, p.90). 
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We have indeed seen specifically how the correlations of no-blank lists and their 
constituent 'terrorists' are thoroughly cultural constructions, 'made real' through the 
apparatuses, practices, and worldview of the technoscientific lab, which at once delimits 
and police threats, and at the same time, writes their fiction. With the number of 
misidentifications on no-blank lists continuing to escalate, and still no proof as to their 
efficiency and effectiveness in preventing terrorist acts, the moral and ethical limitations 
of these facile 'good' and 'evil' cultural constructions has hopefully become far more 
evident too. While it has been very useful, in this way, to characterize no-blank lists and 
their constituent terrorists as cultural constructions, it is by no means intended to suggest 
that terrorism is not a serious danger in our time, quite the contrary. In fact, it is has been 
argued here that no-blank list culture and terrorism are mutually constituted, both a 




Conclusion - In lists we trust? 
The dimension in which the population is immersed amongst the other living 
beings appears and is sanctioned when, for the first time, men are no longer called 
'mankind' {la genre humaine) and begin to be called 'the human species' 
(I'espece humaine). With the emergence of mankind as a species, within a field of 
the definition of all living species, we can say that man appears in the first form of 
his integration within biology (Foucault 2007f, p.75). 
It has been argued here that the list is not simply an innocuous tool of everyday 
life for administering and organizing the minutiae of mundane existence, but rather, is an 
instrument, or more precisely a 'security' technology of contemporary governmentality— 
a critical support of juridical-disciplinary mechanisms and assemblages of police—with 
the dual role, and double integration effect, of self-elaborating and securing the classes of 
'factual' knowledge it itself calls into 'truthful' reality. As such, this research has 
unloosened the relations of power that lists associate, which seek to correlate and secure 
natural divisions, categories, and classifications of the human species. In other words, this 
research has revealed the list as a key site of struggle in the constitution of a 'critical' 
field, domain, and object of modern and contemporary knowledge: homo sacer, or the 
'threatening' class of homo sapiens. 
What we have seen in modern, and contemporary correlations of list technologies 
and techniques is that they have, and continue to function to constitute the ongoing and 
necessary production of fundamental, but highly provisional caesuric subdivisions of 
homo sapiens; of 'us' and 'them,' which have been with 'us' since the emergence of 
'natural history.' In this way, we have also seen how a correlate of the kind of 
governmentality installed through the redeployment of list security technologies is the 
appearance of a 'natural' form of knowledge, an order of things, that can only be 
'truthfully' known by the use of the same techniques and methods as in the production, 
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classification, and listing of all scientific knowledge. With the emergence of no-blank 
lists, we have further seen how out of our ever-expanding entropic disorder, the 
fabricated fact of the laboratory serves to both produce a kind of truthful and natural 
technoscientific knowledge, and self-elaborate a series of practices, that are indispensable 
to contemporary governmentality: the delimitation, prediction, and policing of 
'threatening' and 'terrorist' movements. And in this way, we have seen 'a quite particular 
relationship of power and knowledge, of government and science' (p.351), a 'double 
integration' unity that couples power/knowledge and science/decision as an art of 
governmentality that models its decisions on its own self-elaborating effects. 
It will be necessary to arouse, to facilitate, and to laisser faire, in other words to 
manage and no longer to control through rules and regulations. The essential 
objective of this management will be not so much to prevent things as to ensure 
that the necessary and natural regulations work, or even to create regulations that 
enable natural regulations to work. That is to say, it will be necessary to set up 
mechanisms of security. The fundamental objective of governmentality will be 
mechanisms of security, or let's say, it will be state intervention with the essential 
function of ensuring the security of the natural phenomena of economic processes 
or processes intrinsic to population (Foucault 2007b, p.353). 
The emergence of contemporary no-fly lists and no-blank lists—these states of 
intervention—are in many ways, regulations that have been created to enable other 
'natural' regulations to work, specifically regarding the teleological 'freedom of 
movement' of elements and populations that cotemporary governmentality takes as its 
maxim. In this way, this research into how lists serve formations of power, or how lists 
are political technologies and techniques of security, challenges 'us ' to take responsibility 
for the contradictory and problematic nature of technoscientific practices of delimiting, 
predicting, and policing 'threatening' movements of objects; acknowledging that how we 
classify terrorists today is at once historical, and also highly provisional, based on the 
255 
256 
factoring of populations and probabilities. Indeed, it has been argued here that the 
fabrication of such critical knowledge carries immense power, and as such, cannot be 
ceded exclusively to technoscientific discourses and expertise, and their 'black box' 
security criteria, and 'truthful' classifications. 
Inspired by Jack Goody's (1977) conception of 'ancient lists' as 'intellectual 
technologies' and his taxonomy of their operations (administration, organization, and 
knowledge development roles), the research presented here has bifurcated from such 
'structural' communications research traditions, and has analyzed listing practices in 
modern and contemporary formations of power. Propelling the list's critical operations in 
the delimitation, prediction, and policing of 'threatening' populations from out of modern 
history and into a contemporary analysis of power, this research has demonstrated how 
these correlations of the apparatuses of security continue to factor in the construction and 
constitution of a most critical and necessary contemporary object of knowledge: the 
'terrorist.' 
In short, and following on Bowker and Starr's (1999) pithy summation of 
classification systems, I have argued here that: lists need to be re-listed—as 'cultural 
constructions' of security in correlations of power that produce and police 'natural' 'us' 
and 'them' categories of knowledge in the interest of securing the safe, necessary, and 
sufficient movement and distribution of 'normal' elements and populations circulating in 
the 'free' milieus of contemporary governmentality. In this way, we have seen how the 
list serves to 'let things happen'—laisser-faire, passer et aller. 
This explains finally, the insertion of freedom within governmentality, not only as 
the right of individuals legitimately opposed to the power, usurpations, and abuses 
of the sovereign or the government, but as an element that has become 
indispensable to governmentality itself. Failing to respect freedom is not only an 
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abuse of rights with regard to the law, it is above all ignorance of how to govern 
properly. The integration of freedom, and the specific limits to this freedom 
within the field of governmental practice has now become an imperative 
(Foucault 2007b, p.353). 
This research has demonstrated that listing practices are key techniques in the 
integration of freedom as Foucault articulates it, acting to 'secure' the specific limits of 
'freedom of movement,' which is the modus operandi of the field of contemporary 
governmentality. With the event of no-fly lists we have seen how despite abusing privacy 
rights, and equally, their failure to respect 'freedom of movement,' and notwithstanding 
the complete ignorance of how to govern properly they seemingly represent, the 
pervasive and ubiquitous conjunctive web of no-blank list culture continues to spread 
itself further. 
"On the one hand will be a whole series of mechanisms that fall within the 
province of the economy and the management of the population with the function of 
increasing the forces of the state" (p.353). The list is clearly a part of this series of 
mechanisms that take as their chief objective the necessary and sufficient administration, 
organization, development, normalization, and distribution of elements circulating in 
expanding milieus of uncertainty. "Then, on the other hand, there will be an apparatus or 
instruments for ensuring the prevention or repression of disorder, irregularity, illegality, 
and delinquency" (p.353). At the same time, the list has also been revealed as one of 
these policing instruments, not only for delimiting and policing the movement of 'threats' 
to 'disorder,' but also for establishing the 'truthful' and 'natural' category of terrorist, 
further self-elaborating its own praxis in the constitution of this most critical of 
contemporary knowledge. Indeed, as a contemporary phenomenon, the list fully exhibits 
the 'double integration' effects that are the hallmark of the apparatuses of security—a 
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unity that couples power/knowledge and science/decision as an art of this self-elaborating 
form of governmentality. Following on Foucault, with this investigation into how lists 
serve power/knowledge we have seen how 
We can construct the genealogy of the modern state and its different apparatuses 
on the basis of a history of governmental reason. Society, economy, population, 
security, and freedom are the elements of the new governmentality whose forms 
we can still recognize in its contemporary modifications (ibid, p.354). 
As Foucault also argues, not only can we construct the genealogy of the modern 
state on a history of governmental reason, we can also unloosen the relations of power it 
correlates by unpacking and unloosening how political technologies have operated in the 
constitution of fields, domains, and objects of knowledge, and propelling them into an 
analysis of contemporary formations of power. For we have seen how under the Nazi 
regime, a conjunction of juridical-disciplinary mechanisms, redeployed in apparatuses of 
security, coalesced as a governmentality that sought to delimit and police the movement 
of 'threatening' elements circulating in populations, and milieus to an extreme. It was in 
this moment, and under these conditions that Nazi governmentality first deployed the list 
as a pervasive and ubiquitous security technology which produced the double integration 
effect of both calling threats into reality, and at the same time, policing them in a wide 
variety of everyday milieus of circulation, further self-elaborating the extreme 
biopolitical caesura discourses circulating throughout the Third Reich. 
But as our interrogation of the work of Giorgio Agamben (1998) has also 
revealed, the list can equally be characterized as a juridical-legal mechanism under Nazi 
governmentality: one that produced a double sovereignty effect—at once inscribing 
individual rights and liberties from listed charters of rights and freedoms on bodies in 
birth, and at the same time, exposing 'bare life' as the fundamental political unit on 
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which the removal of such rights turn. In other words, under the Nazi regime, the list 
emerged as a pivot of a form of modern governmentality marked at every turn by the 
policing of biopolitical caesuras of 'us' and 'them'—at once a way of seeing and calling 
'threats' into reality, and at the same time, a practical basis for nullifying their movement; 
stripping away the layers of human rights that shield bare life through the policing of 
economic laws of distribution and statistical reason. Indeed, in this investigation into list 
culture, we have seen Agamben's bare life operating in Foucault's governmentality. 
Economic reason does not replace raison d'Etat, but it gives it a new content and 
so gives new forms to state rationality. A new governmentality is born with the 
economistes more than a century after the appearance of that other 
governmentality in the seventeenth century. The governmentality of'thepolitique's 
gives us police, and the governmentality of the economistes introduces us, I think, 
to some of the fundamental lines of modern and contemporary governmentality 
(Foucault 2007b, p.348). 
Throughout this investigation into list culture, the economic operations of 
mathematically and statistically delimiting and predicting the movement of populations, 
and ensuring the regulation and distribution of circulating elements in the 'securing' of 
milieus has been revealed as a practice completely suffused with the politics of policing 
in both modern and contemporary formations of power/knowledge. Indeed, the political 
assemblage of police that enforces delimitations, and patrols the movement of 'freely' 
circulating elements is integrated with an economic 'probabilities' approach, that takes as 
its chief objective 'securing' the 'normal' distribution of elements in populations, all with 
the intent of serving the best interests of a form of governmentality installed and 
regulated by the apparatuses of security. In other words, by unpacking the correlations of 
power that lists underpin, the political economy that epitomizes Foucault's 
governmentality has also been revealed. 
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With the emergence of the modern computer, we have additionally seen how a 
political economy of discourses, characterized broadly as open-human and closed-world, 
operated in conjunction with computer, statistical, and list technologies, installing a 
global milieu of circulation characterized as a space of entropy, in which we would come 
to see ourselves, and our societies as technoscientific cultural constructions of cyborg 
elements and populations, circulating in disordered and ever-expanding environments, 
where the boundaries between people, objects, and knowledge are completely 
eviscerated. In this way, we can say that the political economy of discourses surrounding 
the emergence of modern computers, while ushering in awe-inspiring developments in 
massive assemblages of living beings and machines, also served to increasingly isolate 
cyborgs in global classification infrastructures, subjecting them to evermore pervasive 
and ubiquitous delimitation, policing and nullification. Building on Bowker and Star's 
(1999) research, this thesis has also argued that like classifications, computers, and 
statistics, lists are also pervasive and ubiquitous technologies that are so deeply 
embedded in our working infrastructures that they too have become relatively invisible, 
despite never losing any of their power in the self-elaborating processes of sublimation. 
Just as categories and classifications are culled into global computer and network 
infrastructures, becoming increasingly taken-for-granted ways of seeing and doing 
everyday life, lists too coalesce into working infrastructures, that are integrated into, and 
aligned with local, national, and global security systems. 
In the era of the Cold War, when myths relating to us vs. them were heightened, 
and ultimately transformed into epic global battles between black and white 
classifications of opposing forces, wars, like the contemporary one on terror, began to 
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appear as ongoing and never-ending, further necessitating the self-elaborating operations 
of assemblages of policing involving delimiting, predicting, and nullifying the 
movements of 'unknown' 'threats' through listing practices. Indeed, we have seen 
through our examination of no-fly lists, and no-blank lists, that such cultural 
constructions are receding further and further into our cotemporary techno-social 
woodwork. Securing 'freedom' through the automated, divisive, and dehumanizing 
classification of living beings as measures of worth/risk, circulating in entropic global 
information infrastructures, policed through list technologies, are contemporary practices 
that are clearly on the rise. As computers and statistics have been increasingly deployed 
to comb ever-expanding sets of social data for regularities and patterns of 'threatening' 
living beings and things since World War II, these self-elaborating processes have 
produced the teleological effect of establishing 'natural' and 'global' good versus evil 
relationships, and the further need to redeploy lists to delimit and police the movement of 
threats. 
In this way, this research into how lists have served, and continue to serve, 
formations of modern and contemporary power can be considered as a part of a 
theoretical tradition that concerns itself with manifestations, technologies, and techniques 
of surveillance, or social control. Indeed, much has been written about integrated 
technologies, techniques, and discourses surrounding observing, tracking, and monitoring 
individuals and their behavior in modern and contemporary surveillance culture. 
Beginning with Jeremy Bentham's visions of panopticism in 1791 as historicized by 
Foucault (1995) in Discipline and Punish, continuing with Gilles Deleuze's (1992) short 
but seminal 'Postscript on Societies of Control,' onto Hardt and Negri's (2000) highly 
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influential Empire, and more currently in the work of David Lyon into The Surveillance 
Society (2002), and how The Border is Everywhere (2005), as well as in a slew of other 
contemporary works like Zureik and Salter's (2005) edited anthology chronicling 
contemporary Global Surveillance and Policing. Taken together, this kind of research has 
emerged as a field and domain that concerns itself with technologies of security, 
surveillance, and social control as a disciplinary form of power. 
But this research into how lists serve formations of power has also unearthed the 
indispensable role of mathematical and statistical techniques that factor populations, 
assess worth/risk elements, and generate populations and 'profiles' in the policing of 
milieus that do not prohibit or prescribe, but rather let things happen. In this way, the 
research presented here has examined questions of social control not from the perspective 
of disciplinary enclosures, as has been the focus of much theoretical investigation into 
surveillance culture, but rather, from the standpoint of the political economy of 
governmentality. 
The list serves: future research directions 
'Security' conjunctures, like no-blank lists, have the ability to correlate 
continuously updated and increasingly complex 'profiles' of population segments 
through the operations of what Elmer (2004) has called Profiling Machines. Moreover, 
Elmer and Opel (2006) have taken Elmer's insights into how up-to-the-minute profiles 
provide continuously updated pictures of populations to another level; arguing that it is 
this "invaluable demographic and psychographic information that informs 'what if 
forecasting modes of research" (p.478). Indeed, Elmer and Opel's 'what if forecasts, and 
their attendant 'when then survivor scenarios' draw upon the same dense thicket of 
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global classification infrastructures, and are organized by the same complex 
mathematical algorithms intended to predict the movement of a multiplicity of variables, 
that have been explored in this research into how lists are 'security' technologies that 
serve governmentality. 
Today answers to such questions draw upon a dense and interlinked information 
environment organized by a complex algorithm that predicts ripple effects 
through a multiplicity of variables. The ability to accurately answer 'what if 
questions relies upon the stability of data—the more unstable, abstract, and 
variable the data the less likely one can predict the future. For many infonauts 
predicting future relationships, consumer confidence, market opportunities, 
revenue streams, voting patterns, (etc.) begins by identifying and then subtracting 
risky or unwelcome scenarios and outcomes. Uncertainty is, of course, the very 
first variable to be subtracted (Elmer and Opel 2006, p.477). 
As Elmer and Opel argue, the more 'stable' our global information environments 
become, the more 'future' relationships and movements—'what if/ when then survivor 
scenarios'—of living beings and things can be predicted across a wider swath of 
populations. Indeed, with the emergence of such factored scenarios, the list is seemingly 
further redeployed as a critical security technology for administering and managing the 
entropy of our highly integrated global classification networks, infrastructures, and 
milieus of circulation. Indeed, the next step in this research project will be to examine 
how lists serve everyday and banal milieus of circulation where the perpetual and endless 
operations of assessing and profiling worth/risk factors goes on ad infinitum, including 
contemporary assemblages like social networking sites (i.e. facebook.com & 
myspace.com), listservs, blogs, portals, cellphones, 'free' email services, and search 
engines. How do lists factor in increasingly pervasive and ubiquitous social networked 
spaces that are proliferating like wildfire in very recent times? What are the implications 
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of the classifying force of list culture in the emergence of such contemporary techno-
social phenomena? 
In this way, the future direction of this work will be to turn the research lens from 
the 'zones of higher risk' that lists serve, like the space of aero-circulation, to everyday 
'zones of lower risk' like listservs, blogs, search engines, 'free' email services, and social 
networking sites. Indeed, deployed in such assemblages, lists would seem to continue to 
administer, organize, and develop knowledge as they have long done, and at the same 
time, further serve their critical role as technologies of security that nullify the movement 
of risky elements, but also, and equally, serve the assessment, targeting, and distribution 
of worthwhile elements circulating in global populations and milieus of circulation. 
Indeed, turning the research lens to everyday 'zones of lower risk,' like social networking 
sites, blogs, and listservs will mean delving further into how lists serve operations that 
factor the worth of elements circulating in entropic milieus. 
Building on research like Elmer's Profiling Machines, and Elmer and Opel's 
'what if, when then, survivor scenarios,,' future investigations into list culture also need to 
draw on research into how people's lives are increasingly being consumed in digital 
networks as profit-based content (Shade 2004). Indeed, where collectives are more and 
more blindly aggregated via digital data-mining (Chung and Grimes 2005; Grimes and 
Shade 2005), and are increasingly represented and reduced as ranked lists on blog portals 
and social networking sites (Lovink and Werbin 2007), the power inherent in 
disaggregating people and things from such milieus—the factoring and targeting of 
elements circulating in populations as worthwhile and/or risky—are practices on the rise, 
that continue to remain under-researched. 
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How does the production o f user-generated content,' and profiles, contribute to 
people's ongoing classification and listing? How is the constitution of such knowledge 
used to predict and ensure the 'normal' distribution of elements—their movement—in 
populations circulating in increasingly 'secured' and 'surveilled' milieus? In this way, 
future research into list culture needs to ask how apparatuses of security continue to serve 
'freedom of movement,' albeit now in much more banal, pervasive and ubiquitous 
everyday global milieus of networked circulation? 
It is for these reasons that my future work will begin by probing contemporary 
juridical-disciplinary mechanisms like popular end-user software licensing agreements 
(i.e. google.com's basic end-user agreement), calling into question at the most basic level 
the everyday, taken-for-granted act of clicking 'I Agree.' What are the 'profiling,' 'what 
if/ when then,' and 'listing' consequences of 'agreeing' to use popular social networking 
services and sites? What kinds of 'secure' milieus of circulation do such assemblages 
enable? How do the operations of delimitation, prediction, policing, and the nullification 
of the movement of 'threatening' elements factor in the use of such 'free services'? How 
can people be better alerted to the powerful operations and agendas underpinning their 
use? 
Attempting to answer such questions and raise such awareness, my future 
research into how lists serve may involve the development of a web-based semantic 
interpretation tool that could provide everyday language translations of end-user licensing 
agreements; laypeople explanations and clarifications of the kinds of rights and liberties 
to 'free movement' that are eschewed in registering for and engaging social networking 
services—the kinds of lists their identities will be constituted in. 
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The problems of governmentality and the techniques of government have really 
become the only political stake and the only real space of political struggle and 
contestation (Foucault 2007a, p. 109). 
Where we have seen in this work how 'in lists we are,' future research needs to 
specifically address how through contemporary assemblages of humans and machines in 
digital classification networks, this state of affairs might be more accurately characterized 
by a self-elaborating discourse where the motto is more aptly 'in lists we trust?' From 
'top ten lists,' to 'best of lists,' to our increasing reliance on listed and ranked information 
to navigate the ever-increasing entropy of the internet and contemporary entropic 
networked spaces, we are seemingly relying more and more on these critical instruments 
of security to constitute natural, truthful, everyday knowledge and fact. In other words, 
where this research has unearthed how lists serve the 'truthful' and 'natural' constitution 
of the human species as a classified and subdivided field, domain, and object of 
knowledge, the next challenge for this project will be to investigate the operations of lists 
in more banal, everyday, milieus of circulation installed through the apparatuses of 
security, including the Internet, cellphones, listservs, blogs, 'free' email services, and 
social networking-sites. 
But for now, it is my hope that the power inherent in correlating, classifying, 
predicting, and constituting knowledge through everyday entropic networked 
environments that has been revealed here, has served to rupture some of the critical self-
elaborating processes of contemporary governmentality. Particularly, those that further 
naturalize the ongoing and never-ending segmenting and subdividing of homo sapiens 
into populations of homines sacres. Moreover, it is my hope that this analysis has served 
to dislodge our profound and unequivocal trust in lists. 
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